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Abstract 
Banks are often excluded in corporate finance research mainly because of the regulatory 
concerns. Compares to non-bank firms, banks are heavily regulated due to its special 
economic role of money and the uncertainty. Heavy regulation on banks could reduce the 
information asymmetry between the managers and investor by limiting the behaviour of 
banks at the time of the Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO), and by increasing the incentive 
for banks to avoid excessive risk-taking. Therefore, the market may be less likely to assume 
that bank issued securities signal information that the bank is overvalued compared to their 
non-bank counterparts.  
The objective of this thesis is therefore to examine commercial banks issued securities 
announcement effect. Three interrelated research questions are addressed in this thesis: 1) 
What is the difference in convertible bond announcement effect between banks and non-
banks firm? 2) What is the difference in SEO announcement effect between banks and non-
banks? 3) How do the stringency levels of bank regulation impact on the announcement 
effects of bank issued SEO? 
By using the U.S. convertible bond and SEO data from 1982 to 2012, I find that the bank 
issued a convertible bond and SEO announcement experience higher cumulative abnormal 
return than non-bank. This is consistent with the view that bank regulation reveals positive 
information about banks. Since banks are heavily regulated, the market is less likely to 
assume that the issuance of the convertible bond and SEO by banks signals information that 
is overvalued. These results are robust after controlling for a number of firm-, issue-, and 
market-specific characteristics. These results are robust by considering the different 
categories of non-bank industries by undertaking tests in relation to the differences in the 
CARS upon convertible bond/ SEO across industries, as well as the unbalanced sample 
between banks and non-banks by using the matched sample analysis. However, the relation 
between the stringency level of bank regulation and bank issued securities announcement 
effect may be nonlinear. As hypothesised, I find that bank regulation has an inverted U-
shaped relation with the announcement effect of bank SEO by using the SEO data across 21 
countries from 2001 to 2012. Under a less bank regulation environment, the market reacts 
more positively to the bank SEO announcement for an increase in the level of bank 
regulation. However, the bank SEO announcement effects become more negative if the bank 
regulation becomes too stringent. This inverted U-shaped relationship is robust after I use 
the exogenous cross-country, cross-year variation in the timing of the Basel II adoption as 
the instrument to assess the causal impact of bank regulation on SEO announcement effects. 
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However, the stringency of regulation does not have a significant impact on the 
announcement effects of involuntary bank equity issuance.  
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Chapter 1 Thesis introduction, background and contribution 
1.1 Research background 
Companies and financial institutions that attract new capital have several options. The 
most common sources are external equity and straight debt. Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) 
are sales of stock after the initial publis offering. They are a means to raise funds through 
the sale of stock rather than the issuance of additiona debt. Before the late 1990s, the U.S. 
equity market was dominated by fully marketed SEOs. From 1982 to 2012, SEO issuance 
volumn amounted to $577.55 billion in the U.S., and $47.50 billion was issued by banks. 1  
However, there is also a third category that is used by a large number of companies, 
convertible debt. A convertible bond is a type of bond that the holder can convert into a 
specified number of shares of common stock in the issuing company or cash of equal value. 
Convertible bonds possess characteristics of both equity and debt: they resemble debt 
because they pay a fixed coupon interest. They also resemble equity, because part of the 
price that is paid for them is for the option to exchange the bonds into shares. From 1982 to 
2012, convertible bond issuance volume amounted to $286.93 billion in the U.S., and among 
these $32.11 billion was issued by banks.2 Duca, Dutordoir, Veld, and Verwijmeren (2010) 
find that convertible debt issuance comprised approximately ten percent of total securities 
issuance by U.S. corporations over the last 30 years. According to the Financial Times of 
March 10, 2011 convertible bonds are particularly popular in the current (post financial crisis) 
financial climate. There are also contingent convertible bonds, which became popular in 
2014 to help banks meet Basel III capital requirements. These bonds are slightly different to 
regular convertible bonds in that the likelihood of the bonds converting to equity is 
“contingent” on a specified event, such as the stock price of the company exceeding a 
particular level for a certain period of time. They were the perfect product for 
undercapitalized banks in markets across the globe, since they come with an embedded 
option that allows banks to meet capital requirements and limit capital distributions at the 
same time. Previous research on the convertible bond and seasoned equity offerings find that 
the announcement effects are generally negative (Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Mikkelson 
and Partch, 1986; Lewis et al., 1999, Abhyankar and Dunning, 1999, Burlacu, 2000, 
Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 2007, Ammann et al., 2006. Duca et al., 2012). The negative 
announcement effect generally can be explained by theories from three aspects, information 
                                                 
1 Source: own calculations, based on data from the Securities Data Company’s Global New Issues database. 
2 Source: own calculations, based on data from the Securities Data Company’s Global New Issues database. 
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effects hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984), price pressure hypothesis (Scholes, 1972), and 
capital structure hypothesis (Modigliani and Miller, 1963).  
According to Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection model on security issuance, 
which is based on asymmetric information between managers and investors, investors will 
demand a discount on the security price when firms issue risky securities (including 
convertible bond), because they assume that managers may overvalue the firm and try to 
maximise the wealth of their existing shareholders by trying to sell overpriced equity. 
Scholes’s (1972) price pressure hypothesis suggests that the demand curve for a firm’s shares 
is downward-sloping and that an increased supply of shares decreases their price. Therefore, 
issuing new equity induces a decline in a firm’s stock price. The capital structure hypothesis 
suggests that, with the tax benefits of debt, firms that issue equity may reduce their stock 
price because it reduces firm’s debt ratio (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). 
Empirical evidence suggests that issuing equity induces a large decrease in abnormal 
return, which is between -2.5 to -4.5 percent (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986) while issuing straight debt only induce slightly negative or non-zero 
announcement effect (Dann and Mikkelson, 1984 and Eckbo, 1986).  
However relevant studies on bank-issued securities are very limited (Wansley and 
Dhillon, 1989; Polonchek et al., 1989). The Global Financial Crisis has highlighted the 
importance of adequate bank regulation and supervision. The passage of Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the United States in 2010 triggered an 
extensive debate on the effect of tighter bank regulation. Whereas regulators perceive a 
strengthened bank regulation can promote a more resilient banking sector, practitioners, and 
others cast doubt that the cost of financial regulation may outweigh the benefits (Furlong 
and Kwan, 2000). Dutordoir et al. (2014, p.12) suggest that it would be interesting to 
examine whether the financial firms’ choice for convertible securities is merely driven by 
regulatory concerns since these financial firms are often excluded from convertible bond 
research samples, as is common in corporate finance research. This study focuses on listed 
commercial banks because banks are often excluded in corporate finance research because 
of the regulatory concerns. To my best knowledge, Janjigian (1987) and De Jong et al. (2012) 
are the only other two studies that report the share price reactions on convertible bond 
offerings in firms within alternative industries, including banks. However, neither study 
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focuses on commercial banks nor they provide any explanation of the difference between 
banks and non-banks 
Previous research suggests that, on average, the new equity offerings announced by 
banks is associated with a less negative market reaction than that announced by non-bank 
firms3. Wansley and Dhillon (1989) and Polonchek et. al. (1989) both find the average 
announcement effect of bank equity offerings support the regulation hypothesis that stringent 
bank regulation mitigates the information asymmetry problem and reduces the magnitude of 
the negative announcement effect associated with bank issued common stock. However, 
these two studies only compare the difference between equity announcement effect of bank 
and non-bank firms by looking at the summary statistics, but not considering any differences 
of the characteristics between banks and non-banks. The relatively small sample of 
Polonchek et al. (1989) also suggests that their findings are not conclusive. For example, 
there are merely 41 equity event announcements in Polonchek et al. (1989), and the 
researchers themselves admit that “the sample sizes involved in this study are necessarily 
small” (p.449).  Moreover, both studies’ findings are based solely on the comparison of the 
mean values of the cumulated abnormal return (CAR) over the SEO announcement window 
and ignore the differences in other characteristics between banks and non-banks. These 
characteristics are important in determining the differences in CARs between banks and non-
banks if any.  
1.2 Research questions  
Since prior study on security announcement effect only focuses on non-bank firms and 
excludes banks because they face a different regulatory environment, the objective of this 
thesis is thus to examine the difference of security (equity and convertible bond) 
announcement effects between banks4 and its counterpart non-bank firms. The first research 
question is what is the difference in convertible bond announcement effect between banks 
and non-banks firm? The second question is what is the difference in Seasoned Equity 
Offering (SEO) announcement effect between banks and non-banks? Chapter 3 aims to 
address the first research question by examining convertible bonds, while the second chapter 
aims to address the second question by examining SEOs.  
                                                 
3 Non-bank firms are industrial firms, which do not include non-bank financial institutions. 
4 I use commercial bank, bank, bank holding company interchangeably across the whole thesis. 
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In the third research question, I further study how the stringency level of bank regulation 
impact on the stock price reaction of bank issued SEO. Chapter 5 addresses the third research 
question, which explores the consequences of this ambiguous relation between bank equity 
value and borrowing cost.  
 
1.3 Hypotheses 
The difference between bank and non-bank firms can be documented by three theories. Bank 
regulation hypothesis, different role of bank capital, and the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) 
hypothesis. First, Keeley (1989) argues that bank regulation policy reduces the information 
content that otherwise would be revealed by a security issuance (in general negative), and 
consequently stock announcement effects might be smaller in absolute value for bank SEOs 
than those of non-banks. The regulation also limits the freedom and flexibility of bank 
managers to set the quantity of capital, to choose the type of capital, and to time security 
offerings to take advantage of differential information between the managers and the public. 
Booth et al (2002) find that regulations (of banks and utility firms) reduce the impact of 
managerial decisions on shareholder wealth, and hence help to address the agency conflicts. 
This means bank SEO is less likely to be assumed as overvalued by the market and has less 
information asymmetry problem between managers and investors than a non-bank SEO 
(Polonchek et al., 1989).  
 Second, Polonchek et al. (1989) suggest that, unlike non-banks, banks are monitored 
by both the market and a regulator, and bank capital structure decisions are constrained by 
regulation. Regulators impose minimum capital ratios and restrictions on the types of 
securities that qualify for inclusion in these ratios. The capital requirement forces nks to have 
more of their own capital at risk and may thus have less incentive to invest in high return but 
with the high-risk level project (Hellmann et al., 2001). Furlong and Keeley (1989) analyses 
the theoretical relationships between capital regulation and bank asset risk. They find that a 
higher bank capital ratio does not lead value-maximising banks to increase asset risk. On the 
contrary, more stringent capital requirements reduce the gains to a bank from increasing the 
risk of its asset portfolio. Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) also 
argue that the bank cannot diversify its risk completely because it is owned and managed by 
the same agent. The capital requirement restricts the bank’s risk-return frontier and forces it 
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to reduce leverage and to reconfigure the composition of its portfolio of risky assets. With 
less bank asset risk under capital regulation, investors are more inclined to build up the 
confidence of bank SEO than a non-bank SEO. 
 Finally, banks are perceived to benefit from the government’s implicit too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF) policy. According to the TBTF theory, banks may receive a capital injection when 
in distress or bailouts by the government when deemed “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) (O’Hara 
and Shaw, 1990; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinc, 2011), which increases 
investors’ confidence and demand less discount on the security issued by banks. In principle, 
the government can always close a failing bank as soon as the bank becomes insolvent. In 
practice, the number of options available to regulators for handling the bank insolvency 
problem decreases with the severity of the problem (Hoggarth et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2006). 
Investors may hence require fewer discounts to the SEOs by banks than non-banks given the 
perception of TBTF.  
Hence, I have the following hypotheses, which are tested in chapters 3 and 4 respectively: 
H1: The announcement effect of convertible bond issuance is less negative for commercial 
banks than non-banks. 
H2: The announcement effect of SEOs is less negative for commercial banks than non-banks. 
The aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has led to an increased interest 
in bank regulation. There are two opposing views in the discussion on whether bank 
regulation needs to become more stringent. The first view is that limited liability and flat 
deposit insurance premiums lead to moral hazard in the form of excessive risk-taking 
behavior by banks due to higher bailout expectations.5 According to this view, prudential 
capital regulation forces banks to hold more capital at risk and hence reduces this moral 
hazard by internalizing the inefficiency of gambling (capital at risk effect). The alternative 
view, proposed by Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), argues that bank profits are 
reduced under capital regulation.6 These reduced profits imply lower franchise values, which 
in turn lower incentives for making good loans, thereby increasing the moral hazard problem 
(franchise value effect). Both theoretical and empirical evidence on the relationship between 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Gorton and Huang (2004) and Dam and Koetter (2012). 
6 The reduction in profits is partly caused by increased competition, as argued by Hellman et al. (2000). It may 
also be caused by banks’ “underinvesting” in loans with positive net present values (Stanton, 1998). 
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bank regulation and moral hazard as well as its consequence on bank risk-taking behavior 
are ambiguous.7   
Banks with opaque assets have private information unknown to outside investors and 
regulators (Haggard and Howe, 2012; Jones et al., 2012). Capital regulation and other types 
of regulation that directly monitor bank behavior, such as activity restrictions, entry barriers, 
and depositor protection, may induce truthful revelation by banks (Baron and Besanko, 
1984). This revelation of private information by banks has a potentially important 
implication for the announcement effects of SEOs because, in general, the market perceives 
that SEO announcements signal firm overvaluation (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, on 
one hand, under a mild bank regulation environment, the market perceives that more 
regulation helps reduce moral hazard and risk-taking by banks. Hence, the market will react 
more positively to an SEO announcement by a bank compared to a less regulated market. 
On the other hand, if bank regulation becomes too stringent and increases beyond a certain 
level, investors may be concerned that the too stringent regulation reduces the franchise 
value of the bank and hence induces more risk-taking. Given the increased moral hazard 
problem, the market may react more negatively to the bank SEO announcement in more 
regulated markets.  
The previous literature has also highlighted that stringent bank regulation can have 
ambiguous effects on bank performance and risk taking and that it, therefore, may not be 
optimal for all banks. Blum (1999) suggests that over-regulation has two effects on banks. 
First, it lowers bank profits, and the banks have less to lose in the event of a bankruptcy. 
Therefore, banks are likely to increase risks. Second, under a binding regulation environment, 
equity is more valuable to the bank. However, because equity issuance is expensive or even 
impossible for some banks, the only way for a bank to increase equity is to increase risk 
today. Using a comprehensive database on bank regulation and supervision across 107 
countries, Barth et al., (2004) find a negative relationship between various regulation and 
supervision measures, bank development, performance, and stability. Their findings raise a 
red flag with regard to extensive bank regulation and supervisory practices that involve direct 
government oversight of and restrictions on banks. These findings are consistent with the 
“tollbooth hypothesis” of Djankov et al., (2002), which states that regulation is pursued the 
benefit of politicians and bureaucrats. In addition, the cross-country differences in banking 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Furlong and Keeley (1989), Flannery (1989), Repullo and Suarez (2004), and Boot and 
Marinc (2006) for conflicting arguments on the relationship between capital requirements, bank monitoring, 
and risk taking incentives.  
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regulations encourage the flow of bank capital from highly regulated banking markets to 
those less regulated, a phenomenon also referred to as the “race to the bottom” (Barth et al., 
2006; Houston et al., 2012). Hence, the existence of regulation differences across countries 
may limit the banks in more highly regulated banking markets to explore their economic 
opportunities. This evidence is consistent with the notion that a stringent regulation only 
positively impacts bank performance if the benefits of higher standards exceed the costs, 
including both the direct compliance costs and the indirect negative costs due to increased 
risk taking or regulation arbitrage. Thus, if investors view the existing regulation to be too 
stringent and beyond the optimal level, thereby inducing a net moral hazard problem, then 
we expect the market reaction to the SEO announcement to be more pronounced for banks 
operating in these highly regulated countries than for those in less regulated countries. 
Therefore, I try to explore the difference in convertible bond and SEO announcement effect 
between banks and non-banks firm. Furthermore, I also try to explore the consequences of 
this ambiguous relationship on bank equity value and its borrowing cost. In particular, I aim 
to investigate whether and to what extent the market would react differently when banks in 
countries with different levels of bank regulation announce seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). 
H3: there is an inverted U-shaped relation between the stringency of bank regulation and 
bank SEO announcement effects.  
 
1.4 Research approach 
U.S. convertible bond data are used in the first empirical analysis of the thesis (Chapter 
3), which seeks to address the first research question. Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
is used to derive the dependent variable which measures the announcement effect associated 
with the convertible bond. I measure the announcement effect following a standard event 
study methodology. A selection of issue-, firm-, and market-specific variables are included 
in the analysis to control the differences in other characteristics between banks and non-
banks. These characteristics are important in determining the differences in CARs between 
banks and nonbanks. The first research question is then addressed through a series of 
statistical tests and multivariate regression analysis. To test the robustness of the results, 
whether banks experience less negative announcement return in relation to individual 
industries across non-bank firms are also tested. The sample between banks and non-banks 
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are not balanced, which may cause bias in the results. Matching sample analysis is used to 
address the problem of the imbalanced sample between banks and non-banks.  
Chapter 4 is seeking to address the second research question to explore the difference in 
SEO announcement effect between banks and non-banks. The sample of banks and non-
banks SEO data in the U.S. are used in this chapter. The research methodology is the same 
as used in Chapter 3. 
The third research question is then addressed through a series of statistical tests and 
multivariate regression analysis by using the SEO data across 21 countries. Four aspects or 
measures of bank regulation are included in the analysis, which are activity restrictions, 
initial capital stringency, depositor protection, and prompt corrective action. To test the 
overall relationship between the stringency level of bank regulation and the bank SEO 
announcement effect, I collapse these four regulation measures into a single measure of bank 
regulation: total regulation. I match the bank-level information with the bank regulation 
measures to explore the link between bank regulation and the wealth effects associated with 
bank-issued SEOs. 
 The endogeneity between bank regulation stringency and SEO announcement effects 
are also considered. There may be simultaneity existed in this test. For example, the observed 
inverted U-shaped relation between the bank regulation measures and the SEO 
announcement effects may be driven by some unknown factors that have an impact on both 
bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effects, which are not controlled in the 
regression model. Bank regulation tends to be strengthened from various aspects after the 
adoption of Basel II that varies across country and time. Therefore, I use the exogenous 
cross-country, cross-year variation in the timing of the Basel II adoption as the instrument 
to bank regulation stringency in order to assess the causal impact of bank regulation on SEO 
announcement effects.  
To test the robustness of the results, I also consider the impact of involuntary equity 
issuance on the relation between the bank SEO announcement effect and the stringency level 
to bank regulation. Previous research suggests that moral hazard exists mainly in under-
capitalised banks that take excessive risks to exploit risk-shifting benefits of deposit 
insurance. Well-capitalised banks take more risks because they are remote from insolvency 
(Calem and Rob, 1999) or because of factors exogenous to the portfolio decisions, such as 
managerial incompetence or a lack of lending opportunities (Gorton and Rosen, 1996). 
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Hence, the relation between bank capital regulation and bank SEO announcement effects 
may be different between under- (involuntary) and well-capitalised (voluntary) bank 
issuance (Gorton and Rosen, 1996). I include an indicator for involuntary issues and the 
interaction of this indicator with both the linear and the quadratic terms of initial capital 
stringency. 
 
1.5 Contribution 
The findings in this study provide evidence that the bank issued a convertible bond and 
SEO are associated with higher announcement effect than non-bank firms issued. Dutordoir 
et al. (2014, p.12) suggest that it would be interesting to examine whether the financial firms’ 
choice for convertible securities is merely driven by regulatory concerns since these financial 
firms are often excluded from convertible bond research samples, as is common in corporate 
finance research. To my best knowledge, Janjigian (1987) and De Jong et al. (2012) are the 
only other two studies that report the share price reactions on convertible bond offerings in 
firms within alternative industries, including banks. However, neither study focuses on 
commercial banks nor they provide any explanation of the difference between banks and 
non-banks. This study intends to fill this gap and contribute to the literature by exploring 
whether the share price reaction to convertible bond offerings made by U.S. commercial 
banks is significantly different from that of non-bank firms. 
This study also contributes to the debate on bank regulation regarding whether carefully 
designed regulation/supervision/monitoring boosts investor confidence and significantly 
reduces firm equity issuing costs in terms of announcement effects. These results confirm 
the fact discussed in Slovin et al. (1991) that banks are frequent equity issuers, and one of 
the reasons for this frequency may be the lower issuing costs. These results are also 
consistent with the previous literature, which documents significantly higher announcement 
effects of SEOs by another highly regulated utility industry (Smith, 1986). 
This study contributes to the literature by extending Polonchek et al. (1989), who find 
that the mean abnormal returns of bank SEO announcements are higher than those of non-
bank counterparts. The limitations of Polonchek et al. (1989), however, are that it covers the 
period (1975-1984) before the adoption of Basel I in 1988 and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. These important regulation changes 
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should have a significant effect on the stock market behaviour of bank SEOs. The 2007-09 
financial crisis may also change the investors’ perception of firm/bank SEO announcement. 
Their relatively small sample also suggests that their findings are not conclusive. For 
example, there are merely 41 equity event announcements in Polonchek et al. (1989), and 
the researchers themselves admit that “the sample sizes involved in this study are necessarily 
small” (p.449). Another recent study on U.K. rights issues between 1988 and 1998 by Iqbal 
(2008) finds less negative stock market reactions in the rights offerings by financial firms 
compared with industrial firms. However, both studies’ findings are based solely on the 
comparison of the mean values of the cumulated abnormal return (CAR) over the SEO 
announcement window and ignore the differences in other characteristics between banks and 
non-banks. These characteristics are important in determining the differences in CARs 
between banks and non-banks if any. For example, banks that issue SEOs are generally 
larger than non-banks, and the different stock market reactions to the announcement of SEOs 
may simply be caused by the differences in size between banks and non-banks. 
This study also complements to the strand of literature that studies the determinants of 
the announcement effects of bank SEOs. For example, Wansley and Dhillon (1989) find 
negative announcement effects from the issuance of common stock, the magnitude of which 
is similar to that found in the previous literature for utilities and smaller than that of industrial 
firms. Keeley (1989) documents a more negative announcement effect for involuntary bank 
stock issues than voluntary ones during the period 1975-1986, whereas Cornett and 
Tehranian (1994), on the contrary, find that involuntary equity issuance does not convey any 
signal of the firm’s future prospects. Krishnan et al. (2010) find that both undercapitalised 
and well-capitalised banks have a significantly negative mean abnormal return around SEO 
announcements, indicating that investors do not perceive these two types of banks as 
economically different. 
Finally, the findings suggest that there is an inverted U-shaped non-linear relationship 
between the stringency of bank regulation and bank issued SEO announcement effect. In 
this study, I consider the impact of the extent of the stringency of bank regulation on SEO 
announcement effect and focus only on banking industry across the world. To my best 
knowledge, this study is the first empirical analysis of the relationship between bank 
regulation and the announcement effect associated with bank issued equity.  
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This study also has timely implications to the current debate over bank regulation. It 
examines the stock market’s reactions to bank SEO announcement across countries with 
different bank regulation environments and shows that the relation between bank regulation 
and the SEO announcement effect is more complex than previous literature would suggest. 
Though the work does not examine the total benefits and costs of bank regulation to the real 
economy, the results do indicate that over-regulation is harmful to bank’s equity issuing cost 
in terms of SEO announcement effects.  Given that reducing firm’s financial constraints is 
important for the whole economy, countries with highly stringent regulation should rethink 
and redesign their regulatory systems. 
 
1.6 Overall structure of the thesis 
The thesis contains 6 chapters in total. Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on the 
security announcement effect, including the theories of the convertible bond, which 
discussing why firms issue convertible bonds, convertible bond announcement effects, SEOs 
announcement effect, and bank security announcement effect, and also presents and 
discusses the developed hypotheses of the thesis. Empirical results are shown in Chapters 3, 
4, and 5. These three empirical chapters have a similar structure. The chapter begins by 
presenting descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in this study, 
followed by tests of pre-stated hypotheses and related discussion. Robustness tests 
conducted are also discussed. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, providing a summary of the 
research, the contribution, and the limitations of the research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
       This section provides the literature review of previous studies in the research objective 
and the hypothesis development of this study. It reviews the theoretical background on 
convertible bonds and SEO the announcement effects, such as the why firms issue 
convertible bond and theories on the announcement effect of securities announcement effect.  
It also reviews the empirical evidence on the stock market reaction on convertible bond and 
SEO announcement. This chapter also develops and discusses testable hypotheses in relation 
to the previously stated research objective (section 1.3). Since bank regulation can reduce 
the information asymmetry between banks and investors and banks are perceived to benefit 
from the government’s implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy. I have the following 
hypotheses, which are tested in chapter 3 and 4, respectively: 
H1: The announcement effect of convertible bond issuance is less negative for commercial 
banks than non-banks. 
H2: The announcement effect of SEOs is less negative for commercial banks than non-banks. 
I also hypothesize that the impact of the stringency of bank regulation and bank SEO 
announcement effects is not linear. If the stringency of bank regulation exceeds a certain 
level, it may cause excessive risk taking by banks, which leads to more negative SEO 
announcement effects. Hence, I have the third hypothesis: 
H3: There is an inverted U-shaped relation between the stringency of bank regulation and 
bank SEO announcement effects.  
 
 
 This section is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 
2.3 provides the hypotheses development. Section 2.4 summarises the chapter. 
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2.2 Relevant literature 
2.2.1 Theories on convertible bonds: why firms issue convertible bonds? 
 
Companies can attract finance from different sources, such as issuing equity or debt. 
Convertible bonds gain popularity as an alternative source of financing other than equity and 
debt in recent years. A convertible bond is a hybrid security with debt- and equity-like 
features. It is a type of bond that can be exchanged by the bondholders at an agreed-upon 
price for shares of common stock in the issuing company or cash of equal value within a 
predetermined time period. It traditionally appeals to long-only investors looking for 
diversification benefits and indirect participation in equities (Lummer and Riepe, 1993).  
 Theoretical studies on convertible debt predict that a convertible bond, as an indirect 
mechanism for implementing equity financing, is able to mitigate the adverse selection costs 
associated with attracting common equity financing (Green, 1984; Brennan and Schwartz, 
1988; Stein, 1992). There are three major theories on why firms issue convertible bonds, the 
‘back-door’ theory (Stein, 1992), the ‘risk-shifting’ theory (Green, 1984), and ‘sequential-
financing’ theory (Mayers, 1998).  
Back-door theory 
According to the back-door theory, Stein (1992) argues that firms find convertible 
bonds an attractive middle ground between the negative informational consequences 
associated with an equity issue and the potential for costly financial distress associated with 
a debt issue. The primary motivation for issuing convertible bonds is to obtain common 
equity financing at a better price than the issue date stock market price. Stein (1992) provides 
a formal model and gives a suggestion of the motivation for firm issuing convertible bonds. 
Firms facing significant information asymmetries are most likely to use convertible bonds 
as an indirect method for implementing equity financing. Firms may use it to get equity into 
their capital structures ‘through the backdoor’ in situations where informational asymmetries 
make conventional equity issues unattractive. This is because if the market is information 
asymmetric, there will be a lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970). Managers run firms in their 
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own interests rather than maximising stockholders’ wealth. Investors do not know whether 
the firm is willing to invest in a good project or not and consequently, ask for discounts on 
the stock price to compensate the information asymmetry. Therefore, firms with good 
investment opportunity (safer but lower return) may feel it is not worth to issue the equity 
given the heavy discounts.  
The convertible bond provides a financing alternative to the firm that mitigates the 
adverse selection costs of an immediate sale of common equity. It is typically callable after 
the expiration of a call protection period. The backdoor theory focuses on this call provisions 
of the convertible bonds. The firms issuing convertible bonds could force investors to 
exercise their conversion option early, thereby inducing them to swap their bonds for shares 
of stock. In this case, convertible bonds serve as an indirect mechanism for implementing 
equity financing with less adverse price impact than an offering of common stock. Straight 
debt seems to be a financing solution for firms facing information asymmetric problem, but 
Stein (1992) argues that the excessive debt can lead to costs of financial distress. With costly 
distress, a company that is already substantially leveraged will choose convertible financing 
only if it is relatively optimistic about the prospects for its stock price. Because if the stock 
price falls, the firm will be unable to force conversion and left with an even larger debt. 
Stein’s model suggests that convertible bonds would be especially valuable for firms 
(including banks) with the significant information asymmetric problem and high financial 
distress costs. For these firms, common equity is an unattractive financing source because 
its value is very sensitive to the subsequent disclosure of the firm’s private information. 
Convertible bonds allow them to obtain financing immediately through a delayed equity 
offer. 
Risk-shifting theory 
        According to the risk-shifting theory, Green (1984) suggests that investment incentive 
problems associated with debt financing. The wealth transfers from creditors to shareholders 
by the substitution of ‘risky’ for ‘less risky’ operating. Straight debt may be an incentive of 
firms to overinvest in risky but high return project in order to maximise the wealth transfers 
from creditors. If the wealth transfer is large enough, shareholders may even support the 
adoption of negative net present value projects to increase the shareholder’s wealth to the 
detriment of bondholders. Bondholders get the limited coupon but bearing unlimited risk, 
consequently the investors are reluctant to invest in the straight bonds. Therefore, Green 
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(1984) addresses the financing and incentive problems simultaneously and proposes a ‘risk-
shifting’ theory that convertible bonds, unlike straight debt, can reduce the agency costs that 
are caused by bondholders and stockholders conflicts of interest. Bondholders have the right 
to convert the debt into common share, which forces the existing shareholders to share any 
wealth expropriated from bondholders. The conversion features impose a payoff structure 
on the shareholders’ residual claim that reduces the incentive to overinvest in risky projects. 
Since by issuing convertible debt the firm has committed itself to choosing the less risky 
asset, the convertible bonds may be a solution to control distortionary incentives. Therefore, 
firms (including banks) facing significant risk in their investment project and having 
incentive problem are most likely to issue convertible bonds.  
Sequential financing theory 
Mayers (1998) proposes a reason of firms issuing convertible bonds from a different 
perspective. He proposes that firms can use convertible bonds to solve sequential-financing 
problems. He assumes a sequential financing problem involves an investment option with a 
future maturity date and it is costly to issue securities. He examines 289 calls of convertible 
bonds from 1971 through 1990 in the U.S market. Consider a firm at the beginning of the 
first period in a two-period world. The firm requires financing not only for a profitable 
investment project to undertake immediately but also for an investment option that will 
mature at the beginning of the second period.  
Two key factors in making financing decisions are issue costs and overinvestment costs. 
The convertible bond economises on issue costs because conversion leaves funds in the firm 
and reduces leverage when the investment option is valuable. Managers prefer profitable 
projects and get perquisites from firm size. If there is cash available they always invest, even 
when the investment option turns out to be unprofitable. Thus, managers have control over 
funds unless the funds are required by contract to be paid out. This causes the overinvestment 
problem. Issuing a convertible bond that matures at the end of the first period could be a 
good solution for this problem because of it both economies on the second-period issue costs 
and controls the overinvestment problem. The firm could get the fund immediately when the 
bond is constructed if the net present value of the investment option is revealed to be positive. 
If the second-period project turns out to be profitable enough, the bondholders prefer to 
convert at the bond maturity date, leaving the funds in the firm. These funds can be used to 
finance the second-period project, thus economising on the second-period issue costs. The 
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bondholders can choose not to exercise the conversion option and redeem the convertible 
bond and get the fund back if the project turns out to be not sufficiently profitable. This helps 
to control the overinvestment problem. When the maturity date of the investment option is 
uncertain, the call provision allows the firm to force the conversion. Therefore, the firm 
could proceed with its financing plan when the investment option is valuable.  
Chang et al. (2004) provide an empirical evidence of the sequential-financing 
hypothesis advanced by Mayers (1998). They examine the wealth effect of the 
announcement of convertible bonds from Taiwanese-listed firms within 1990-1999. The 
hypothesis suggests that firms may design their convertibles so that there are sufficient 
internal funds for future investment expenditures so as to avoid the costs of accessing capital 
markets. They find that the issuing firms’ net new financing is not significantly different 
from zero over the life of the convertible bond. Thus, their results provide further support 
for the sequential-financing hypothesis that convertible bond financing is motivated by a 
desire to minimise security issue costs and agency costs of overinvestment for firms with 
promising growth opportunities to finance a sequence of potential investment options.  
In sum, theoretically, firms (including banks) issue convertible bonds mainly because it 
has less informational consequences than equity and less potential for financial distress than 
debt, and it also can reduce the agency costs that are caused by bondholder and stockholder 
conflicts of interest, and help to control the overinvestment problem. There is also extensive 
literature focusing on wealth effect of convertible bond theoretically and empirically. I 
review this literature in the next section.  
 
2.2.2 Theories on the security issuance announcement effect 
Theoretical studies on security issuances announcement effect have different predictions. 
The negative announcement effect hypothesis comes from three aspects, information effects 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984), price pressure hypotheses (Scholes, 1972), and capital structure 
hypotheses (Modigliani and Miller, 1963).  
Information effect hypothesis 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) develop an adverse selection model on security issuance that 
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is based on asymmetric information between shareholders and managers. Since managers 
have more information than shareholders, a company issuing securities for investment 
opportunities sends a negative signal to the market. Therefore when a company issues equity, 
investors demand a discount on the security price, because they assume that managers may 
overvalue the firm and try to maximise the wealth of their existing shareholders by trying to 
sell overpriced equity. As Ross’s (1977) signalling model predicts, a company issuing 
securities for investment opportunities sends a negative signal to the market. Therefore when 
a company issues risky securities (including convertible bond), investors will demand a 
discount on the security price, because they assume that managers may overvalue the firm 
and try to maximise the wealth of their existing shareholders by trying to sell overpriced 
equity. According to these models, the announcement of convertible issues is associated with 
a negative future abnormal return. Miller and Rock (1985) also suggest that changes in 
outside financing are signals to investors of opposite changes in firm’s current earnings. 
They predict that equity issues have negative stock price reaction since they are perceived 
as releasing negative information about the firm’s cash flows. 
Price pressure hypothesis 
Scholes’s (1972) price pressure hypothesis suggests that the demand curve for a firm’s 
shares is downward-sloping and that an increased supply of shares decreases their price. 
Therefore issuing new equity induces a decline in a firm’s stock price. However some later 
studies (Loderer and Zimmermann, 1988; and Loderer et al., 1991) point out that if the 
demand functions for different stocks are not identical and firms do not face the same initial 
price-quantity combinations, downward-sloping demand curves can generate almost any 
cross-sectional relation between changes in stock price and the number of shares outstanding. 
Capital structure hypothesis 
Capital structure hypothesis is based on redistribution of firm value among classes of 
security holders, tax effects, and leverage-related information effects (Modigliani and Miller, 
1963; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; and Masulis, 1980a, 1980b, 1983). With the tax benefits 
of debt, firms that issue equity may reduce their stock price since it reduces the firm’s debt 
ratio. Moreover, Galai and Masulis (1976) argue that an unanticipated reduction in financial 
leverage will make debt less risky, resulting in a transfer of wealth from shareholders to 
bondholders. The choice of a firm’s capital structure may convey management’s 
expectations about the firm’s prospects (Ross, 1977). Therefore a higher debt ratio is to 
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convey a positive signal to the market and shows an optimistic management expectation 
concerning future cash flows, but more equity issues send a negative signal to the market 
and may reduce a firm’s stock price.  
 
2.2.3 Theories on positive security issuance announcement effect 
Other literature, however, suggests that the equity announcement could have positive 
wealth effect if there is favourable information associated with the investment. Trueman 
(1986) predicts that capital expenditure increases will be associated with a positive stock 
price reaction. In contrast to the negative information effect, equity issues can also be 
interpreted as favourable news about the firm’s investment opportunities. Since the 
additional capital must be committed by the existing shareholders, equity issues attest to the 
shareholders’ confidence in their own firm’s future. Hence, equity issues can be seen as a 
signal that the firm has new projects with positive net-present-value (NPV), causing a 
positive re-evaluation of the firm’s shares. The larger the issue size, the larger the NPV, and 
the higher stock price reaction. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) assume that managers are 
motivated to maximise current shareholder wealth through the acceptance of positive net 
present value. Therefore, investors adjust its market value upwards if there is any unexpected 
increase of capital expenditure of the firm is announced and vice versa. They find that on 
average stock price rise approximately one percent with capital expenditure increases and 
fall approximately one percent with capital expenditure decreases. 
 
2.2.4 Empirical evidence on convertible bond announcement effects 
 There is an extensive literature on stock market reactions to the announcement of 
convertible bond issues. Empirical studies generally find negative abnormal stock returns 
associated with the announcement of convertible bond issues. For example, this evidence 
has been found in the U.S. (Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Lewis 
et al., 1999; Duca et al., 2012), Australia and the U.K. (Abhyankar and Dunning, 1999), 
France (Burlacu, 2000), Western European markets (Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 2007), 
Germany and Switzerland (Ammann et al., 2006).  
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 In particular, Dann and Mikkelson (1984) provide evidence on the valuation effect of 
the issuance of convertible debt. They analyse the average daily common stock prediction 
errors centre around the announcement date of 132 convertible debts from 124 different U.S. 
firms over the time period from 1970 through 1979. They argue that the negative common 
stock valuation effect does not appear to be systematically related to the estimated leverage 
change induced by the added convertible debt, the extent to which the proceeds are used for 
new investment or to refinance existing debt, or possible under-pricing of the new offerings.
 Mikkelson and Partch (1986) examine the stock price effects of security offerings of 
360 U.S. firms from 1972 to 1982 and find that the type of security is the only significant 
determinant of the price. Their result shows that the announcement of convertible bonds 
offering gives a statistically significant negative valuation effect on stock price, supporting 
Myers and Majuf’s (1984) argument that offerings of common stock and convertible debt 
are met with a less favourable price response than are offerings of straight debt. In Myers 
and Majuf (1984) model, the type of security conveys information about the values of the 
firm’s investment opportunities and assets in place. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) also 
suggest that market participants tend to infer that the market price is too high whenever an 
offering of common stock or convertible debt is announced.  
 Duca et al., (2012) find that the average abnormal stock returns of convertible bonds 
announced between 1984 and 1999 is -1.69%, the announcement effects of convertible 
bonds over the period 2000-2008 are more than twice as negative (-4.59%). They suggest 
that evolution is attributable to a shift in the convertible bond investor base from long-long 
investors towards convertible arbitrage funds. These funds buy convertibles and short the 
underlying stocks, causing downward price pressure. They also find the average 
announcement effects of convertible bonds issued during the Global Financial Crisis are 
even more negative (-9.12%), because of a combination of short-selling price pressure and 
issuer, issue, and macroeconomic characteristics associated with these offerings. 
 Zeidler et al., (2012) find U.S. convertible bonds issued during 1980-2002 have 
negative announcement effect (-1.7%). They suggest that convertible bond issuers 
experience a sharp increase in their systematic risk prior to issuance, and a sharp decrease 
after issuance. Henderson and Zhao (2014) find the announcement effect of U.S issued 
convertible bond are generally negative. They also find that the announcement returns are 
2.5% higher when convertible bond issuers simultaneously repurchase shares or purchase 
call options. Announcement effects are 1.7% lower when issuers simultaneously sell SEO.  
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 The literature on convertible bond announcement effect in European markets also find 
negative wealth effect. Lewis et al. (1999) examine the excess returns for 203 convertible 
bonds issues from European countries over the period from 1977 through 1984 by using the 
security choice model and show that the announcement of convertible bonds has negative 
wealth effect on common stock excess return. Burlacu (2000) find during January 1981 and 
February 1998, France issued convertible bonds generally have a negative announcement 
effect (-0.34%). Ammann et al, (2006) find a negative announcement effect (-1.61%) of 
convertible bonds issued by Germany and Switzerland from January 1996 to May 2003. 
They both argue that stock returns around convertible bond announcements are negatively 
affected by the offering’s equity component size. Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007) find 
the abnormal stock returns around Western European convertible bond announcements 
between January 1990 and December 2002 on average is -1.35%. They suggest that stock 
returns around convertible bond announcements are more positive during hot convertible 
markets. During hot convertible bonds, convertible bond announcement returns are less 
affected by firm-specific and issue-specific characteristics. 
 Using a sample of 4,148 convertible bonds issued over 1990-2009 by companies listed 
in 35 countries, de Jong et al., (2012) find the average abnormal return around the 
announcement date of convertible bonds is -0.55%.  They suggest that stock returns around 
convertible bond announcements are less negative for convertibles issued in short-sale 
constrained countries and time periods. 
 Other literature finds that there is less negative abnormal stock return or even positive, 
in some countries, such as Japan, the Netherlands, Australia and Taiwan. Christensen et al 
(1996) find that convertible bond offerings the Japanese capital market received neutral 
stock price responses. Their sample consists a total of 139 events of security issuance from 
1984-1991, and there are 36 convertible bond announcements among them. By using mean-
adjusted returns model in the event study, they detect no significant results of the stock price 
in offering convertible bonds. For the Dutch financial market, De Roon and Veld (1998) use 
a standard event study methodology to analyse 47 convertible bonds announcement from 
January 1976 to December 1996. They measure the abnormal return using the Ordinary 
Least Squares market model regression and find that the average abnormal stock returns are 
positive but insignificant around the announcement day. Suchard (2007) find Australia 
issued convertible bonds during 1980-2002 on average have a positive announcement effect 
(0.84%). Chang et al. (2004) find the abnormal stock return and the announcement of 
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convertible bonds are positively related by examining 109 from 86 Taiwanese-listed firms 
within 1990-1999.  
Lee and Loughran (1998), and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) both find generally 
the U.S. convertible bonds have a negative announcement effect in the long run. They 
suggest that convertible bond issuers significantly underperform their stock benchmarks in 
the long run. Lee and Loughran (1998) also suggest that these is a decline in the operation 
performance of convertible bond issuers in the years following the offering.Janjigian (1987) 
includes 1393 convertible bonds issued between 1968 and 1983 issued by the U.S. firms in 
his study and documents significantly negative abnormal returns in association with 
announcements of convertible bonds issued by financial firms. But this study does not 
provide any explanation of the difference between banks and non-banks. 
In chapter 3, I explore the difference in convertible bond announcement effect 
between banks and non-banks. The results are consistent with previous studies that both 
banks and non-banks issued convertible bonds have negative announcement effect. I also 
find banks issued convertible bond has less negative announcement effects than non-banks 
issued. 
  
2.2.5 Empirical evidence on SEO announcement effects 
Previous empirical studies that have investigated the announcement effect of SEOs 
generally find that it has experienced a negative announcement effect on equity issue 
announcement. For US firms, the share price reaction to both firm-commitments 
underwritten offers and rights offers have almost invariably been negative (Mikkelson and 
Partch, 1986; Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; Hansen, 1989; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992).  
Literature focusing on public offers of SEO announcement effects generally finds 
negative stock price reaction to the public SEO announcement. For example, relying on U.S. 
data, Scholes (1972) examines the sample of equity issued from January 1947 to December 
1965 and finds evidence of a permanent price reduction of approximately 2% after the 
announcement of equity issues. He concludes that the demand curve for shares is essentially 
horizontal and finds the price reduction is not associated with the size of the distribution. 
The assumption for this hypothesis is that price pressure should be a temporary phenomenon. 
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The stock prices did not recover within several weeks after the issue date. Therefore, he 
concludes that the price reduction reflects a permanent revaluation of the firm’s shares and 
rejects the price pressure hypothesis, and also argues that the decline is due to a discrete 
information effect. 
 Kraus and Stoll (1972) use the sample of block trades over 10,000 shares carried out on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from July 1, 1968, to September 30, 1969, and they 
have the similar results as Scholes (1972). They also find a small, temporary intra-day price 
decline will substantially be reversed by the end of the day. They suggest that the price 
declines are significantly related to the value of the distribution, but they cannot determine 
whether this relation was due to price pressure or information asymmetry. Dann et al. (1977) 
also use the sample of 2130 block trades of 50,000 shares traded on the NYSE during the 
same sample period as Kraus and Stoll (1972) to investigate this intra-day price decline. 
They find that abnormal trading profits are possible if investors react within 15 minutes of 
the news.  
Jung et al., (1996) examine 192 U.S. equity offerings from 1997 to 1984 and find the 
average abnormal return is -2.70%. They suggest that firms without valuable investment 
opportunities have more negative announcement returns than firms with substantial growth 
opportunities, approximated by high market-to-book ratios. Choe et al., (1993) show that 
SEO announcement effects are negative (-2.42%) by using the common stock issued in the 
U.S. during 1971-1991. They suggest that offer announcement effects are less negative in 
expansionary periods these periods are characterized by the existence of more promising 
investment opportunities and are subject to less moral hazard risk. Lee and Masulis (2009) 
also show that the announcement effects of SEO issued between 1990-2002 are negative (-
2.67%). They suggest that poor accounting information quality is associated with larger 
negative SEO announcement effects. Henry and Koski (2010) examine the U.S. SEO issued 
during January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2006, and find the mean announcement abnormal 
return is -2.3%. Their results show that around SEO issue dates, higher levels of pre-issue 
short selling are significantly related to larger issue discounts for non-shelf-registered 
offerings, which is consistent with manipulative trading. They suggest that SEO Rule 105 
constrains some but not all manipulative trading Moreover, Smith (1986) concludes that 
stock price reaction on average is -3.14% for industrials (-0.75% for utilities) surrounding 
the announcement of a public offering of new equity. Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) 
examine the within-day pattern of common stock returns surrounding the announcements of 
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new issues of equity. Their study uses 218 new issues of common equity offered between 
January 1981 and December 1983 by industrial firms listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchange. They find that there is a large number of transaction, high volume of the 
equity issues in the first fifteen minutes following the equity announcement, and the average 
return is -1.3%. They also find that there is a small, but statistically significant negative 
average returns one hour preceding the announcement of common equity. They conclude 
that the size of the offering, the purpose of the issue and the estimated profitability of new 
investments do not have a significant impact on the stock return. Corwin (2003) finds 
empirical evidence that after seasoned equity offerings announcement, the stock continues 
to experience a negative abnormal return until the offer. He examines the sample between 
1980 and 1998 in the U.S. market and finds significant under-pricing for seasoned equity 
offers 
Early literature focuses on primary issues of seasoned equity in the U.S. market and 
generally find a small stock price reduction associated with the equity issues (Smith, 1977; 
Logue and Jarrow, 1978; Hess and Frost, 1982; Masulis and Korwar, 1986). Hess and Frost 
(1982) focus on the issue date rather than the date that the offering is announced. They 
suggest that the price decline is not associated with the size of the issue. They collect data 
on 152 new issues of common stock by utilities which are listed on the NYSE from January 
1, 1975, to March 1, 1977. But they do not examine the possibility that the price decline 
would be anticipated by investors at the announcement date. Masulis and Korwar (1986) 
examine the stock price adjustments of the equity offerings surrounding the announcement 
date and find the effect is negative. They find that industrial firms issued equity has more 
negative announcement effect than public utilities issued. Similarly, Denis (1994) by 
studying a sample of U.S. industrial firms finds that equity issue announcement effects are 
significantly negative for low-growth firms, but insignificantly negative for high-growth 
firms. Cline, Garner and Yore (2014) examine the U.S. firms issued SEOs announcement 
effects by using the sample between the year 1979 to the year 2011. They find that value-
destroying conglomerates witness SEO announcement returns that are, on average, 1% more 
negative than firms operating more efficient internal capital markets. and Zhao (2014) also 
using the U.S. firms issued SEO data, and find the announcement returns on average is -
7.85%. They suggest that average equity market announcement effects differ when issuers 
conduct concurrent transactions. Consistent with models of adverse selection, concurrent 
transactions that increase the dilutive impact on earnings, thereby making the design more 
equity like, are associated with more negative announcement effects. Gokkaya and Highfield 
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(2014) investigate the information content of registered insider sales in the SEO process 
from 1997 to 2009. They find that initial market reactions and long-run post-issue stock 
performance are negatively related to C-level executive insider sales, but unrelated to 
participation by non-executive insiders. They also find significantly lower post-issue 
abnormal returns (-2.62%) surprises for SEOs with C-level executive sales. 
Banks are often excluded in corporate finance research mainly because of the regulatory 
concerns. Therefore, previous empirical studies on banks issued SEO are very limit. Wansley 
and Dhillon (1989) and Polonchek et. al. (1989) both find the average announcement effect 
of bank equity offerings support the regulation hypothesis that stringent bank regulation 
mitigates the information asymmetry problem and reduces the magnitude of the negative 
announcement effect associated with bank issued common stock. However, these two studies 
only compare the difference between equity announcement effect of the bank and non-
financial firms by looking at the summary statistics. Krishnan et al. (2010) use public offers 
of SEO made by commercial banks in the U.S. over the period 1983 through 2005, to 
understand how opacity and capital regulation interact to determine the timing of bank SEOs 
and their market valuation. They argue that well-capitalised banks’ offers should elicit a 
negative market reaction, but undercapitalised banks’ offers should not. Because SEOs in 
general signal poor future prospects (Cornett and Tehranian, 1994), undercapitalised banks’ 
offers, in contrast, are characterised as non-informative-and are arguably less opaque-
because issuing banks are under regulatory duress and have little choice. However, they find 
a negative announcement effect on stock prices. They argue that the negative abnormal 
returns are due to investor reaction to the opportunistic timing of these equity issuances, and 
find banks wait for an attractive stock price before announcing an equity offering.  
However, other literature finds positive SEO announcement effect in other countries. 
Kato and Schallheim (1993) They investigate Japanese equity issue announcements and find 
that the two-day market model prediction errors for 63 Japanese public equity issue 
announcements during the 1970s are, on average, negative. However, for the 113 
announcements during the 1980s, the average market reaction is positive. The mean 
abnormal return for the entire sample is zero. They suggest that one of the major factors that 
distinguish Japanese firms that issued new equity during these two time periods is their 
relatively high market-to-book-value ratios (means 5.87% and 2.72% respectively, and 
statistically different at the 0.01 level). Chen et al., (2001) find that on average the 
announcements of SEO are associated with positive stock market reactions in Taiwan. They 
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suggest that this positive announcement effect may be caused by the growth potential of 
SEO issuers in Taiwan. 
Other literature finds positive announcement effect for private equity offerings. Wruck 
(1989) provides empirical evidence by using the U.S. market data from July 1, 1979, to 
December 1, 1985, that private sale of equity’s announcement increases shareholder wealth 
by 4.5% on average. They suggest that even though the type of security being issued is the 
same, private and public sales of equity send opposite signals to the market about firm value. 
Private issues are likely to result in a more concentrated ownership structure, the potential 
benefits of which can explain the positive announcement effect. Hertzel and Smith (1993) 
also find significant positive relationship between equity issue announcement and stock 
price reaction. Their results are consistent with the role of private placements as a solution 
to the Myers and Majluf underinvestment problem and with the use of private placements to 
signal undervaluation.  
In chapter 4, I explore the difference in SEO announcement effects 
between banks and non-banks. The results are consistent with previous 
studies that both banks and non-banks issued SEOs have negative 
announcement effect. I also find banks issued SEOs have less negative 
announcement effects than non-banks issued.2.3 Hypotheses 
development 
Compared to non-banks, banks are heavily regulated due to their special economic role 
of money and the uncertainty (Dow, 1996). The heavy regulation on banks could reduce the 
information asymmetry between the managers and investors (Polonchek et al., 1989; Chu, 
1999; and Santos, 2001). The government uses regulation to reduce financial firms’ 
opaqueness by monitoring banks to provide a report with detailed financial information to 
public investors and checking the accuracy of the report (Flannery et al., 2004).  
Different from industrial firms, banks are monitored by both the market and the regulator 
and are constrained in terms of the timing and choice of financing (Polonchek et al., 1989). 
The security issuance process by commercial banks is also frequently mandated by bank 
regulators. The regulatory environment under which banks operate may mitigate much of 
the informational asymmetry between management and investors for securities issuance 
(Wansley and Dhillon, 1989). The reduction in informational asymmetry may be the result 
35 
 
of increased disclosure requirements and/or monitoring by regulators, as well as a reduction 
in the adverse selection problem discussed by Myers and Majluf (1985). They examine the 
stock market response to public security offerings during the year 1978 to 1985 and find that 
common issue by banks also has negative market reactions, but the magnitude of is reaction 
is smaller than that found for industrial firms  
Banks face stringent government regulation, which limits managers’ ability to take 
advantage of the information asymmetry between the issuers and investors (Polonchek et al., 
1989; Chu, 1999; Santos, 2001). First, the disclosure requirement, in general, tends to 
mitigate banks’ opaqueness (Flannery et al., 2004). The government monitor banks to 
provide detailed financial information reported to public investors and check the accuracy 
of the report. Formal enforcement actions for the publication of the financial report directed 
at individual banks have been publicly available since 1989. Investors should be able to 
receive more information on bank financial conditions and quickly impound this information 
into the bank’s stock and bond prices for an effective market discipline (Flannery et al., 
2004).  
 The regulation of bank capital plays an important role in banks’ soundness, risk-taking 
incentives, and the corporate governance of banks (Santos, 2001). The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision has also made efforts to improve transparency in banking and to 
promote more effective market discipline over large financial firms. In Basel II, market 
discipline becomes one of three pillars on which the future banking supervision should be 
based. The recent global financial crisis calls for stringent bank regulation to encounter the 
problems when the market conditions worsened abruptly. Basel III requires banks to hold 
4.5% of common equity (an increase from 2% in Basel II) and 6% of Tier I capital (an 
increase from 4% in Basel II) of risk-weighted assets. The minimum capital as a percentage 
of risk-adjusted assets prevents banks from excessive risk taking (Berger et al., 1995). The 
capital requirement forces banks to have more of their own capital at risk so that they 
internalise the inefficiency of gambling (Hellmann et al., 2001). Banks may thus have less 
incentive to invest in high return but with the high-risk level project, because they do not 
want to put their own money at risk.  
 Literature suggests that a higher bank capital ratio does not lead value-maximising 
banks to increase asset risk. On the contrary, more stringent capital requirements reduce the 
gains to a bank from increasing the risk of its asset portfolio (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). 
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With less bank asset risk, investors are easier to build up the confidence of banks issued 
securities. Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) also argue that the 
bank cannot diversify its risk completely because it is owned and managed by the same agent. 
The capital requirement restricts the bank’s risk-return frontier and forces it to reduce 
leverage and to reconfigure the composition of its portfolio of risky assets. Rochet (1992) 
also argues that the bank may dominate risk aversion when the liability is limited and bank 
capital is exogenously set at a certain level. The capital requirements induce banks to take 
more prudent portfolio or at least the investors perceive banks to do so. The demand of 
sufficient information investors about the issuers and the security may be reduced if investors 
are aware that the firm shareholders have a substantial stake in the firm. The regulation also 
limits the freedom and flexibility of bank managers to set the quantity of capital, to choose 
the type of capital, and to time security offerings to take advantage of differential information 
between the managers and the public. This means the securities issued by banks is less likely 
to be assumed as overvalued by the market and has less information asymmetry problem 
between managers and investors (Polonchek et al., 1989). Therefore, the capital regulation 
gives investors more confidence of the issuers by reducing the possibility of banks to take 
advantage of differential information between the issuers and investors.  
 Unlike non-bank firms, banks are monitored by both the market and a regulator, and 
bank capital structure decisions are constrained by regulation (Polonchek et la., 1989). 
Capital restrictions are established by regulators in the U.S. (the Federal Reserve, the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC) who have access to considerable inside 
information about the banks they regulate. Regulators impose minimum capital ratios and 
restrictions on the types of securities that qualify for inclusion in these ratios. The capital 
requirement forces banks to have more of their own capital at risk so that they internalise the 
inefficiency of gambling (Hellmann et al., 2001). Banks may thus have less incentive to 
invest in high return but with the high-risk level project, because they do not want to put 
their own money at risk. Furlong and Keeley (1989) analyse the theoretical relationships 
between capital regulation and bank asset risk. They find that a higher bank capital ratio does 
not lead value-maximising banks to increase asset risk. On the contrary, more stringent 
capital requirements reduce the gains to a bank from increasing the risk of its asset portfolio. 
With less bank asset risk, investors are easier to build up the confidence of banks issued 
securities. Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) also argue that the 
bank cannot diversify its risk completely because it is owned and managed by the same agent. 
The capital requirement restricts the bank’s risk-return frontier and forces it to reduce 
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leverage and to reconfigure the composition of its portfolio of risky assets.  
 The regulation also limits the freedom and flexibility of bank managers to set the 
quantity of capital, to choose the type of capital, and to time security offerings to take 
advantage of differential information between the managers and the public. This means the 
securities issued by banks is less likely to be assumed as overvalued by the market and has 
less information asymmetry problem between managers and investors (Polonchek et al., 
1989). Regulators also have disclosure requirements on banks, which in general tends to 
mitigate banks’ opaqueness. Investors should be able to receive more information on bank 
financial conditions and quickly impound this information into the bank’s stock and bond 
prices for an effective market discipline (Flannery et al., 2004). They may have more 
confidence on equity issued by banks.  
 The second explanation for the difference between announcement effect of securities 
issued by banks and that issued by non-banks is that banks, particularly large banks, are 
subject to the government’s implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy. Banking is a very 
important part of a free-market economy. In principle, the government can always close a 
failing bank as soon as the bank becomes insolvent. In practice, the number of options 
available for regulators to handle the bank insolvency problem decreases with the severity 
of the problem (Hoggarth et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2006). Banks may receive a capital 
injection when in distress or bailouts by the government when deemed “too-big-to-fail” 
(TBTF) (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinc, 2011), 
which increases investors’ confidence on the security issued by banks. By removing any 
deposit insurance coverage limit, the TBTF policy removes any possibility of bankruptcy. 
Bank’s cost of funds no longer tied to its riskiness, and banks may thus have incentives to 
increase the risk of their operations, which, in turn, should also be associated with higher 
expected returns. In September 1984 the Comptroller of the Currency testified before 
congress that some banks were ‘too-big-to-fail’ and that for those banks total deposit 
insurance would be provided. Non-bank institutions that do not offer deposit services can be 
allowed to fail, as their failure does not endanger the payments system and the conduits 
through which the government carries out monetary policy (Corregan, 1987). All except ten 
of the over 9,000 banks that failed during the Great Depression were single office banks, 
more of which were located in small towns. 
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Larger banks may have better investment and diversification opportunities. Moreover, 
banks will be bailed out by the public government in the case of financial distress, due to the 
TBTF policy (Stolz and Wedow, 2011). While controlling for quality and probability of 
failure, the effect of bank size on the price of uninsured funds can be calculated for evidence 
on the existence and magnitude of the TBTF doctrine, which suggest that regulators are more 
apt to bail out large creditors and equity holders of large failed banks than those of small 
failed banks, and that bank investors take this into account. Thus, all else equal, the risk 
premium on deposits at large banks should be smaller than at small banks if uninsured 
depositors perceive that regulators implement a TBTF doctrine (Hughes and Mester, 1993). 
Lang and Stulz (1992), and Slovin et al. (1999) suggest that there might be a regulatory 
concern that a failing bank potentially reveals information about the whole banking system 
and that this information might cause runs on other banks. Such fears of contagion may delay 
regulatory intervention (Brown and Dinc, 2011).  
Evidence on the significant positive wealth effects accruing to the TBTF banks with 
corresponding negative effects accruing to the non-included banks has been provided by 
O’Hara and Shaw (1990) by using the event study method. 
If the TBTF theory holds, investors may perceive banks to be more stable than non-bank 
firms. Therefore, they may have more confidence in banks issued securities, which may be 
associated with less negative announcement effects upon equity issuance by banks than non-
bank institutions. 
 Based on the literature and these two theories I develop the first two hypotheses as 
follow: 
H1: The announcement effect of convertible bond issuance is less negative for commercial 
banks than non-banks. 
H2: The announcement effect of SEOs is less negative for commercial banks than non-banks 
There is a strand of literature that suggests that bank regulation could have a negative 
impact on the stock price reactions associated with bank issued SEOs. Therefore, the 
relationship between the stringency of bank regulation and bank issued SEO announcement 
effect could be not simply linear.  
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Calem and Rob (1999) suggest a U-shaped relationship between bank capital and 
risk taking, whereby undercapitalised banks first take less risk when bank capital increases 
and then take more risk when bank capital continues to increase beyond a certain threshold. 
Their findings reconcile the two opposite strands of literature that find that on one hand bank 
risk-taking declines with the capital increase and on the other hand that rises with a capital 
increase. Their results also imply that capital-based regulation has a U-shaped influence on 
the risk-taking behavior of banks.  
 Besides the literature that bank regulation has a positive impact on bank-issued 
securities announcement effect, there is also a stream of literature that has highlighted that 
stringent bank regulation can have ambiguous effects on bank performance and risk taking 
and that it, therefore, may not be optimal for all banks. Blum (1999) suggests that over-
regulation has two effects on banks. First, it lowers bank profits and the banks have less to 
lose in the event of a bankruptcy. Therefore, banks are likely to increase risks. Also by 
knowing that in a banking system with more stringent regulation the banks may have more 
potential to issue equities in the future to meet the regulation requirements, investors may 
demand higher discount for the current stock issuance to compensate for the potential loss 
in the sequential SEOs (Gale and Stiglitz, 1989; Solvin et al., 1992). Second, under a binding 
regulation environment equity is more valuable to the bank. However because that equity 
issuance is expensive or even impossible for some banks, the only way for a bank to increase 
equity today is to increase risk today. Using a comprehensive database on bank regulation 
and supervision across 107 countries, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) find a negative 
relation between various regulation and supervision measures, bank development, 
performance, and stability. Their findings raise a flag on extensive bank regulation and 
supervisory practices that involve direct government oversight of and restrictions on banks. 
These findings are consistent with the “tollbooth hypothesis” of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) that regulation has pursued the benefit of politicians and 
bureaucrats. In addition, the cross-country differences in banking regulations encourage the 
flow of bank capital from highly regulated banking markets to those less regulated, a 
phenomenon also referred to as “race to the bottom” (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006; 
Houston, Lin, and Ma, 2012). Hence, the existence of regulation differences across countries 
may limit the banks in more highly regulated banking markets to explore their economic 
opportunities. This evidence is consistent with the notion that a stringent regulation only 
positively impacts bank performance if the benefits of higher standards exceed the costs, 
including both the direct compliance costs and the indirect negative costs due to increased 
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risk taking or regulation arbitrage. Thus, if investors view the existing regulation to be too 
stringent and beyond the optimal level, thereby inducing a net moral hazard problem, I 
expect the market reaction to the SEO announcement to be more pronounced for banks 
operating in these highly regulated countries than those in less regulated countries.  
 Therefore, I develop the third hypothesis: 
H3: there is an inverted U-shaped relation between the stringency of bank regulation and 
bank SEO announcement effects.  
 
2.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter provides the relevant literature review and the development of 
hypotheses used to address the research questions of this study.  The theories on the reason 
for firms issuing convertible bond and theories on the securities announcement effect are 
discussed. This review shows the importance of convertible bond and the reasons that 
securities announcement effect would be negative. Theories on securities announcement 
effect demonstrate the reason that convertible bond and SEO announcement effect should 
be negative. Empirical studies of the stock market reaction of the convertible bond and 
SEO announcement effects are also reviewed in this chapter. It is clear that results of 
previous studies suggest that convertible bond and SEO announcements effect should be 
negative. Added to this, to date, no significant work has considered bank issued convertible 
bond announcement effect. Based on these reviews, I further develop the research 
hypotheses that bank issued securities associated with less announcement effect than non-
bank issued, and there is a non-linear relationship between bank regulation stringency level 
and bank issued SEO announcement effect. The next three empirical chapters test these 
three hypotheses, respectively. 
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Chapter 3 Empirical analysis: Difference in the convertible bond 
announcement effect between banks and non-banks 
3.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of the first hypothesis by comparing the 
convertible bond announcement effect between banks and non-banks. Because convertible 
bond can be structured to mitigate several different combinations of debt- and equity-related 
costs of external finance, an empirical examination of average valuation effects for the full 
issuer universe is likely to be uninformative. Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986) and 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) document that investor reactions to the announcement of 
convertible bond offerings are negative on average, however, these studies ignore the 
heterogeneity between industries, and in particular, they exclude banks from their samples 
due to the special regulation status of financial institutions. This thesis is also motivated by 
the suggestion made in Dutordoir et al.’s (2014, p.12) survey that “another limitation is that 
empirical studies tend to focus on convertibles issued by non-financial corporations. 
Financial firms are often excluded from research samples, as is common in corporate finance 
research. Financials account for a substantial portion of US hybrid securities issuance…It 
would be interesting to examine whether these firms’ choice for convertible securities is 
merely driven by regulatory concerns…”. This chapter intends to fill this gap and contribute 
to the literature by exploring the research question whether the share price reaction to 
convertible bond offerings made by banks is significantly different from that of non-banks.  
 In this chapter, a sample of convertible bond issuance data between January 1982 and 
December 2011 are used to compare the share price reaction of convertible bond issuance 
for U.S. banks and counterpart U.S. non-banks. OLS regression technique is employed to 
test the hypothesis. The findings support the hypothesis that the cumulated abnormal returns 
(CAR) for banks is less negative than the counterpart non-banks. The cumulative abnormal 
return over the three day period (-1, 1) around the issuance for banks is -1.31 percent, that is 
1.42 percentage points higher than non-bank firms and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. The results are robust after controlling for firm-, issue-, and 
market-specific variables. Consistent with Arshanapalli et al. (2005); Duca et al. (2012); 
Loncarski et al. (2009); and De Jong et al. (2011), I also find that arbitrageurs’ activity of 
buying convertible bonds and short selling equities induce significant downward pressure 
on stock price, however, this effect cannot explain the full difference in CARs between banks 
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and non-banks.  
Various statistical tests are carried out to test the robustness of the main results. I attempt 
to explore whether banks experience less negative announcement returns in relation to 
individual industries across non-bank firms. I use eight industry classifications, a rather wide 
definition, to have a reasonable amount of observations available per industry. The results 
offer further credence that banks experience less negative announcement returns on 
convertible bonds announcements in comparison to counterpart non-banks.  
Finally, I consider the bias in the results which may be caused by the un-balanced sample 
between banks and non-banks (88 vs. 2,045). Following Faulkender et al. (2012), the 
matching sample method is used to address this problem. I compare the CARs of banks and 
non-bank firms issued convertible bond by matching each sample banks with a controlled 
non-bank firm on the basis of important characteristics as a robustness test. The results are 
still robust with this alternative methodology, showing that bank issued convertible bond is 
associated with a higher abnormal return than non-banks issued. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. At first, section 3.2 outlines the 
process of quantitative data collection and analysis, including the data sources and the 
sample selection. Section 3.3 presents the research methodology used in this chapter. Section 
3.4 discusses the control variables used in this chapter, including the measure of firm opacity 
and hedge fund arbitrage induced shot-selling (arbitrage demand), which are both related to 
the hypotheses. Section 3.5 outlines the descriptive statistics of depend on, independent, and 
control variables used in the regression models. After that, the estimated OLS results and 
some robustness test results are discussed step by step in section 3.6.  Section 3.7 discussed 
the results of the robustness tests. Finally, section 3.8 provides the overall discussions and 
conclusions.  
 
3.2 Data sources and data selection 
I gather the information necessary for constructing the explanatory variables for the 
empirical tests from the following sources. My initial sample on announcement dates and 
other features consists of all the convertible bond issuances on the US market from January 
1982 to December 2011, which is obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC 
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Platinum) global new issues database. The starting year 1982 was constrained by data 
availability from SDC. The issuing firm's stock price data (eg. share price, stock market 
index etc.) and bank account data (eg. total assets, stock run-up etc.) are collected from 
DataStream. 
The SDC global new issues database reports 4614 convertible bond issuances over the 
period from 1982 to 2011. I apply the following criteria to select offerings for inclusion in 
the final sample: 
- In line with Duca et al. (2012) to simplify the exposition and in order to make the 
results consistent, I only include plain vanilla convertible bond issuance 
observations (e.g. no exchangeable bonds, contingent convertible or mandatory 
convertible bonds, etc.). For a plain vanilla convertible bond, neither the issuer 
is permitted to redeem the bond early nor can the bondholder retract the bond 
prior to maturity. This step further reduces the sample size to be 3016 
observations.  
- Then I narrow the sample by excluding the issuers from the regulated utility 
industry, whose capital structure arrangements and market reactions are found to 
be different from other industries 8  and banks. The issuers’ industries are 
identified by their Standard Industry Classification codes (SIC codes). The utility 
industry’s SIC codes are from 4900 to 4999. Banks’ SIC codes are from 6000-
6199, insurance companies are from 6300-6499.  
- The issuing firm’s daily stock price data for the full calendar year preceding the 
announcement date must be available on Datastream; 
- The offering announcement date must be available on SDC9; 
- The issuing firm’s balance sheet and income statement data for the fiscal year-end 
immediately prior to the announcement date must be available on Datastream. 
 I consolidate multiple issues of convertible bonds by the same firm on the same 
date into one offering. The proceeds are added up to arrive at the total proceeds for that day. 
                                                 
8 Other industries are referred as non-banks in the study, which include manufacturing, wholesale retail, 
services, transportation, telecommunication, and construction. 
9 Following Duca et al. (2012), I use the filing date as announcement date where possible, and issue date 
when filing date is not available. Some of the announcements are time-stamped after the closure of the stock 
market, which is why I also include day +1 in the analysis of convertible bond announcement returns. 
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Then I obtain a data set of 2,133 convertible issues during the sample period. There are 88 
convertible bonds issued by banks and 2,045 convertible bonds issued by non-bank firms. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
I empirically document the convertible bond announcement effect by comparing the 
cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) of banks with those of non-bank firms. The CARs are 
generally measured by standard event study methodology as described in Brown and Warner 
(1985). They measure abnormal returns using the market model. At time t, the market model 
for the i-th security issuer is  
ARi,t =  Ri,t − αi −  βiRm,t+εi,t     (1) 
Where Ri,t is the return for the i–th security issuance on time t and Rm,t  is the return of the 
market on time t. εi,t is the disturbance term. The parameters αi  and βi can be estimated over 
the estimation period by running an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression of the stock 
returns on a constant and the return on the market index. The market return is the rate of 
return on S&P 500, a market-weighted index of the top 500 stocks trading on either of the 
New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. 
Following Duca et al. (2012), I use the 3-day event window (day -1 to day +1)10. The 
announcement day reported by SDC is denoted as day 0, one day before this date is denoted 
as day -1, while one day after is day +1. A 240-day (day -250 to day -10) period for each 
firm is used for the estimation for the abnormal returns by using the market model. The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the 3-days event window are then calculated. CAR 
indicates the extent to which the market adjusts the firm's value in response to the new 
information signal obtained through the firm-related announcement. Equity offerings have 
inherent signalling potential regarding the quality of the issuing firm. When an equity 
offering is announced, these quality-related phenomena will have implications or the 
magnitude of the price reaction around the announcement period. As Ross’s (1977) 
signalling model predicts, a company issuing securities for investment opportunities sends a 
                                                 
10 I also examine the cumulative abnormal return using the alternative event window (-1, 0), (-2, +2), (-5, 
+5). The main results of the study stay the same. 
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negative signal to the market because of the information asymmetry problem between the 
investors and the managers. When a company issues risky securities (including convertible 
bond), investors will demand a discount on the security price, because they assume that 
manager may overvalue the firm and try to maximise the wealth of their existing 
shareholders. Other literature suggests that the equity announcement could have positive 
stock market reaction if there is favourable information associated with investment, since 
the equity issues can be seen as a signal that the firm has new projects with positive net 
present value (Trueman, 1986). Therefore, CARs are expected to be positive or negative 
depending on whether investors overall believe that the event will result in incremental 
positive or negative future cash flows. 
I include firm-, issue-, and market-specific variables in the analysis of convertible bond 
announcement stock returns respectively. The regression model is as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑏,𝑐 =   𝛼 ∗  𝑋𝑏,𝑐 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝑌𝑏,𝑐 +  𝛾 ∗ 𝑍𝑐  +  𝑢𝑏,𝑐                                          (2) 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑏,𝑐  is the CAR of bank b in country c; 𝑋𝑏,𝑐  is a matrix of firm level control 
variables; 𝑌𝑏,𝑐 is a matrix of issue specific variables; 𝑍𝑐 is a matrix of country level control 
variables; 𝑢𝑏,𝑐 is the error term; α, β, and γ are vectors of coefficient estimates.   
 
3.4 Control variables 
I include issue-specific, firm-specific, and market-specific variables in the analysis of 
convertible issues announcement stock returns. Appendix 1 provides the detailed definition 
of each of the variables. All issuer characteristics included in the regression analyses are 
measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the convertible issues announcement date, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
Firm opacity. Theories suggest that banks are more opaque than non-bank firms 
(Morgan, 2002; Iannotta, 2006; Haggard and Howe, 2012), hence banks may have more 
information asymmetry than their non-bank counterparts. Jin and Myers (2006) define firm 
opacity as reduced firm information available to outside investors. Banks deal with money, 
and the risks taken in the process of intermediation are difficult to observe from outside. The 
inherent complexity of banks and the nature of the underlying assets make them opaque 
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(Jones et al., 2012). Slovin et al. (1992) suggest that although there is disclosure requirement, 
banks are not required to disclose information about individual loans. Bank managers have 
the flexibility to adjust the accounting measures of loan portfolio quality to disclose to the 
public. Banks also reports the percentage breakdown of asset portfolios by type of loans (eg. 
Commercial and industrial, highly-leveraged transaction, and cross-border loans), but these 
data do not necessarily convey information about asset quality. Bank managers also have 
ability to adjust the classification of a non-performing loan. They can lend a borrower 
addition funds to ensure sufficient payments to keep a loan from reaching non-performing 
status. These characteristics of the information structure of bank operations limit the 
market’s access to information needed to assess individual bank value and risk, which make 
banks more opaque. 
Theories also maintain that bank loans are opaque because bank managers may 
possess valuable private information about the credit condition of borrowers or the bank’s 
monitoring efforts. This informational opacity increases the difficulty to evaluate bank loan 
quality for rating agencies (Berlin and Loeys, 1988, Diamond, 1991; Kwan and Carleton, 
2010). Campbell and Kracaw (1980) posit that bank lends informational opaque loans, 
because when borrowers have confidential information that they do not wish to disclose to 
the public may choose bank loans. By using Jin and Myers’ (2006) model, which defines the 
opaqueness as reduced firm information available to outside investors, Haggard and Howe 
(2007) examine the relative opacity of banks and find similar results that banks are generally 
more opaque than non-bank firms.  
 The opacity exposes banks and the entire financial system to runs and contagion and 
makes the outsiders unable to distinguish between sound institutions and unsound ones. 
Opacity can result when a firm chooses to withhold information from investors, which 
increases information asymmetry between bank managers and outside investors (Jones et al., 
2012). Jin and Myers (2006) argue that opacity reduces firm-specific information available 
to outside investors and affects the division of risk bearing between firm insiders and outside 
investors. Managers have the ability to rapidly transform liquid bank assets, increasing the 
uncertainty about the underlying profitability and risks of the firm (Myers and Rajan, 1998). 
Since the banks are more opaque, investors may feel they are not sufficiently informed or 
even do not believe the information disclosed. When banks issue convertibles, investors may 
want more discounts on it. Therefore, the announcement of banks issued convertible bond 
may have more negative impact on the abnormal return than non-bank firms.  
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Morgan (2002) provide evidence of bank opaqueness by investigating the relative 
opacity of banks using disagreement between the Moody’s and S&P’s bond-ratings as a 
proxy for uncertainty associated with asymmetric information. He examines the ratings of 
new bonds issued by banks and industrial firms. If a firm is completely transparent, then the 
two major rating agencies should give the same rating regarding the risk of any given bond 
issued by the firm. If bank risk is harder to observe, the ratings given by these two bond-
rating agencies may disagree more often over bank bond issues than non-bank ones. He finds 
that Moody’s and S&P split more often over financial intermediaries, and the splits are more 
lopsided. He finds that banks and insurance firms are inherently more opaque than other 
types of firms. Iannotta (2006) arrives at the same conclusion by using the same analysis 
method, with the sample from European banking industry from 1993 to 2003.  
However, there are contradictory evidence regarding bank opacity. For example, 
Flannery et al., (2004) examine analyst and microstructure data and find that banks are not 
more opaque than industrial firms. Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) examine the 1987 Brazilian 
debt moratorium and show that “the market reacted rationally and penalised banks in direct 
proportion to their exposure to Brazilian debt.” Calomiris and Mason (1997) examine the 
1932 Chicago banking panic and show that although depositors were temporarily confused 
about bank asset quality, they finally make the right decision. The panic did not produce 
significant social costs in terms of failures among solvent banks. Flannery et al. (2004) find 
that there is no difference between market microstructure characteristics of banks and those 
of industrial firms. They evaluate the market microstructure properties of U.S. banking firms’ 
equity, to determine whether or not their assets are more opaque than similar-sized 
nonbanking firms. The results indicate that both large and small bank holding companies 
have very similar trading properties to their matched non-bank firms. Moreover, analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings appear to be more accurate for banks, suggesting that banks are perhaps 
less opaque. But the improved accuracy of analyst forecasts may simply indicate the ability 
of banks to manage earnings (Beatty et al., 2002). In Flannery et al. (2013), a dramatic shift 
in market microstructure characteristics coincided with increased bank opacity in the 2007 
financial crisis. 
Following by Morgan (2002) and Livingston et al., (2007), I consider the difference 
between Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) ratings as a proxy for uncertainty, which 
is used to measure firm’s opacity. If the firm is opaque then its risk is hard to observe, and 
the rating agencies may disagree in ratings over this firm’s issues. Hence, I expect the 
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difference between the ratings given by these two major rating agencies is negatively related 
with the convertible bond announcement return. I control for the issue’s credit rating by 
applying a numerical credit rating transformation similar to Chan and Chen (2007). I assign 
a credit rating value of one to S&P AAA ratings and add a value of one to each subsequent 
rating. Since risk uncertainty should be higher for the lower rated convertible bond issue, I 
assign a value of 1 for the highest rated issue (S&P rating of AAA) and 21 for the lowest 
rated issue in the sample (S&P rating of C). ‘Ratingdiff’ is used to measure this difference. 
This is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the ratings from two rating agencies are 
different and 0 otherwise.  
De Jong et al. (2012) assign a credit rating value of one to S&P AAA ratings and add 
a value of one to each subsequent rating. They assign a value of 19 for the convertible issue 
that is not rated by either credit agency. Loncarski et al. (2009) and De Jong et al. (2011) 
assign a BBB rating to unrated bonds. Bord and Santos (2012) use the lowest rating and 
median rating for the unrated asset-backed commercial paper. Since the SDC database does 
not report both S&P and Moody's rating scores for the majority of the convertible bond 
issues in the sample (i.e, there are only 181 out of 2118 issues which have both S&P and 
Moody's rating scores), I estimate firm opacity by following a two-step approach11. This 
method gives us more accurate result by using the relative possibility of rating difference 
rather than set the missing rating score as a certain number. First, I employ logit model to 
estimate "ratingdiff' dummy variable on a selective firm and issue specific variables (i.e., 
lnTA and proceeds/ total assets) for the convertible bond issues where I have both S&P and 
Moody's rating scores. Second, I apply the estimated coefficients of this regression to those 
convertible bond issues which have either single or no rating agency scores (i.e., the fitted 
values of the regression in the second step).  
Arbitrage-related short selling. Research suggests that hedge fund arbitrage has 
negative impact on convertible bonds’ abnormal return. Convertible arbitrage opportunities 
arise either when convertibles are under-priced or when arbitrageurs can exploit superior 
technology in managing convertible risk (Agarwal et al., 2007). To exploit under-priced 
convertible bond issues, convertible arbitrageurs buy convertible bonds and short the 
underlying common stock. The short selling creates downward pressure on the stock price 
                                                 
11 Goddard et al (2011) use similar method to estimate beta for non-listed banks in the EU area.  
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of the convertible bond issuer (Arshanapalli et al., 2005; Loncarski et al., 2008, Duca et al., 
2012).  
The convertible bonds trading demand tends to move in the opposite direction of the 
convertible bond arbitrage activities. A typical convertible bond arbitrage strategy is that 
convertible arbitrage takes a long position in, or purchases, convertible securities, and 
simultaneously takes a short position in, or sells the same company’s common stock. If the 
company’s stock price falls, the hedge fund will benefit from its short position. On the other 
hand, if the stock price rises, the hedge fund can convert its convertible bonds into stock and 
sell that stock at market value, thereby benefiting from its long position, and ideally 
compensate for any losses on its short position (Choi, et al., 2009). Hence, short selling 
induced by hedging activities explains part of the stock price decline following convertible 
bond issues. Therefore, more hedge fund arbitrage trading on convertible bond induces more 
negative abnormal return. De Jong et al (2012) also provide evidence that a substantial part 
of the announcement date stock price effects associated with recent convertible debt issues 
can be attributed to hedging- induced price pressure. They exploit worldwide differences in 
short-sale constraints, and find positive impact on issue-date abnormal stock returns. The 
effect is stronger in years with higher hedge fund involvement, as well as for offerings 
expected to induce more arbitrage short selling. Henderson (2005) studies the under-pricing 
of convertible bonds at issue, as well as the risk and returns of the convertible bond arbitrage 
strategy. He finds that new issues of convertible bonds are under priced at issuance but that 
excess returns occur soon after issuance (mainly in the first six months). This can decrease 
the presence of convertible bond arbitrageurs over longer horizons.  
While on the other hand, De Long et al (1990) argue that opacity limits informed 
arbitrage, the absence of which creates space for noise trading. If banks are more opaque 
than non-bank firms, arbitrageurs may have to bear a greater risk when hedging the security 
issued by them. To the extent that arbitrageurs are risk averse, the high risk and potential 
ruin from the accumulation of short-term losses reduce their willingness to hedge the 
convertible bond issued by banks (Jones et al., 2012). Therefore, the negative impact of 
hedge fund arbitrage may be significantly less for banks. Consequently, banks issued 
convertible bonds may have less negative abnormal return than non-bank firms. Therefore, 
I expect that banks issued convertible bonds are associated with lower negative abnormal 
return than non-bank firms since less arbitrageurs are willing to buy convertibles issued by 
banks 
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Although I do not have direct data on convertible bond arbitrage activity in individual 
issues, I am able to identify firms and dates on which I know that initial arbitrage positions 
are taken: convertible bond issuance dates. 12 Following Duca et al., (2012), I construct a 
measure of the amount of arbitrage-related short selling associated with each convertible 
bond offering, to test the arbitrage explanation for differences in convertible bond 
announcement returns of bank and non-bank industries. Firstly, I download short interest 
data from the Securities Monthly file of the CRSP-Compustat merged database during the 
sample period from January 1982 to December 2011. Then I scale the change in monthly 
short interest (∆SI) by the number of shares outstanding (SO) measured on trading day -20 
relative to the announcement date.   
 As argued by Choi et al. (2009), part of the observed increase in short interest around 
convertible bond offerings may be attributable to the short-selling actions of fundamental 
traders. Hence, in the second step, I isolate the portion of the ∆SI/SO measure that can 
effectively be attributed to short selling by convertible arbitrageurs by regressing ∆SI/SO on 
potential determinants of convertible arbitrageurs’ interest in that particular convertible 
offering. I take the predicted value of this regression for each convertible bond issue as a 
measure of the change in short interest caused by arbitrage-related short selling for that 
convertible bond, namely, CBarbitrage. 
 I expect convertible arbitrageurs to be more interested in issuers with more liquid 
shares (since high liquidity makes it easier for them to obtain their hedging positions), with 
no dividend pay-outs (since dividends represent a cash outflow for short sellers), and with 
more volatile stock returns (since volatility positively affects the option value of the 
convertible, thus allowing a higher potential profit). I, therefore, consider the Amihud’s 
(2002) measure of illiquidity, a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond issuers 
that paid out a dividend in the previous fiscal year, and the issuer’s stock return volatility as 
potential issuer-specific determinants of the arbitrage demand for convertible bond offerings. 
 Moreover, I expect arbitrageurs’ interest in a convertible bond issue to be affected 
by the characteristics of the offering itself. I predict a larger increase in arbitrage-related 
short interest around offerings for which arbitrageurs need to short-sell a larger number of 
shares to hedge their positions. I, therefore, include the ratio of DeltaNeutral to shares 
                                                 
12 Huang and Ramirez (2010) and De Jong et al (2011) document that announcement and issue dates coincide 
for the majority of U.S. convertible debt offerings. This finding can be attributed to the very fast placement 
of recent convertible bonds (Mitchell et al., 2007; Huang and Ramirez, 2010).  
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outstanding (SO), with DeltaNeutral representing the expected number of shares shorted by 
arbitrageurs following a delta-neutral hedging strategy. The typical convertible bond 
arbitrage strategy employs delta-neutral hedging and consists of two parts. The arbitrageur 
initially buys the convertible bond and sells short the underlying equity at the current delta. 
Next, if the price of the stock increases, the arbitrageur adds to the short position because 
the delta has increased. Similarly, when the stock price declines, the arbitrageur buys stock 
due to the decrease in the delta. 13  
According to Choi et al. (2009), using the change in short interest caused by 
arbitrage-related short selling for that convertible bond as a proxy for arbitrage activity has 
several advantages over using hedge fund databases to estimate convertible bond arbitrage 
activity. First, this provides a measure of positions taken by arbitrageurs in individual 
securities. Fund flows data in hedge fund databases are self-reported and therefore provide 
an incomplete measure of convertible bond arbitrage activity. The databases only partially 
represent the hedge fund universe, with many large funds choosing not to participate. Second, 
there can be style misclassification and funds reporting multiple strategies to hedge fund 
databases. Third, even if I measured the assets of the funds perfectly, the positions would 
still be unobservable due to the use of leverage.  
lnTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, which measures the size of the firm. 
Previous studies (Kang and Stulz, 1996; Abhyankar and Dunning, 1999; Lewis et al., 1999) 
suggest that larger firms are likely to have a lower level of information asymmetry since 
larger firms are more likely to have greater analyst coverage and to undergo greater scrutiny 
by institutional investors. Information asymmetry tends to decrease with firm size 
(Vermaelen, 1981). Large firms may face less information asymmetry because they tend to 
be more mature firms, have established and time-tested disclosure policies and practices, 
and receive more attention from the market and regulators (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). 
Lewis et al. (2003), however, suggest that smaller firm face higher equity-related financing 
costs and the security issue follows a substantial increase in the firm’s stock price. 
Richardson (2000) also suggests larger firm has higher level information asymmetry because 
that larger firm has more incentive for managing earnings to reduce political costs. Therefore, 
I do not have a clear expectation for the relationship between firm size and stock abnormal 
return.  
                                                 
13 The calculation of delta is discussed in Appendix 2 
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         Proceeds/Total assets are the relative size of the convertible bond offering, calculated 
as the offering proceeds divided by total assets. Miller and Rock (1985) theoretically link 
issue size with the strength of a security’s signal to the market. Dutordoir and Van de Gucht 
(2007) suggest that all else equal, larger size offering may induce higher external financing 
costs, hence has more negative announcement impact on abnormal return. Mikkelson and 
Partch (1986), Jen et al. (1997) and Lewis et al. (1999) provide empirical evidence that the 
issue size is negatively related to stock abnormal return. Hence I expect a negative 
relationship between proceeds and stock abnormal return. 
Equity/TA, calculated as total equity divided by total assets, is the measure of firm’s 
equity level. Firms with lower equity level are considered as riskier, and facing higher 
expected costs of financial distress. Stein (1992) suggests that firms may issue convertible 
securities as an indirect method to increase the equity in their capital structures thereby 
reducing the adverse selection costs associated with pure equity issues. Therefore, firms with 
lower equity level benefit more from convertible issues. Therefore, I expect a negative 
relationship between the announcement period abnormal returns and equity level. 
         Maturity is the time between the issue date and the date on which the issue first can 
be converted to the shares of common stock in the issuing company or cash of equal value, 
at the agreed-upon price. Lewis et al. (2003) suggest that the conversion option of a bond 
with a longer maturity is assumed to be more equity-like. Since equity volatility is 
proportional to the square root of the time to maturity when stock prices follow a geometric 
Brownian motion process, an increase in maturity effectively increases the volatility of the 
conversion option, and hence the option value Following Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse 
selection assumption, I expect more equity-like convertible bonds announcement to have 
more negative impact on the stock abnormal return. In Myers (1977) underinvestment 
problem, a longer term debt involves greater risk of a shift in corporate investment policies 
and aggravates the underinvestment problem. One approach to controlling this investment 
incentive problem is to shorten the effective maturity of the debt. Krasker (1986) also 
predicts that relatively larger equity-linked security issues should induce more negative 
announcement effect on stock returns. The debt maturity choice models used in Flannery 
(1986) and Kale and Noe (1990) suggest that firms that issue debt with longer maturities 
have better qualities. Easterbrook (1984) obtain at a similar conclusion high-quality firms 
reduce their agency costs of monitoring by issuing shorter maturity debt. Overall, research 
suggests that firms with a better performance issue convertible bond with longer maturity, 
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because they do not want convertible bondholders to convert their bond to common stock 
and share the profits with them. Datta et al. (2000) also provide empirical evidence that debt 
maturity could have a positive relationship with stock price. Thus, the length of maturity 
could also positively affect the stock abnormal return. Overall, I do not have clear expected 
sign for maturity. 
Stock return volatility is the annualized bank stock return volatility, measures firm’s 
riskiness, calculated from daily returns over the window (-250,-10) relative to the convertible 
bond announcement date. Since firms with high operational risk are expected to have a large 
expected cost of financial distress (Chang et al., 2004), I expect that firm’s volatility is 
negatively related to abnormal return associated with convertible bond announcements. 
Duca et al., (2012), Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007) provide the empirical evidence in 
split-sample abnormal return regressions that the volatility of stock return is significant 
negatively related to the abnormal return in both hot and non-hot convertible debt markets, 
where hot convertible bond market means the periods with high convertible debt issuance 
volumes.  
Stock run-up is a proxy for the level of equity-related financing costs faced by the 
convertible bond issuers. It is measured as the continuously-compounded non-market-
adjusted daily stock return over trading days -60 to -2 (Duca et al., 2012). Dutordoir and Van 
de Gucht (2007) suggest that a firm with high stock run-up is more likely to be seen as 
overvalued by stockholders. Lewis et al. (2003) also find that firms with the high pre-issue 
stock run-up and high-risk firms are more likely to issue equity-like convertibles to reduce 
equity-related financing costs. Therefore, I expect the relationship between pre-issue stock 
run-up and convertible bonds announcement abnormal return is negative. 
Market run-up is a measure of the overall market and economic conditions, as well as 
the growth expectations, during the period leading up to the security offer (see, for example, 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Lowry, 2003). For equity issues, Choe et al. (1993) argue that 
the investor reactions are typically less negative in good economic conditions because of the 
lower costs of external equity financing during market expansions. From their observations, 
one can also expect risk uncertainty, asset substitution, and adverse selection costs will 
decrease during the economic blooming time. The empirical studies of Lewis et al. (2003) 
found no significant influence of market run-up on convertible bond abnormal return in the 
U.S. market, while Ammann et al. (2006) find a positive and negative impact, respectively.  
54 
 
Market volatility is the annualised market stock return volatility, or the market risk, 
which is calculated from daily returns on the S&P 500 index. Volatile stock market indicates 
macroeconomic deterioration, which may have a negative impact on convertible bond 
abnormal return. In addition, research suggests a strong positive correlation between market 
volatility and information asymmetry. Duca et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that the 
volatility of market return is significant negatively related to the abnormal return of 
convertible bond issues. Hence, I expect market volatility has a negative impact on 
convertible bond abnormal return. 
Rule 144A is a dummy variable used to control the effect of the Rule 144A private 
placement of convertible bonds. It equals to one for convertible bonds issued in 144A market, 
zero otherwise. Rule 144A was issued in 1990 in the U.S. to improve the liquidity and 
efficiency of private placement market by giving more freedom to institutional investors to 
trade securities. Securities under Rule 144A do not require registration with SEC (Securities 
and Exchange Commission) but can be traded without restriction in the secondary market 
among qualified institutional buyers (i.e. institutions own over $100 million in assets). 
Livingston and Zhou (2002) suggest that investors in 144A market have lower liquidity, 
information uncertainty, and weaker legal protection. Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004) also 
suggest that high-quality firms issue in both markets but face higher yield spreads in the 
144A market and low-quality firms that issue only in the 144A market. Therefore, I expect 
that convertible bonds issued in 144A market have negative announcement effect. 
Carayannopoulos and Nayak (2013) provide empirical evidence that issuers of convertible 
bonds under Rule 144A experience a negative stock reaction around the announcement day. 
 
3.5 Summary statistics 
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, Table 3.1 reports the summary descriptive 
statistics of CAR and firm-, issue- and market-specific characteristics of the whole sample 
over the sample period. The mean, median, minimum and maximum of proxies for market 
conditions and other issue and firm characteristics for the convertible bond samples are 
shown in the table. The detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1.  
There are in total 2,133 issues, and in general, convertible bond issues have a negative 
cumulative abnormal return (-2.55%). The mean value of the CAR for the whole sample is 
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significantly different from 0 at 1% level. The highest and the lowest 2% of each variable 
have been eliminated from the sample to mitigate the potential distortions that may be 
resulted from the extreme outliers. I find that the value of total assets ranges from 4.43 
million to 19.64 million, with a mean of 13.04 million US dollars. It shows a quite large 
variation in the size of firms which issued convertible bonds. However, the size of issues 
(Proceeds/Total assets) remains relatively low at on average 0.04%. The equity level of the 
firms (Equity/Total assets) has a wide range from 0 to 91.55%, which indicates that the 
variation of sample firm’s level of capital risk is large. The average length of maturity is 
16.82 years, while the range of maturity is from 0.08 to 99.99 years indicating a large 
variation in the length of maturity. In line with Ducat et al., (2012), the average market run-
up is 4.22%, while the average market volatility is 17.08%. The mean value of Opacity is 
0.76, which suggests that the sample firms have on average 76% probability to have rating 
scores different from the two rating agencies. For CBaribitrage I only have available data 
for 713 sample issues, and the mean value is 0.01. I find an average value of 0.015 for the 
ratio of monthly short interest by the number of shares outstanding measured on the trading 
day -20 relatives to the announcement date. This figure is similar to values recorded by Duca 
et al, (2012), Choi et al (2009), and De Jong et al. (2011). 
 
 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics for the whole sample 
Variable obs mean stddev median min max 
CAR 2133 -2.55 6.68 -2.17 -23.22 27.46 
Total assets 2133 13.04 2.13 13.14 4.43 19.64 
Proceeds/Total assets 2133 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.22 
Equity/Total Assets 2133 43.99 25.38 44.96 0.00 91.55 
Maturity 2133 16.82 20.79 10.12 0.08 99.99 
Stock run-up 2133 18.43 47.82 13.03 -136.85 538.68 
Market run-up 2133 4.22 7.25 4.63 -43.89 29.99 
Stock return volatility 2133 64.69 55.65 50.25 8.11 633.58 
Market volatility 2133 17.08 8.30 14.49 7.25 49.35 
Opacity 2133 0.76 0.17 0.79 0.00 1.00 
CBarbitrage 713 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.21 0.03 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for issuer-specific, firm-specific, and 
macroeconomic variables for the whole sample over the period from January 1982 to December 
2011. The cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) is calculated using standard event study 
methodology and measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date, using 
market model methodology with time window (-250, -10). All the ratios are in percentages, while 
Total assets are in million US dollars.  
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Panel A of Table 3.2 provides the t-test results for pairwise differences in the means 
between the bank and non-bank firm. The convertible bond offerings for non-banks have 
significantly negative CAR at -2.62% in the day interval between -1 and +1, which is 
consistent with Dutordoir and Van De Gucht (2004). In line with the hypothesis, I find the 
abnormal return associated with bank issued convertible bond is less negative than non-bank 
firm issued (-0.8 % versus -2.62%), and the difference is significant at 1% level.  
The table further shows the statistics of the control variables. On average, banks have a 
higher level of log total assets than non-bank firms (15.02 versus 12.95). This is not a 
surprising finding given that banks tend to be large organisations. However, compare to non-
bank firms, banks have significantly lower proceeds/total assets ratio (0.01% versus 0.04%), 
and lower equity level (18.02% equity/total assets ratio versus 45.11%). On average, banks 
also have lower stock run-up (6.19% versus 18.96%), and lower stock return volatility than 
non-bank firms (61.44% compares to 64.83%). The market run-up difference is significant, 
but at a marginal level (5.31% versus 4.18%). In line with Morgan (2002) and Iannotta 
(2006), banks are generally found to be more opaque than non-bank firms. On average there 
is 84% probability that the two rating agencies would give different ratings for bank issued 
convertible bonds, while this probability for non-bank firms is 76%, where the difference is 
also significant at 1% level. However, the difference between arbitrage demands for banks 
issued convertible bonds and non-bank firms issued is small and insignificant.  
Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the number of convertible bond announcements for banks 
and non-bank firms. Banks do not have of convertible bonds in the year 1988, 1989, 1990, 
1993, 1994, 1997 and 2011. The numbers of observations for both institutions increase after 
the year 2000. Bank issued convertible bonds increase over years. The number of issues 
reaches the highest point 2009. 
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Table 3.2 Summary statistics  
Panel A: Overall statistics              
  Panel 1: Banks Panel 2: Non-banks 
mean of Panel 
1 vs mean of 
Panel 2 
median of Panel 1 
vs median of 
Panel 2 Variable obs mean stddev median min max obs mean stddev median min max 
CAR 88 -0.8 7.46 -0.63 -27.44 31.79 2045 -2.62 7.94 -2.71 -27.44 31.79 1.82*** 2.08 
lnTA 88 15.02 18.90 4.32 0.06 52.70 2045 12.95 5.53 0.02 0.02 52.70 2.07*** 4.30 
Proceeds/Total assets 88 0.01 0.02 0.00 2.35E-05 0.10 2045 0.04 0.14 2.22 0.00 5.35 -0.03*** -2.22 
Equity/Total assets 88 18.02 18.85 9.29 1.37 73.22 2045 45.11 24.82 45.96 0.00 91.55 -27.09*** -36.67 
Maturity 88 17.11 13.93 20.29 1.01 99.90 2045 16.8 20.42 10.12 0.08 99.99 0.31 10.17 
Stock run-up 88 6.19 24.27 6.53 -64.68 118.11 2045 18.96 41.70 13.03 -136.85 538.68 -12.77*** -6.50 
Stock return volatility 88 5.31 6.54 3.93 -13.59 27.30 2045 4.18 7.17 4.55 -43.89 29.99 1.13 -0.62 
Rule 144a 88 61.44 39.40 35.00 8.11 161.48 2045 64.83 46.62 49.67 11.95 633.58 -3.39 -14.67 
Market run-up 88 18.38 8.64 12.36 7.35 49.09 2045 17.02 8.02 14.49 7.25 49.35 1.36 -2.13 
Opacity 88 0.84 0.13 0.86 0.00 1.00 2045 0.76 0.17 0.79 0.00 1.00 0.08*** 0.07 
Cbarbitrage 77 0.01 0.18 -0.09 -0.83 0.54 686 0.01 0.74 -0.09 -0.83 5.96 0.00 0.00 
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Panel B: Number of observations (Yearly)  
Year Banks Non-banks   Year Banks Non-banks 
1982 2 24  1998 1 51 
1983 1 33  1999 1 37 
1984 4 21  2000 1 95 
1985 5 62  2001 5 163 
1986 3 77  2002 1 103 
1987 2 75  2003 4 221 
1988 0 28  2004 8 155 
1989 0 24  2005 10 94 
1990 0 21  2006 3 124 
1991 1 36  2007 6 135 
1992 1 52  2008 4 75 
1993 0 53  2009 18 92 
1994 0 16  2010 1 66 
1995 2 29  2011 0 59 
1996 4 94     
1997 0 127   Total 88 2045 
Notes: Panel A of this table provides the summary statistics and t-test for the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) and firm-specific, issue-specific and macroeconomic variables of 
banks and non-bank firms over the sample period January 1982 to December 2011. Variables 
are defined as outlined in Appendix 1. CAR is calculated using standard event study 
methodology. I use student t-test to examine the differences the mean value of CAR and each 
firm-, issue-, and market-specific characteristic between banks and non-bank firms. Total 
assets are in million US dollar. Obs denotes the number of observations. *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.  Panel B of this table 
reports the number of observations for both bank and non-bank institutions each year across 
the sample period.  
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Overall, the summary statistics are consistent with the first hypothesis that bank issued 
convertible bond has less negative abnormal return upon issue announcement than non-bank 
firms. I also find that on average, banks have a larger size, but smaller relative size 
convertible bond issuance, lower equity level, less firm riskiness and lower equity-related 
financing cost. The market and economic condition and growth expectation for banks and 
non-bank firms are similar. Banks generally are more opaque than non-bank firms. However, 
banks issued convertible bond has the similar arbitrage demand as non-bank firms issued. 
Figure 3.1 further depicts annual abnormal returns for banks and non-banks separately. 
I find that banks tend to experience higher abnormal returns over the duration of the sample 
period with only a few exceptions. The trend analysis shows that this difference is not driven 
by any particular time period, for example, the early 2000s dot.com bubble, and the 2007-
09 global financial crisis. 
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3.6 Multivariate analysis 
The regression analysis described in this section evaluates the difference between the 
abnormal return of banks and non-bank firms while controlling for exogenous factors. Firms’ 
cumulative abnormal return is used as the dependent variable to test whether banks have less 
negative abnormal return than non-bank firms.  
Table 3.3 presents the results of the cross-sectional regression specifications with the 
cumulative abnormal return over the window (-1, 1) relative to the convertible bond 
announcement date as the dependent variable. Specification 1 only regresses on bank dummy, 
while specification 2 includes bank- and issue-specific variables. In Specification 3, I further 
control for the market conditions.  A year crisis dummy is included in specification 4, which 
equals to 1 for convertible bonds issued between the year 2007 and year 2009, and 0 
otherwise. In specification 5 and 6, Opacity and CBarbitrage are included respectively, one 
at a time, to investigate whether the differences between a bank and non-bank firm’s 
abnormal return, if any, is influenced by the firm level of opacity and arbitragers induced 
convertible bond arbitrage.  
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The bank dummy variable enters the regression positively and significantly at 1% 
significant level in all specifications, which indicates that banks have higher cumulative 
abnormal return upon convertible bond announcements than non-bank firms. The difference 
is also economically significant. The parameter coefficient equals to 2.889 after controlling 
for a number of variables (specification 5), which indicates that bank’s announcement 
returns for convertible bond offerings are 2.889% higher than the counterpart returns 
experienced by non-bank firms. This result supports the hypothesis that less negative stock 
abnormal return upon convertible bond offerings should be found for banks than non-bank 
firms.  
Control variables in the regressions tend to have the expected signs. Larger firms in size 
(lnTA) tend to have a negative impact on the abnormal stock return upon convertible bond 
announcements, indicating that larger firms tend to be more complex and have more 
incentives to manipulate earnings account, and hence have a higher level of information 
asymmetry, which is consistent with Richardson’s (2000) theory. 
The coefficient on the relative size (Proceeds/Total assets) of the convertible bond issue 
is negatively related to abnormal returns at 10% level. The Larger issue size is associated 
with a higher external financing cost, and therefore brings the negative impact. This result 
is consistent with Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007). In line with Chang et al. (2004), the 
equity level of the firm is found to have a significant negative impact on convertible bond 
abnormal return. A firm with lower equity level are considered as riskier, and facing higher 
expected costs of financial distress, which would benefit more from convertible bond issues. 
Consistent with Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988), I find a longer 
maturity is related to a more positive stock price reaction. Maturity enters all regressions 
positively and significantly. Better perform firm tends to issue convertible bonds with longer 
maturity because they do not want bondholders to convert the bond to shares. On average 1-
year longer of maturity is associated with a 0.03% increase in the cumulative abnormal return. 
As expected, the stock price reacts more negatively to the announcement of convertible bond 
issuance by a firm with a higher stock run-up. According to Lewis et al (2003), firms with 
the high pre-issue stock run-up and high-risk firms are more likely to issue equity-like 
convertibles to reduce equity-related financing costs. These equity-like convertibles are 
often seen as overvalued by investors, therefore there will be a downward pressure on the 
stock price, which may be associated with a decrease in the abnormal return. Consistent with 
Lewis et al., (1999, 2003), Chang et al. (2004), Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007), and Lee 
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et al. (2009), I do not find a significant impact of firm risk (measured as stock return volatility) 
on abnormal returns. In line with Livingston and Zhou (2002) and Duca et al. (2012), the 
results also show that issuers of convertible bonds under Rule 144A experience a negative 
stock price reaction to the offering because investors in 144A market have lower liquidity, 
information uncertainty, and weaker legal protection.  
To assess the contribution of the market conditions to the announcement effect of 
convertible bonds, I control for market volatility and market run-up. These two variables are 
all positively related with the cumulative abnormal return but not significant. Therefore, 
these results indicate that stock price reaction to convertible bond announcements is not 
influenced by the market conditions, such as growth expectations and market risk. These 
results are also consistent with Lewis et al. (2003) and Duca et al. (2012). 
As the expectation, the result shows that the Global Financial Crisis has a negative 
impact on the announcement effect of equity offerings since the coefficient of year crisis is 
significantly negative.  
The “opacity” enters the regression significantly and negatively, indicating a higher 
probability of disagreement of the two rating agencies is associated with the lower abnormal 
return. The impact is also economically important. A disagreement between two rating 
agencies will reduce the CAR by 1.573% points than those which have the same ratings. 
This result is consistent with the expectation that the level of firm opacity increases 
information asymmetry, and hence more negative abnormal return.  
The results show that arbitrage activity (CBarbitrage) have significant negative 
impact on convertible bond abnormal return at 1% significant level. This result indicates that 
more arbitrage activities for convertible issues induce less abnormal return associated with 
the convertible bond announcement. Arbitrageurs’ investment behaviour of buying 
convertible bonds and short selling equities simultaneously makes stock price react 
negatively and reduces the convertible bond abnormal return (Brown et al., 2012). 
The overall results from the univariate analysis hold even after adjusting from firm-, 
market-, and issue- characteristic. The results from multivariate analysis suggest that banks 
issued convertible bond’s cumulative abnormal return is generally significantly larger than 
that of non-bank institutions issued. This result is robust even after I control for other bank-, 
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issue-specific and stock market conditions, particularly the level of firm opacity, and the 
arbitrage demand by convertible bond arbitragers.  
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Table 3.3 Regression analysis of convertible bond announcement effects 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank 2.608*** 2.886*** 2.904*** 1.452*** 2.889*** 2.373** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (4.203) (0.001) (0.026) 
lnTA  -0.368*** -0.375*** -0.185** -0.309** -0.393 
  (0.003) (0.003) (2.298) (0.016) (0.122) 
Proceeds/Total assets  -1.436 -1.46 -1.313 -1.758* -5.918 
  (0.174) (0.163) (1.416) (0.063) (0.459) 
Equity/Total assets  -0.015* -0.015* -0.007 -0.015* -0.027* 
  (0.079) (0.075) (1.167) (0.076) (0.058) 
Maturity  0.032*** 0.033*** 0.020** 0.033*** 0.014 
  (0.004) (0.004) (2.532) (0.004) (0.421) 
Stock run-up  -0.017** -0.018** -0.014*** -0.018** -0.017 
  (0.03) (0.023) (2.824) (0.022) (0.23) 
Stock return volatility  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.046** 
  (0.461) (0.433) (1.309) (0.422) (0.021) 
Rule 144a  -0.575 -0.575 -0.717** -0.56 -0.76 
  (0.181) (0.181) (-2.259) (0.193) (0.306) 
Market run-up   0.039 0.024 0.039 0.094 
   (0.335) (0.447) (0.331) (0.127) 
Market volatility   0.026 0.058** 0.027 -0.052 
   (0.765) (2.192) (0.753) (0.666) 
Year crisis    -3.489*   
    (1.884)   
Opacity     -1.573** -1.940* 
     (0.036) (0.078) 
Cbarbitrage      -86.740*** 
      (0.000) 
Constant 1.146 3.76 2.849 0.524 3.138 9.749** 
 (0.717) (0.119) (0.352) (0.346) (0.304) (0.027) 
N 2133 2133 2133 2133 2133 713 
adj. R-sq 0.017 0.04 0.04 0.050 0.041 0.035 
Notes: This table presents the results of a regression analysis of announcement-period cumulative 
abnormal stock returns of convertible bond on a number of potential determinants. The dependent 
variable is the cumulative abnormal return measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the 
announcement date, calculated using standard event study methodology. N denotes the number of 
observations. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in Appendix 1. *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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3.7 Robustness tests 
3.7.1 Differences in CARs across different industries 
A further robustness test is undertaken in relation to the differences across industries. In 
Table 3.4 I explore whether banks experience less negative announcement returns in relation 
to individual industries across non-bank firms: manufacturing, wholesale retail, services, 
transportation, telecommunication, construction, mining and utilities. I use eight industry 
classifications, a rather wide definition, to have a reasonable amount of observations 
available per industry. I only include those industries with more than 15 observations across 
the whole sample period. 
Different from non-bank firms, banks are monitored by both the market and the regulator 
and are constrained in terms of the timing and choice of financing (Poloncheck et al., 1989). 
The security issuance process by banks is also frequently mandated by bank regulators. 
Through chartering, proposals for new banks are screened to prevent undesirable people 
from controlling banks, therefore reduce the adverse selection problem. The regulation also 
limits the freedom and flexibility of bank managers to set the quantity of capital, to choose 
the type of capital, and to time security offerings to take advantage of differential information 
between the managers and the public (Poloncheck et al., 1989). 
The results show that the parameter coefficients across other industries are negative and 
mostly statistically significant. These results offer further support that banks experience less 
negative announcement returns on convertible bonds announcements in comparison to 
counterpart non-banks. I observe, however, that the differences in CARs between 
telecommunications industry and banks are not statistically significant. Telecommunications 
industry has traditionally been subject to a complex federal and state regulation in the U.S., 
since telecommunications services are based on an increasingly sophisticated and complex 
network of services that differ in distance, quality, amount and nature of data, etc. 
(Economides, 2008), and the regulation is even strengthened after the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.  
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Table 3.4 Industry estimations 
Bank (1) 
lnTA -0.371*** 
 (-2.956) 
Proceeds/Total assets -7.748 
 (-1.263) 
Equity/Total assets -0.003 
 (-0.314) 
Maturity 0.016* 
 (1.817) 
Stock run-up -0.008 
 (-1.197) 
Stock return volatility -0.003 
 (-0.378) 
Rule 144a -1.091*** 
 (-2.791) 
Market run-up -0.052 
 (-0.744) 
Market volatility 0.027 
 (0.830) 
Manufacturing -2.499*** 
 (-3.432) 
Wholesaleretail -2.428*** 
 (-3.175) 
Services -2.515*** 
 (-3.313) 
Transportation -3.345*** 
 (-3.221) 
Inforcommunication -1.496 
 (-1.551) 
Construction -4.852*** 
 (-3.774) 
Mining -1.478* 
 (-1.697) 
Utility -1.922** 
 (-2.183) 
constant 6.908*** 
 (3.164) 
N 1835 
adj. R-sq 0.053 
Notes: This table presents the comparison analysis of the 
cumulative abnormal stock returns upon convertible bond 
offerings across different industries. The default is banks. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return measured 
over the window (-1, 1) relative to the issue date.  
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3.7.2 Matched sample methodology 
I also concerned with the robustness of the methodology used in this study so far. One 
may argue that the sample between banks and non-banks are not balanced (88 vs. 2,045), 
and this imbalance may cause bias in the resultsFollowing Faulkender et al. (2012), I use the 
Mahalanobis matching method to compare the CARs of banks issued and non-bank firms 
issued convertible bonds by matching each sample bank with a controlled non-bank firm on 
the basis of important characteristics as a robustness test. The Mahalanobis distance is a 
measure of the distance between a point P and a distribution D (Mahalanobis, 1936). It is a 
multi-dimensional generalization of the idea of measuring how many standard deviations 
away P is from the mean of D. This distance is zero if P is at the mean of D, and grows as P 
moves away from the mean: along each principal component axis, it measures the number 
of standard deviations from P to the mean of D. I select the firm whose size, and relative size 
of proceeds/total assets ratio is closest to the bank as the non-bank control firm. These 
matches are nevertheless imperfect, so I control for these differences in the regression.   
∆CARi =  δ0 +  δ1 (∆ 
Equity
Totalasseti
) +  δ2 (∆ stock runupi) +
 δ3 (∆ stock return volatilityi) + δ4 (∆ market volatilityi) +   δ5 (∆ market runupi) +
 δ6 (∆ maturityi) +  μi  (4) 
Where ∆CARi denotes the i
th bank’s CAR less that of its control firms estimated into 
a number of bank characteristics.  
          The estimated value of δ0  thus measures the mean excess CAR of bank issued 
convertible bond over its control firm, after controlling for differences in firm-, issue- and 
market- specific variable between banks and control. The regression results are reported in 
Table 3.5. The results are robust with this alternative methodology, showing that bank issued 
convertible bond has higher abnormal return than non-banks, since after controlling for the 
differences in various characteristics, the constant term (δ0 ) is still significantly positive. In 
particular, the constant term shows that banks have higher abnormal returns by 2.438 percent 
than non-banks.  
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Table 3.5 Matched sample test 
Variables 
Parameter estimate (t-value) 
(1) 
∆Equity/Total assets -0.002 
 (-0.034) 
∆stock run-up -0.053 
 (-1.171) 
∆stock return volatility -0.018 
 (-0.810) 
∆market volatility -0.120** 
 (-2.178) 
∆market runup 0.17 
 (1.316) 
∆maturity -0.058 
 (-0.873) 
constant 2.438** 
 -2.268 
N 88 
adj. R-sq 0.08 
Notes: In this table, I match each bank institution with a non-bank institution 
based on size and relative size of proceeds/total assets. The dependent variable 
is the cumulative abnormal return of bank issued convertible bond less that of 
its matched non-bank institution issued convertible, which is measured over 
the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date. Constant denotes the 
constant term δ_0. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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3.8 Conclusions 
 Convertible bonds are attractive middle ground between equity and straight debt, 
which has become more popular since the financial crisis. Previous literature focused on 
non-banks and generally found significantly negative stock price effects associated with 
convertible bond offerings. This study focuses on the wealth effect of US banks. Banks differ 
significantly from non-banks especially in the aspect of the level of regulation that reduces 
the level of asymmetric information. I, therefore, hypothesise less negative share price 
reaction for banks that issue a convertible bond.  
 This chapter examines the announcement effect of convertible bond issued by banks 
by using the U.S. firms’ data from January 1982 to December 2011. The abnormal returns 
are measured by using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) by using market model and event study methodology. I 
find that banks issued convertible bond is generally 2.889% significantly larger than that of 
non-bank institutions. These regulation changes increased bank capital requirement and 
encouraged voluntary disclosure, and thus reduced the level of information asymmetry 
between managers and investors, to more favourable stock abnormal return upon convertible 
bond offerings for banks than non-banks. The results hold strong after adjusting for a number 
of firm-, issue-, and market-specific characteristics. I also find that arbitrageurs’ activity of 
buying convertible bonds and short selling equities induce significant downward pressure 
on stock price, however, this effect cannot explain the full difference in CARs between banks 
and non-banks.  
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Chapter 4 Empirical analysis: Difference in Seasoned Equity 
Offerings announcement effect between banks and non-banks 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
Consistent with the signalling model of Myers and Majluf (1984), which argues that SEO 
announcement signals firm overvaluation, literature on the announcement effects of SEOs 
by non-banks finds that SEO announcement induces negative abnormal stock returns (Smith, 
1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; Hansen, 1898; Eckbo 
and Masulis, 1992; Corwin, 2003). However, banks raising new equity give the market a 
conflicting signal. On one hand, it gives the market a signal that banks are willing to engage 
with capital regulation and to increase the bank’s safety (Keeley, 1989). On the other hand, 
it may reveal private information that the bank is in financial trouble and have to raise new 
equity capital to survive the adverse conditions (Krishnan et al., 2010). This chapter attempts 
to examine the difference in the announcement effects between banks’ and nonbanks SEOs.  
The hypothesis is that the cumulated abnormal return (CAR) of bank SEO announcement 
is less negative than that of non-bank. First, Keeley (1989) argues that bank regulation 
reduces the information content that otherwise would be revealed by a security issuance (in 
general negative), and consequently stock announcement effects might be higher for bank 
SEOs than those of non-banks. The regulation also limits the freedom and flexibility of bank 
managers to set the quantity of capital, to choose the type of capital, and to time security 
offerings to take advantage of differential information between the managers and the public. 
Booth et al (2002) find that regulations (of banks and utility firms) reduce the impact of 
managerial decisions on shareholder wealth, and hence help to address the agency conflicts. 
This means bank SEO is less likely to be assumed as overvalued by the market and has less 
information asymmetry problem between managers and investors than a non-bank SEO 
(Polonchek et al., 1989). 
Second, Polonchek et al. (1989) suggest that, unlike non-banks, banks are monitored by 
both the market and a regulator, and bank capital structure decisions are constrained by 
regulation. Regulators impose minimum capital ratios and restrictions on the types of 
securities that qualify for inclusion in these ratios. The capital requirement forces banks to 
have more of their own capital at risk and may thus have less incentive to invest in high 
return but with high-risk level project (Hellmann et al., 2001). Furlong and Keeley (1989) 
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analyses the theoretical relationships between capital regulation and bank asset risk. They 
find that a higher bank capital ratio does not lead value-maximising banks to increase asset 
risk. On the contrary, more stringent capital requirements reduce the gains to a bank from 
increasing the risk of its asset portfolio. Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and 
Santomero (1988) also argue that the bank cannot diversify its risk completely because it is 
owned and managed by the same agent. The capital requirement restricts the bank’s risk-
return frontier and forces it to reduce leverage and to reconfigure the composition of its 
portfolio of risky assets. With less bank asset risk under capital regulation, investors are 
more inclined to build up the confidence of bank SEO than a non-bank SEO. 
Finally, banks are perceived to benefit from the government’s implicit too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF) policy. In principle, the government can always close a failing bank as soon as the 
bank becomes insolvent. In practice, the number of options available to regulators for 
handling the bank insolvency problem decreases with the severity of the problem (Hoggarth 
et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2006). Investors may hence require fewer discounts to the SEOs by 
banks than non-banks given the perception of TBTF. 
In this chapter, I examine 375 SEO announcements of U.S. banks and compare their 
announcement returns in relation to those of counterpart non-banks from 1982 to 2012. The 
baseline results support the hypothesis that the announcement effect of banks is less negative 
than that of non-banks. The cumulative abnormal returns over the three-day period (-1, 1) 
around the announcement date for banks is -0.96 percent, which is 0.61 percentage points 
higher than that of non-banks. These results hold even after controlling for various firm-, 
issue-, and market-specific variables. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. At first, section 4.2 outlines the 
process of quantitative data collection and analysis, including the data sources and the 
sample selection. Section 4.3 presents the research methodology used in this chapter. Section 
4.4 discusses the control variables used in this chapter, including the measure of firm opacity 
and hedge fund arbitrage induced shot-selling (arbitrage demand), which are both related to 
the hypotheses. Section 4.5 outlines the descriptive statistics of depending, independent, and 
control variables used in the regression models. After that, the estimated OLS results and 
some robustness test results are discussed step by step in section 4.6.  Section 4.7 discussed 
the results of the robustness tests. Finally, section 4.8 provides the overall discussions and 
conclusions. 
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4.2 Data sources and data selection 
I collect the full sample of U.S. common stock offerings from SDC database during the 
sample period January 1, 1982, to December 31, 2012. I only include the offers issued by a 
firm listed on either the NYSE or Nasdaq. I identify the sample using the database of the 
Centre for Research in Security Price (CRSP). The criteria for selecting offerings for 
inclusion in the final sample are as follow: 
- The firm’s account data must be reported in Compustat; 
- The offering announcement date must be available on SDC; 
- The comparison of issuances is between commercial banks (SIC codes 6000 to 
6199) and non-bank companies. From the latter group, I exclude issues from 
other industries which may face regulation restrictions, i.e., utilities (SIC codes 
4900 to 4999), and non-bank firms (SIC codes 6300-6499, 6200-6299 and 6500-
6999). Non-bank firms include insurance carriers, security and commodity 
brokers, dealers, exchanges, and services, and real estate. 
Lease et al. (1991) note that stated offer dates are often inappropriate for analysing price 
effects due to the fact that some offers take place after the close of trading. They examine 
time stamps from the Dow Jones News Service (DJNS) and find that 25% of offers from 
1981 through 1983 take place after the close. Similarly, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) identify 
offer dates using both the DJNS and the closing price listed in the final prospectus and find 
that 20% of offers from 1963 through 1981 take place after the close. Safieddine and 
Wilhelm (1996) note that even time stamps from the DJNS may not identify the true time of 
the offer. They apply a volume-based correction and find that 18.4% of offers from 1980 
through 1991 require an offer-date correction. Following Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996), I 
apply a volume-based correction. Specifically, if the trading volume on the day following 
the offer date is more than twice the trading volume on the SDC offer date or more than 
twice the average daily volume over the previous 250 trading days, then the day following 
the SDC offer date is designated as the offer date. The dataset consists of 3,710 equity issues 
out of which 366 are issued by banks and the remaining 3,344 by non-bank firms. 
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4.3 Methodology 
This chapter is using the same research method as the chapter as mentioned in section 
4.3.  The CARs are also generally measured by standard event study methodology as 
described in Brown and Warner (1985).   
3-day event window from the day -1 to day +114 is used in this chapter. A 240-day (day 
-250 to day -10) period for each firm is used for the estimation for the abnormal returns by 
using the market model. The CAR over the 3 days event window is then calculated.  
I also include firm-, issue-, and market-specific variables in the analysis of SEO 
announcement stock returns respectively.  
 
4.4 Control variables 
The detailed definitions of the variables used in the study are provided in Appendix 1. 
All firm- and macroeconomics-specific characteristics included in the regression analysis 
are measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the equity announcement date. I control for the 
following firm-, issue- and market-characteristics:  
Secondary shares are offerings in which all of the shares are being sold by existing 
shareholders (Gao and Ritter, 2010). Issuers of equity issuances with secondary offers are 
more frequently older and have a larger book value of assets, sales, cash flow margins, and 
proportions of tangible assets (Brav and Gompers, 2003), which are associated with the 
lower asymmetric information. Secondary shares reduce primary share being issued in 
equity of a given size, and underwriters tend to accept secondary offers only for high-quality 
issues, which reduces the adverse selection associated with the issuance of primary shares 
as noted by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). They assume that an agency problem between 
the issuer and underwriter in the spirit of Baron (1982) and Biais et al. (2002) gives rise to 
under-pricing. Other things equal, then, insiders should bargain for more aggressive positive 
revisions when their stakes are larger and more concentrated and when they are selling more 
                                                 
14 I also examine the alternative event window (-1, 0), (-2, +2), and (-5, 5). The main results stay the same. 
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secondary shares. This leads me to expect a positive relation between secondary shares and 
equity offering effect. 
Equity ratio, calculated as total equity divided by total assets, is the measure of firm’s 
equity level. Firms with lower equity level are considered as riskier, and facing higher 
expected costs of financial distress. Bah and Dumontier (2001) and O’Brien (2003) also 
show that companies with higher research and development and advertising expenses have 
higher levels of equity. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between the equity level 
and the stock price reaction of the equity offering. 
The issue size is defined as the number of new shares offered divided by the number of 
existing shares outstanding prior to the offering. It is used test the information effect. The 
amount of new equity may represent an unanticipated deficit in internal cash flow and thus 
negative offering effect as predicted by Myer and Majluf (1984). Miller and Rock (1985) 
also posit that external equity issues indicate a shortfall of cash flow relative to expectations 
and a need for external financing, implying an unfavourable share price effect. Therefore, 
the larger the issue size, the more negative the price reaction to the offering. On the other 
hand, Tan et al. (2002) document that the larger an equity issue, the more favourable the 
news about the earnings prospects and investment opportunities of the firm, and the more 
positive the price reaction to the offering. Earlier studies also find conflicting evidence, as 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find that the issue size is not a significant variable while 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) find the same variable to be statistically significant in a multiple 
regression including the preannouncement return as a second explanatory variable. Masulis 
and Korwar (1986) find that the issue size is statistically significant in two or three multiple 
regressions. Therefore my expectations on the relationship between issue size and the equity 
offering announcement effect are mixed. 
Firm Size is used to test the price pressure effects. It is measured as the natural logarithm 
of total assets. Followed by Loderer et al. (1991), larger expected return is required if 
investors have already tied up a substantial portion of their wealth to hold the stock of a large 
firm. Corwin (2003) also argues that small firms are more uncertainty. When they issue new 
equity, there should be more information asymmetry problem between issuers and investors. 
Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between firm size and the stock price reaction of 
equity issues. 
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Rule 415 shelf is a dummy variable equals to 1 for the issuer under shelf registration 
rules who can decide to make an SEO any time within a two-year window, choosing from a 
large list of potential underwriters. Under this rule, issuers (including both banks and non-
bank firms) can make the decision to go to the market and then sell an issue within minutes, 
and offering dates can be timed to take advantage of favourable market conditions, which 
could increase the price reaction. Before Rule 415, for select companies, SEC regulations 
required a minimum delay of 48 hours between the decision to make the offering and the 
actual sale. For some companies, the delay could be several weeks to several months. This 
rule also increases the competition among underwriters, which potentially lowering 
underwriting fees. The issuers may find it cost-effective to make many small offerings 
through various underwriters. But on the other hand, there may be a ‘market overhang’ 
problem, that stock price may fall since putting the shares on the shelf increase their potential 
supply without any offsetting increase in demand. Some investment bankers argue that the 
traditional offerings provide better services than shelf offerings which include the marketing 
and stabilisation activities of the underwriters. These services may result in a higher offering 
price than shelf offerings. Lee and Masulis (2009) also argue in a shelf offering, underwriters 
may not be able to discharge adequately their traditional due-diligence responsibilities due 
to the uncertainty surrounding the timing of the shelf offering and the speed with which a 
shelf offering can be made. The intensification of the competition among underwriters also 
creates further eroded due diligence and increases adverse selection risk. Therefore, this rule 
may raise underwriting fees. Autore et al. (2008) report that shelf registered SEOs have 
lower underwriting fees, consistent with the underwriter's competition effect. Therefore, my 
expectations on the relationship between Rule 415 and the equity offering announcement 
effect are mixed. 
Share turnover is the trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding (Gao 
and Ritter, 2010). This variable is used to measure the level of information asymmetry. 
Theories suggest that banks are more opaque than non-bank firms (Morgan, 2002; Iannotta, 
2006; Haggard and Howe, 2012), hence banks may have more information asymmetry than 
their non-bank counterparts. The inherent complexity of banks and the nature of the 
underlying assets make them opaque (Jones et al., 2012). Slovin et al. (1992) suggest that 
although there is disclosure requirement, banks are not required to disclose information 
about individual loans. Bank managers have the flexibility to adjust the accounting measures 
of loan portfolio quality to disclose to the public. Banks also reports the percentage 
breakdown of asset portfolios by type of loan (eg. Commercial and industrial, highly-
76 
 
leveraged transaction, and cross-border loans), but these data do not necessarily convey 
information about asset quality. Bank managers also have the ability to adjust the 
classification of a non-performing loan. They can lend a borrower additional funds to ensure 
sufficient payments to keep a loan from reaching non-performing status. These 
characteristics of the information structure of bank operations limit the market’s access to 
information needed to assess individual bank value and risk, which make banks more opaque. 
Opacity can result when a firm chooses to withhold information from investors, which 
increases information asymmetry between bank managers and outside investors (Jones et al., 
2012). Jin and Myers (2006) argue that opacity reduces firm-specific information available 
to outside investors and affects the division of risk bearing between firm insiders and outside 
investors. Since the banks are more opaque, investors may feel they are not sufficiently 
informed or even do not believe the information disclosed. When banks issue equity, 
investors may want more discounts on it.  
Investors may trade more frequently with one another because they disagree about the 
impact of news on a firm’s value (Karpoff, 1986; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Bailey et al., 2003). 
However, share turnover could also decrease in the presence of information asymmetry. 
Firms with high information asymmetry may have lower share turnover if uninformed 
investors are less likely to trade in these shares for fear that they could lose to informed 
traders (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990; Leuz and Verecchia, 2000). Therefore, I do not have 
a clear expectation of the relation between ‘Share turnover’ and abnormal return associated 
with equity issues. 
Inverse elasticity is the natural log transformation of the absolute value of the daily raw 
return divided by the daily turnover, averaged over 250 trading days before the 
announcement date (Gao and Ritter, 2010). In Gao and Ritter’s (2010) model, the demand 
elasticity for a stock is determined by an order flow inverse demand elasticity. The daily 
order flow inverse price elasticity on day t is defined as the ratio between the absolute value 
of the stock’s raw return and its share turnover. If the stock is listed on Nasdaq, I apply 
various adjustments to the trading volume. On February 1, 2001, a ‘riskless principal’ rule 
went into effect, according to the director of research of Nasdaq and Frank Hathaway, the 
chief economist of Nasdaq, that resulted in a reduction of approximately 10% in reported 
volume. Thus, for February 1, 2001, to December 31, 2001, I divide Nasdaq volume by 1.8. 
During 2002, securities firms began to charge institutional investors commissions on Nasdaq 
trades, rather than the prior practice of merely marking up or down the net price, resulting 
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in a further reduction in reported volume of approximately 10%. Thus for 2002 and 2003, I 
divide Nasdaq volume by 1.6. For 2004 and later years, in which much of the volume for 
Nasdaq (and NYSE) stocks has been occurring on crossing networks and other venues, I use 
a divisor of 1.0,  reflecting the fact that there are no longer important differences in the 
reporting of Nasdaq and NYSE volume. To reduce the influence of extreme values, I use a 
natural log transformation. The quantity for elasticity is in the numerator rather than the 
denominator. A large inverse elasticity reflects a large change in price if there is a demand 
or supply shock, which implies an inelastic demand curve. Gao and Ritter (2010) also find 
the comparable result of inverse elasticity. If a firm issue new equity, more inelastic of the 
demand is associated with a more reduction in the stock price. Therefore, I expect a negative 
relation between stock inverse elasticity and the stock reaction of the equity offering. 
Stock run-up is the stock return over the window (-60,-2) relative to the offering date. 
Lucas and McDonald (1990) argue that if the firm is undervalued, managers are more likely 
to delay issuing new equity to fund an investment project until good news about the firm is 
released. On the contrary, overvalued firms have incentives to issue immediately. If new 
investment projects arrive in an unbiased manner and unrelated to the firm’s prior share price, 
equity issues will occur after a period of positive abnormal returns to the firm and signal 
overvaluation. Therefore, the announcement of an equity issued by firm with high abnormal 
returns prior to the announcement is likely to have a more negative price reaction.  
Stock return volatility is the annualised stock return volatility measuring firm’s 
riskiness calculated from daily returns over the day interval from -250 to -10 relative to the 
equity issue date. Since firms with high operational risk are expected to have a large expected 
cost of financial distress (Chang et al., 2004), I expect that a firm’s volatility is negatively 
related to abnormal return associated with equity offerings. 
Market run-up is a measure of the overall market and economic condition and is 
measured as the continuously-compounded non-market-adjusted daily market index (S&P 
500) return over trading days between -60 and -2. Following Lewis et al. (2003), I use this 
pre-issue run-up in the market as a measure of the overall market and economic conditions 
during the period leading up to the security offer. They also suggest that investor reactions 
are typically less negative following increases in stock market prices. The reason for this 
less negative reaction may be the lower costs of external equity finance during market 
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expansions (Choe et al., 1993). I would expect a positive relation between market run-up 
and equity announcement effect.  
Market volatility is the annualised market stock return volatility, or the market risk, 
which is calculated from daily returns on the S&P 500 index. Volatile stock market indicates 
macroeconomic deterioration, which may have a negative impact on the market reaction to 
equity issues. In addition, market volatility acts as a proxy for the level of debt-related 
financing costs in the economy as a whole (Choe et al., 1993; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; 
Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2008), I, therefore, expect that the market volatility is negatively 
related the equity announcement effect. 
Table 4.1 shows the expected signs of determinants of SEO announcement effects. 
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Table 4.1 Expected signs of the determinants of SEO announcement effects 
Determinants Expected signs 
Secondary shares positive 
Rule 415 shelf mixed 
Share turnover mixed 
Firm size positive 
Proceeds/total assets mixed 
Equity/total assets positive 
Stock run-up negative 
Stock return volatility positive 
Market volatility negative 
Firm commitment positive 
Capital expenditure positive 
Inverse elasticity negative 
Arbitrage risk positive 
Bid-ask-spread negative 
Note: This table presents the expected signs of the determinants of SEO announcement effects. 
All the variables are defined as outlined in Appendix 1. 
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4.5 Summary statistics 
Table 4.2 provides the summary statistics of the key variables used in this study for banks 
and non-bank firms. The sample consists 375 equity issued by banks and 3,388 equity issued 
by non-bank firms. The results show that on average the equity offerings’ CAR over the 
window (-1, 1) for U.S. banks is -0.98 percent, which is 0.61 percent higher than that of non-
bank firms, and the difference is statistically significant at 1% level. This result is consistent 
with Poloncheck et al. (1989) and Wansley and Dhillon (1989) that bank issued equity have 
less negative announcement effect than that of non-bank firms. This result is possible due to 
capital theory, TBTF theory, and regulation theory. Since capital theory suggest that 
investors would have more confidence on equity issued by banks with higher capital level 
since bank capital absorb negative shocks to earnings, which increase banks’ safety and 
stability (Von Thadden, 2004 and Repullo, 2004). Therefore, equity issued by banks should 
be associated with better announcement effect than that issued by non-bank firms since 
issuing new equity increases bank’s capital. TBTF suggests that equity issued by banks 
should have better performance on stock price reaction than that issued by non-bank firms, 
since banks may receive government’s support when in distress when deemed “too-big-to-
fail” (O’Hara and Wayne, 1990; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinc, 2011), 
which increases investors’ confidence on the security issued by banks. Regulation theory 
suggests that bank issued equity may be associated with the higher abnormal return because 
bank regulators monitoring and disclosure requirement lower the information asymmetry 
level between bank managers and investors, therefore reduce the adverse selection problem 
and give investors more confidence (Wansely and Dillion, 1989 and Polonchek et al., 1989). 
Table 4.2 further shows the statistics of the control variables. All the variables are 
winsorized at 2% and 98% level. Panel A of Table 4.2 provides the t-test results for pairwise 
differences in the means between banks and non-bank firms. The secondary shares issued 
by banks are significantly larger than those issued by non-banks. The trading frequency of 
bank-issued equity is less than that of non-bank-issued equity; the share turnover is 
significantly lower. The results show that banks are significantly larger than non-banks, the 
average total assets being $33,133 million and $2,157 million, respectively. This difference 
is not surprising given that most commercial banks in our sample are listed at the Bank 
Holding Company (BHC) level and tend to be large in size. The proceeds to assets ratio of 
banks, however, is significantly lower than that of non-banks: 3.07% and 26.39%, 
respectively. The smaller proceeds ratio may to some extent reflect the significantly larger 
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size of banks. I also observe a significantly lower equity/assets ratio for banks, 11.85%, than 
for non-banks, 55.39%. Nevertheless, the 11.85% equity ratio is significantly higher than 
the government-required level, and it may indicate the safe conditions of banks that issued 
equity during the sample period. I further notice that the stock run-up of banks (9.39%) is 
significantly lower than that of non-banks (14.08%). Banks may face fewer financial 
constraints than their non-bank counterparts, and hence, bank managers may tend to issue 
equity when they need it, whereas managers of non-banks may have to consider the timing 
of the issuance to reduce the issue cost. The results also show that banks have less operational 
risk than non-banks because banks’ stock return volatility is significantly lower. The market 
volatility of banks is higher than that of non-banks, indicating that banks face a higher level 
of debt-related financing costs. The market run-up for banks is also significantly higher. 
Finally, compared with non-banks, banks that issued equity have fewer substitutes, and the 
demand is more inelastic. 
Panel B of Table 4.2 shows the number of yearly equity announcements for banks and 
non-banks. These results show that banks had no announcement of equity issuance in 1989. 
The number of observations for banks and non-banks tended to increase significantly after 
2000, and the number of issues reached the highest point in 2009-2010.  
In summary, the sample banks have significantly lower proceeds/total assets ratio, equity 
level, stock run-up, stock return volatility, share turnover, and demand elasticity, but a higher 
level of total assets, market volatility, and market run-up than their non-bank counterparts. 
The CAR of banks issued equity is significantly 0.61% higher than that issued by non-bank 
firms.  
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics  
Panel A: Overall statistics              
  Panel 1: Banks Panel 2: Non-banks 
mean of Panel 1 vs 
mean of Panel 2 
median of Panel 1 vs 
median of Panel 2 Variable obs mean stddev median min max obs mean stddev median min max 
CAR 375 -0.98 4.45 -0.71 -12.77 9.67 3388 -1.59 4.86 -1.62 -13.35 9.71 0.61*** 0.90 
Secondary 375 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.51 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.21*** -1.00 
Rule 415 shelf 375 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.06** 0.00 
Share turnover 375 4.90 8.95 1.40 0.00 50.19 3388 6.62 10.74 2.06 0.00 50.19 -1.73*** -0.65 
Total assets 375 32.58 142.04 3.47 0.02 1309.64 3388 2.16 19.76 0.26 0.00 797.77 30.42*** 3.21 
Proceeds/Total assets 375 3.07 7.82 1.18 0.10 93.08 3388 26.39 32.26 15.31 0.10 173.20 -23.32*** -14.13 
Equity/Total assets 375 11.78 9.65 9.61 -2.16 73.48 3388 55.39 25.31 56.66 -35.11 93.96 -43.61*** -47.05 
Stock run-up 375 9.39 22.33 6.74 -41.23 92.17 3388 14.08 26.42 11.45 -41.23 92.17 -4.69*** -4.71 
Stock volatility 375 52.08 34.41 40.45 15.95 164.60 3388 58.05 28.75 52.20 15.95 164.60 -5.97*** -11.75 
Market volatility 375 19.01 9.95 16.78 7.75 45.64 3388 16.04 7.43 13.88 7.75 45.64 2.97*** 2.90 
Market run-up 375 4.15 6.91 4.63 -12.72 16.64 3388 3.48 6.30 3.74 -12.72 16.64 0.67** 0.89 
year crisis 375 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.12*** 0.00 
Firm commitment 375 0.57 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.52 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.05*** 0.00 
Capital expenditure 375 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.08*** 0.00 
Inverse elasticity 375 1.33 1.53 1.16 -1.65 5.44 3387 1.18 1.71 1.00 -1.65 5.44 0.16*** 0.16 
Arbitrage risk 373 11.00 1.06 10.85 8.99 13.87 3334 11.44 0.95 11.46 8.99 13.87 -0.44*** -0.61 
bid-ask-spread 347 1.80 2.10 1.17 0.06 9.59 3123 2.00 2.15 1.29 0.06 9.59 -0.19* -0.12 
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Panel B: Number of observations (Yearly)  
Year Banks Non-banks   Year Banks Non-banks 
1982 3 61  1998 16 80 
1983 3 150  1999 4 84 
1984 3 28  2000 6 87 
1985 3 37  2001 17 228 
1986 4 53  2002 12 211 
1987 4 52  2003 21 231 
1988 2 30  2004 20 275 
1989 0 32  2005 16 189 
1990 1 36  2006 15 176 
1991 9 109  2007 10 121 
1992 8 68  2008 13 71 
1993 14 121  2009 59 138 
1994 2 99  2010 45 85 
1995 10 134  2011 25 61 
1996 12 145  2012 10 65 
1997 8 131   Total 375 3388 
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics and 
t-test for the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and firm-specific, issue-specific and 
macroeconomic variables of banks and non-bank firms over the sample period January 1980 
to December 2012. Variables are defined as outlined in Appendix 1. CAR is calculated using 
standard event study methodology. I use student t-test to examine the differences in the mean 
value of CAR and each firm-, issue-, and market-specific characteristic between banks and 
non-bank firms. Panel B reports the number of observations for both bank and non-bank each 
year across the sample period. Total assets are in billion US dollar. Obs denotes the number of 
observations. *, **,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels respectively   
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4.6 Multivariate analysis 
In this section, I focus on the test of whether the less negative share price reaction on 
bank equity offerings than non-banks can be explained by the firm-, market- and issue-
specific characteristics. The explanatory variable is CAR over the day interval between -1 
and +1. Table 4.3 presents the estimated coefficients from the regressions of the bank 
dummy variable and other firm- and issue-specific, and market-specific variables. The 
regression is Ordinary Least Squares model with White-corrected standard errors (White, 
1980). Year dummies controlling for technology changes have been included in these 
regressions but not reported to save space. 
The results show that the bank dummy is significantly positive at the 5% significant level. 
Its estimated coefficient is 0.731 with a p-value of 0.017. These indicate that banks’ 
abnormal stock returns upon equity offerings are 0.617 percent higher than non-banks’. This 
result is consistent with the hypothesis H2 and the result in Table 4.2 that bank issued equity 
has a better performance in stock price reaction than that of its counterpart non-bank firms. 
This difference may be explained by the TBTF theory and/or regulation theory. Banks may 
receive a capital injection when in distress or bailouts by the government when deemed “too-
big-to-fail” (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dic, 2011), 
which increases investors’ confidence on the security issued by banks. Non-bank firms that 
do not offer deposit services can be allowed to fail, as their failure does not endanger the 
payments system and the conduits through which the government carries out monetary 
policy (Corregan, 1987). Therefore, bank issued equity announcement will have better stock 
market reactions. The regulation theory also suggest that the heavy regulation on bans could 
reduce the information asymmetry between the managers and investors (Polonchek et al., 
1989; Chu, 1999; and Santos, 2001). Government uses regulation to reduce financial firm’s 
opaqueness by monitoring banks to provide report with detailed financial information to 
public investors, and checking the accuracy of the report (Flannery et al., 2004). Investors 
should be able to receive more information on bank financial conditions and quickly 
impound this information into the bank’s stock prices for an effective market discipline 
(Flannery et al., 2004). Investors may have more confidence on equity issued by banks, 
which makes bank issued SEOs have better stock market reactions than non-bank firms. 
Regarding the control variables, signs, and significant levels are to a large degree in line 
with my expectations. For example, in line with Autore et al. (2008), I find that issuers of 
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equity under Rule 415 experience a positive stock reaction of the offering, because shelf 
registered equity have lower underwriting fees, consistent with a dominant underwriter 
competition effect. I also control for the secondary issuance in the regression. Firms issue 
primary shares and current shareholders wishing to share existing shares issue secondary 
shares (Gao and Ritter, 2010). In line with Lee and Masulis (2009), I find that secondary 
shares have significant positive relation with an equity offering effect because issuers of 
secondary shares face less information asymmetry and adverse selection problem with 
investors.  
In line with Masulis and Korwar (1986), larger pre-announcement stock price run-ups 
are associated with larger stock price drops on the offering announcement. Since overvalued 
firms may have incentives to issue immediately, equity issues will occur after a period of 
positive abnormal returns to the firm. I also find that stock return volatility has a negative 
impact on equity announcement effect, which is consistent with Chang et al., (2004). I also 
observe that market run-up tends to be positively associated with the stock price reaction to 
equity announcement. This finding is consistent with Lewis et al (2003) that investor 
reactions are less negative following increases in stock market prices.   
I incorporate a series of robustness tests by adding a number of additional variables, to 
check the validity of the prior findings. After adding these variables, the significance of the 
main variables remains the same, and the results still robust. 
In column (2) of Table 4.3, I add dummy variable ‘year crisis’ which equals to 1 if the 
equity issued during the year 2007 to the year 2009, and zero otherwise. As the expectation, 
the result shows that the Global Financial Crisis has a negative impact on the announcement 
effect of equity offerings. 
In the third specification, I include the dummy variable “Firm commitment” equals to 
one for equity issued as a firm commitment (the entire issue is sold directly to the 
underwriter), and zero otherwise (eg. best efforts). Previous research suggests that to issue 
equity by using firm commitment has lower direct issue costs (underpricing and investment 
bank compensation) than the use of best efforts offering methods. In a firm commitment 
underwriting, the issuing firm is assured of the dollar value of the proceeds of the offerings. 
If the share price of the issuing firm drops unexpectedly, the new shares cannot be issued at 
their issue price (which was set without knowledge of this unexpected price drop). The 
underwriter bears an unexpected loss from his compensation.  
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In the fourth specification in Table 4.3, I include a dummy variable “Capital expenditure”, 
which equals to one if the intended use the proceeds is for capital expenditure, and zero 
otherwise. McConnel and Muscarella (1985) argue that if managers follow the market value 
maximisation rule, an announcement of an unexpected increase in capital expenditures 
should have a positive impact on the market value of the firm and vice versa. The positive 
revaluation associated with unexpected capital expenditure increases because the market 
immediately capitalises the incremental positive NPV associated with the unexpected 
projects to be undertaken by the firm. I find that the main results hold with banks having 
0.736 percent higher abnormal returns after controlling for capital expenditure, though I do 
not find that the use of proceeds has a significant relation with equity offering effect. 
In the fifth specification, I add “inverse elasticity” to the main regression. The result 
shows that the coefficient of inverse elasticity is found to be significant and negative, which 
is consistent with Gao and Ritter (2010). An issue with higher inverse elasticity indicates 
that there are fewer substitutions for it in the market and more stock price reduction 
associated with the issuance.  
In the sixth specification, I add “Arbitrage risk” instead of Inverse elasticity to measure 
the price pressure. Arbitrage risk is the variance of the market model OLS regression 
residuals estimated over the 250 trading days (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002). In Wurgler 
and Zhuravskaya’s (2002) model, the demand elasticity for a stock is determined by the 
arbitrage risk. Arbitrageurs keep the demand curve flat if the asset has perfect substitutes 
and the arbitrage risk is zero. On the other hand, if the asset does not have perfect substitutes, 
the demand curve is downward sloping because the arbitrage risk is nonzero and arbitrageurs 
are risk averse. The larger the arbitrage risk, the more inelastic the demand curve is. Wurgler 
and Zhuaravskaya’s (2002) show that there is a positive relation between arbitrage risk and 
returns on the announcement day of S&P 500 additions, which suggests that stocks with 
greater arbitrage risk have less elastic demand. Gao and Ritter (2010) also find the 
comparable result of arbitrage risk. If a firm issue new equity, more inelastic of the demand 
leads a more reduction in the stock price. Therefore, I expect a negative relation between 
stock arbitrage risk and the stock reaction of the equity offering. However, I do not find the 
significant result for this variable either.      
I consider using “bid-ask-spread” as an alternative measure of information asymmetry 
instead of share turnover in column (7). But there is no significant relation found between 
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this variable and the announcement effect of equity offerings. Previous literature raises that 
in practice using bid-ask-spread as a proxy for information asymmetry suffers from three 
deficiencies. First, the spread is associated with order processing costs and inventory holding 
costs faced by the specialist (Stoll, 1989). This errors-in-variable problem biases statistical 
tests toward the null and is not easily overcome. Second, the observable bid-ask spread has 
institutionally imposed discreteness. Since large firms often report spreads of just one tick, 
the percentage spread (in term of stock price) is primarily a function of the level of the stock 
price. Third, the previous studies have shown that bid-ask spreads are not very sensitive to 
changes in the information environment (Morse and Ushman, 1983). 
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Table 4.3 Regression analysis of SEO announcement effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Bank 0.617** 0.643** 0.612** 0.647** 0.703** 0.647** 0.560* 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.036) (0.026) (0.019) (0.027) (0.066) 
Secondary 0.918*** 0.862*** 0.885*** 0.816*** 0.842*** 0.850*** 0.785*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule 415 shelf 0.602*** 0.660*** 0.962*** 0.671*** 0.738*** 0.667*** 0.646*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Share turnover 0.020** 0.020** 0.019** 0.020** 0.020** 0.021**  
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.023) (0.026) (0.019)  
Firm size 0.123** 0.128** 0.139** 0.129** 0.104 0.113* 0.164*** 
 (0.033) (0.026) (0.017) (0.025) (0.101) (0.086) (0.009) 
Proceeds/total assets -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.202) (0.205) (0.202) (0.229) (0.191) (0.195) (0.279) 
Equity/total assets 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007** 0.007* 0.007** 0.008** 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.056) (0.048) (0.063) (0.050) (0.035) 
Stock run-up -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock return volatility -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009 -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.248) (0.002) 
Market volatility -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.401) (0.952) (0.953) (0.988) (0.960) (0.918) (0.970) 
Market run-up 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year crisis  -0.626** -0.619** -0.607** -0.660** -0.633** -0.472* 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.019) (0.023) (0.094) 
Firm commitment   0.398     
   (0.110)     
Capital expenditure    -0.146    
    (0.584)    
Inverse elasticity     -0.067   
     (0.218)   
Arbitrage risk      -0.129  
      (0.592)  
Bid-ask spread       -0.019 
       (0.622) 
Constant -2.432*** -2.566*** -2.967*** -2.549*** -2.369*** -1.201 -2.668*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.642) (0.000) 
N 3763 3763 3763 3763 3709 3760 3470 
Adj. R-squared 0.038 0.039 0.04 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.039 
Notes: This table presents the results of the OLS regression analysis of the difference in cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs, %) of seasonal equity offerings between banks and non-banks, controlling for firm-specific, issue-specific, and 
market-specific measures. A 240-day (day -250 to day -10) period for each firm is used for the estimation window for 
beta. The dependent variable (CAR, %) is measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date, 
calculated using the market model. Bank is a dummy variable for depository institutions. All other explanatory variables 
are defined as outlined in Appendix 1. The p-value, calculated using White (1980), and heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significant levels, respectively. 
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4.7 Robustness tests 
4.7.1 Differences in CARs across different industries 
I undertake the robustness tests in relation to the differences across industries. In Table 
4.4, I test whether bank issue equity is associated with difference announcement effect than 
that issued by other industries, such as manufacturing, wholesale retail, services, 
transportation, telecommunication, construction, mining, and agriculture. A wide definition 
has been used to have a reasonable amount of observations available for each industry. I 
only include those industries with more than 15 observations across the whole sample period.  
The default of the regression is bank, and I find that the parameter coefficients across 
other industries are negative and mostly statistically significant. These results indicate that 
the announcement of banks issued equities is associated with less negative stock price 
reaction than that issued by the counterpart non-bank firms. The coefficient of real estate is 
not statistically significant, indicating that the market reaction of equity issued by real estates 
is not significantly different from that issued by banks. Real estate is a non-bank firm, which 
is also under a great deal of regulation. These regulations may mitigate the difference 
between the announcement effect of equity issued by banks and equity issued by real estates. 
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Table 4.4 Industry estimations 
Bank (1) 
Secondary 0.612*** 
 (2.687) 
Rule415 shelf 0.645** 
 (2.522) 
Firm size 0.176*** 
 (2.680) 
Proceeds/total assets -0.003 
 (-0.678) 
Equity/Total assets 0.013*** 
 (2.960) 
Stock run-up -0.019*** 
 (-4.282) 
Stock return volatility -0.012** 
 (-2.443) 
Market volatility 0.022 
 (0.754) 
Market run-up 0.080*** 
 (4.551) 
Manufacturing -0.906*** 
 (-2.703) 
Whole sale retail -0.886** 
 (-2.388) 
Services -0.787** 
 (-2.113) 
Transportation -1.189** 
 (-2.049) 
Information communication -0.932* 
 (-1.719) 
Real estate -0.871 
 (-1.090) 
Construction -1.953** 
 (-2.526) 
Mining -0.961** 
 (-2.387) 
Agriculture -3.277*** 
 (-2.632) 
Constant -1.445 
 (-1.522) 
N 3139 
adj. R-sq 0.039 
Notes: This table presents the comparison analysis of the cumulative abnormal stock 
returns upon equity offerings across different industries. The default is of this 
regression is bank. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return 
measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the issue date. All explanatory variables 
are defined in Appendix 1.  
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4.7.2 Matched sample methodology 
Since there is great difference between the number of observation of bank and non-
bank (375 versus 3,388), I consider another robustness test. Since there is a great difference 
between the number of observation of bank and non-bank (375 versus 3,388), I consider 
another robustness test. Following Faulkender et al. (2012), In Table 4.5, I use the 
Mahalanobis distance matching method to compare the CARs associate with equity 
announcement issued by banks and non-banks by matching each sample banks with a 
controlled non-bank firm on the basis of important characteristics. The Mahalanobis distance 
is a measure of the distance between a point P and a distribution D (Mahalanobis, 1936). It 
is a multi-dimensional generalization of the idea of measuring how many standard deviations 
away P is from the mean of D. This distance is zero if P is at the mean of D, and grows as P 
moves away from the mean: along each principal component axis, it measures the number 
of standard deviations from P to the mean of D. The firm whose size and proceeds are closest 
to the bank are chosen to be the non-bank control firms. These matches are nevertheless 
imperfect, so I control for these differences in the regression.  
∆CARi =  δ0 +  δ1 (∆ 
Equity
Totalasseti
) + δ2  (∆ 
Proceeds
Totalassetsi
) +  δ3 (∆ stock runupi) +
 δ4 (∆ stock return volatilityi) + δ5 (∆ market volatilityi) +   δ6 (∆ market runupi) +
 δ7 (∆ shareturnoveri) + μi  (5) 
Where ∆CARi denotes the i
th bank’s CAR less that of its control firms estimated into 
a number of bank characteristics.  
          The estimated value of δ0 thus measures the mean excess CAR of bank issued equity 
over its control firm, after controlling for differences in firm-, issue- and market- specific 
variable between bank and control. I find that the results are robust with this alternative 
methodology, showing that bank issued equity associated with higher abnormal return than 
non-banks, since after controlling for the differences in various characteristics, the constant 
term (δ0 ) is still significantly positive. In particular, the constant term shows that banks 
have higher abnormal returns by 1.026 percent than non-banks.  
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Table 4.5 Matched sample test  
Variable Parameter estimate (t-value) 
  (1) 
∆Equity/total assets 0.018 
 (1.225) 
∆Proceeds/total assets -0.010 
 (-0.356) 
∆Stock run-up -0.012 
 (-0.810) 
∆Stock return volatility -0.010 
 (-0.791) 
∆Market volatility 0.004 
 (0.112) 
∆Market run-up 0.012 
 (0.302) 
∆Share turnover -0.005 
 (-0.163) 
Constant 1.026** 
 (2.081) 
N 367 
adj. R-sq -0.008 
Notes: In this table I match each bank with a non-bank institution based on the size. The dependent 
variable is the cumulative abnormal return of bank issued equity less that of its matched non-bank 
institution issued equity, which is measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date. 
All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 1. Constant denotes the constant term δ_0. N denotes 
the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter examines whether the announcement effect of SEOs by commercial banks 
differs from that of non-banks. The results suggest that banks experience less negative 
announcement stock returns than non-banks when issuing equity. The difference in the 
cumulative stock returns associated with equity offered by banks is 0.61 percent higher than 
that issued by non-banks. The baseline regression and matching sample results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that bank regulation reveals positive information about banks. First, bank 
monitoring regulations limit the an of banks at the time of the SEO; second, there is an 
incentive for banks to avoid excessive risk-taking due to the existence of capital regulation; 
and third, the market perceives that commercial banks may benefit from the government’s 
implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy. Therefore, the market is less likely to assume that 
bank SEOs signal information that the bank is overvalued compared to their non-bank 
counterparts.  
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Chapter 5 Empirical analysis: Bank regulation and cross country 
SEO announcement effect 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
Results reported in chapters 3 and 4 show that the announcement effect associated with 
bank-issued securities is less negative than non-bank firms. The explanation may be that 
banks face more stringent regulation than non-bank firms, and may thus be less able to take 
advantage of differential information between the managers and the public. Consequently, 
the market is less likely to assume that the issuance of securities by banks signals information 
that the bank is overvalued. A natural question one may ask is that does the level of the 
stringency of bank regulation may thus have a positive impact on the announcement effect 
upon equity issuance announcement? The answer may not be as simple as a “yes”.  
The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether and to what extent the market would 
react differently when banks in countries with different levels of bank regulation announced 
SEOs. I consider regulatory monitoring in addition to capital regulation because, according 
to Campbell, Chan, and Marino (1992), direct monitoring will partially substitute for capital 
requirements in the optimal scheme. I hypothesise an inverted U-shaped relation between 
the stringency of bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effects. Under a mild bank 
regulation environment, the market perceives that more regulation helps to reduce moral 
hazard and risk-taking by banks. Hence, the market will react more positively to an SEO 
announcement by a bank compared to a less regulated market. However, if bank regulation 
becomes too stringent and increases beyond a certain level, investors may be concerned that 
the too stringent regulation reduces the franchise value of the bank and hence induces more 
risk-taking. Given the increased moral hazard problem, the market may react more 
negatively to the bank SEO announcement in more regulated markets.  
The global data on SEOs by banks are used in this chapter. Following Laeven and Levine 
(2009) I consider five aspects of bank regulation adopted from Barth et al. (2004). The 
regression analysis includes both linear and quadratic terms of five bank regulation measures 
to examine the hypothesised inverted U-shaped relation between bank regulation and the 
bank SEO announcement effect. The latter is measured by the CAR over the three-day event 
window around the announcement date. The findings support the hypothesis that there exists 
an inverted U-shaped relation between the SEO announcement effect and initial capital 
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stringency, depositor protection, prompt corrective action, and total regulation. These 
findings are robust after controlling for bank-, market-, and country-specific variables. 
I attempt to address the endogeneity between bank regulation stringency and SEO 
announcement effects. The observed relation between the bank regulation measures and 
SEO announcement effects may be driven by some factors that are not controlled for in the 
regression model. Bank regulation tends to be strengthened from various aspects after the 
adoption of Basel II that varies across country and time. Therefore, I use the exogenous 
cross-country, cross-year variation in the timing of the Basel II adoption as the instrument 
to bank regulation stringency in order to assess the causal impact of bank regulation on SEO 
announcement effects. The main results hold in this two-staged least square regression 
analysis, indicating that endogeneity is not a major issue for this study. Finally, the impact 
of involuntary equity issuance on the relation between bank SEO announcement effect and 
bank regulation stringency is examined. Previous research suggests that moral hazard exists 
mainly in under-capitalised banks that take excessive risks to exploit risk-shifting benefits 
of deposit insurance. Well-capitalised banks take more risks because they are remote from 
insolvency (Calem and Rob, 1999) or because of factors exogenous to the portfolio decisions, 
such as managerial incompetence or a lack of lending opportunities (Gorton and Rosen, 
1996). Hence, the relation between bank capital regulation and bank SEO announcement 
effects may be different between under- (involuntary) and well-capitalised (voluntary) bank 
issuance (Gorton and Rosen, 1996). I include an indicator for involuntary issues and the 
interaction of this indicator with both the linear and the quadratic terms of initial capital 
stringency. The results show that involuntary banks SEOs are associated with more negative 
SEO announcement effects than voluntary issues. However, the stringency of the regulation 
on the source of funds that can be counted as regulatory capital does not have any further 
impact on the announcement effects of these involuntary issuances. These results are 
consistent with Cornett and Tehranian’s (1994)’s finding that the issuance of equity required 
to maintain capital standards (involuntary issuance) does not convey any signal of future 
prospects of the firm. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 outlines the process of 
quantitative data collection and analysis, including the data sources and the sample selection. 
Section 5.3 discusses the control variables used in this chapter, including the measure of 
bank regulation. Section 5.4 outlines the descriptive statistics of depending, independent, 
and control variables used in the regression models. After that, the estimated OLS results are 
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discussed step by step in section 5.5. Section 5.6 provides the robustness test. Finally, section 
5.7 provides the overall discussions and conclusions. 
 
5.2 Data sources and data selection 
I select data from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) (1999, 2003, 
2007, 2011) database of the World Bank. These four worldwide surveys on bank regulation 
are conducted by Barth et al. (2004, 2006, 2008, 2012). The first three surveys capture 
information as of 1999, 2001, and 2005 respectively. The 2012 survey covers the period of 
2008-2010. This comprehensive survey database is compiled from answers provided by 
official regulatory and supervisory authorities and includes various measures on bank 
regulation.   
I consider four aspects or measures of bank regulation adopted the BRSS. First, activity 
restriction is an indicator of the degree to which national regulatory authorities allow banks 
to engage in three fee-based activities, which are securities market activities (e.g., 
underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry), insurance (e.g., 
insurance underwriting and selling), and real estate businesses (e.g., real estate investment, 
development, and management). Second, initial capital stringency measures whether the 
source of funds that count as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or 
government securities, borrowed funds, and whether the regulatory/supervisory authorities 
verify the sources of capital. Third, depositor protection is an index of deposit insurer power 
to measure each country’s deposit insurance regime and to trace its evolution from 1999 to 
2011. It measures the extent to which the regulator has the authority to make the decision to 
intervene in a bank, take legal action against bank directors or officials, and has ever taken 
any legal action against bank directors or officers. Fourth, prompt corrective action measures 
the extent to which the law establishes pre-determined levels of bank solvency deterioration 
that forces automatic enforcement actions, such as intervention, and the extent to which 
supervisors have the requisite, suitable powers to do so. Finally, I collapse these four 
regulation measures into a single measure of bank regulation --- total regulation --- by using 
factor analysis.  
Data on SEOs, the initial sample of announcement dates and other features consists of 
all the equity issuances on global market from January 2001 to December 2012, is obtained 
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from the Securities Data Company (SDC Platinum) global new issues database. The issuing 
firm's stock price data and bank account data are collected from DataStream.  
I matched the bank-level information with the bank regulation measures to explore the 
link between bank regulations, supervision, depositor protection, and bank issued equity 
announcement effect. Following Barth et al. (2013), the values of regulatory variables for 
year 2001 is taken from the first survey for 1999; the values of regulatory variables for the 
period of 2002-2004 are taken from the second survey for 2003; the values of regulatory 
variables for the period of 2005-2008 are taken from the survey for 2007 and the regulatory 
measures for the period of 2008-2012 are taken from the fourth survey 2011. I also tried 
some alternative ways to assign values, such as moving all the thresholds one year before or 
1 year later and found the results to be quite robust. 
The banks included in the sample are chosen on the basis of data availability: 1) I only 
include the countries with index price in Datastream; 2) I exclude New Zealand because all 
its major banks are subsidiaries of Australian banks and these are already included in the 
sample; 3) I exclude those countries with less than 10 SEOs during the whole sample period 
to allow for a meaningful sample of banks to represent each country. The sample consists of 
1,307 SEOs from 21 countries over the sample period of 2001-2012. 
The banks included in the final sample are chosen on the basis of data availability: I only 
include countries which there is price index in Datastream. New Zealand is excluded because 
all its major banks are subsidiaries of Australian banks, which are already included in the 
sample. I only include the countries with more than 10 observations. The final sample 
consists of 1,307 equity issues from 663 banks in 31 countries over the sample period.  
5.3 Control variables  
5.3.1 Bank regulation measures 
Following Levine and Laeven (2009), I use (from Barth et al., 2004, 2006, 2008, and 
2012 database), capital regulatory variables, activity restrictions, official supervisory action 
variables, and deposit insurance, as the proxies of bank regulation. In a broad survey of rules 
governing banking systems, Barth et al. (2004, 2006, 2008) document various regulatory 
restrictions on commercial banks, including various entry and exit restrictions and practices. 
I choose regulations stressed by the Basel Committee and regulations that theory highlights 
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as affecting bank behaviour. I classify the survey question used into four groups: regulatory 
restrictions on bank activities, capital regulations, official supervisory action, and deposit 
insurance. 
Activity restrictions could affect bank issued equity announcement effect through 
reducing competition and limiting economies of scope. Claessens and Laeven (2004) find 
that cross-country variations in bank competition can be explained by differences in a lack 
of activity restrictions, with few restrictions enhancing competition. That means, when faced 
with fewer restrictions to conducting other fee-based financial activities, banks may make 
use of the chance to provide customers with more financial products other than traditional 
interest-based activities. In other words, commercial banks may be able to compete with 
each other in various kinds of areas apart from taking deposits and making loans. Keeley 
(1990) suggests that anticompetitive restrictions endow banks with market power and 
increase the value of the bank’s charter, which reduces banks’ incentives to take the risk. 
Goddard et al (2011) also suggest that restrictions on permissible banking services offered 
might improve the safety and soundness of the banking system, by minimising opportunities 
for banks to accept the excessive risk, eliminating some conflicts of interest, and simplifying 
supervision. Investors may thus have more confidence in bank issued equity because of this 
less risk taking behaviour.  
Broad financial activities, however, might intensify moral hazard problems and provide 
more opportunities for banks to increase risk taking (Boyd et al., 1998). Moreover, broad 
activities may lead to the formation of extremely large and complex entities that are 
extraordinarily difficult to monitor and “too big to discipline” (Laeven and Levine, 2007). 
Thus banks with broad activities are more likely to issue equities with more negative 
announcement effects since investors may perceive these banks are complex and opaque and 
have confidence on the equity issued by them.  
Barth et al (2004) suggest broad banking power allows the bank to diversify income 
sources and enhance stability. Restrictions on bank activities limit the banks’ diversification 
and reduce the banking power. Thus, greater activity restrictions may have a negative impact 
on bank issue equity announcement effect because it reduces banks’ stability. Therefore, 
there may exist a non-linear effect of activity restrictions on the announcement effect 
associated with bank issued equity. 
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Activity restrictions is an indicator, as adopted from Barth et al. (2004), of the degree to 
which national regulatory authorities allow banks to engage in three fee-based activities, 
which are securities market activities (e.g., underwriting, brokering, dealing and all aspects 
of the mutual fund industry), insurance (e.g., insurance underwriting and selling) and real 
estate businesses (e.g., real estate investment, development, and management). Barth et al 
(2004) define these three fee-based activities as follows: 
(1) Securities activities measure the ability of banks to engage in the business of securities 
underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry.  
This ability is based on the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in 
securities activates.  
(2) Insurance activities: the ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling. 
This ability is based on the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in 
insurance activities.  
(3) Real estate activities: the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, 
development, and management. This ability is based on the level of regulatory 
restrictiveness for bank participation in real estate activities. 
If the answer to these questions is that the full range of activities can be conducted 
directly in the bank, the level of regulatory restrictiveness can be defined as ‘unrestricted’ 
and coded as score 1. If the full range of activities can be conducted, but some or all must be 
conducted in subsidiaries, it can be defined as ‘permitted’ and coded as score 2. If less than 
the full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries, it can be defined as 
‘restricted’ and counted as score 3. If the activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or 
subsidiaries, it is defined as ‘prohibited’ and counted as score 4.   
A fourth question needed to be considered is the ability of banks to own and control 
nonfinancial firms. The level of ability is based on the answer to the question:  
(4) Can banks own voting shares in the nonfinancial firm?  
If a bank own 100% of the equity in any non-financial firm can be defined as 
‘unrestricted’, and counted as score 1. If a may own 100% of the equity in a nonfinancial 
firm but ownership is limited based upon a bank’s equity capital is defined as ‘permitted’ 
and counted as score 2. If a bank can only acquire less than 100% of the equity in a 
nonfinancial firm is defined as ‘restricted’ and counted as score 3. If a bank does not acquire 
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any equity investment in a nonfinancial firm is defined as ‘prohibited’ and counted as score 
4. 
The Activity restriction measure is thus the average of the above four indicators, which 
ranges from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate greater restriction and a higher level of 
regulation stringency.  
Initial capital stringency is considered to affect bank issue equity announcement effect 
as it specifies the required amount of capital that bank owners must have at risk. If bank 
owners are required to have more capital at risk, the upside gains that they would enjoy from 
greater risk taking would be countervailed by the potential downside loss of their capital 
(Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005; Barth et al., 2013). Therefore, official capital adequacy 
regulations are seen as an important role in aligning the incentives of bank owners with 
depositors and other creditors, which results in more careful lending and better bank 
performance (Keeley and Furlong, 1990; Kaufman, 1991; Barth et al., 2006). Capital 
regulation may hence give investors more confidence in the securities issued by banks, 
leading to a more positive announcement effect of bank issued equity. 
Capital provides loanable funds and buffers earning decline for the bank, which imply 
that better-capitalised banks could be safer. Keeley and Furlong (1990) demonstrated that 
capital controls do indeed enhance bank safety. They suggest that lower capital, holding 
asset risk constant, leads to less protection against failure. The lower capital ratio also 
increases the incentive for banks to increase asset risk.  
This positive relationship, however, may not be linear given the existence of the possible 
regulatory costs in the form of a higher barrier to entry and greater rent extraction by 
governments that result from higher capital requirements (Barth et al., 2013). Moreover, 
Mehran and Thakor (2011) suggest that high capital level of bank reduces bank’s market 
value by giving a protective cushion for the manager who has less willingness to subject 
himself to capital market discipline. Hellmann et al. (2001) also provide empirical evidence 
that higher capital requirements may induce the bank to take more prudent portfolio risk on 
one hand but may also reduce charter values and thereby encourage more gambling 
behaviour on the other hand. 
I use the initial capital stringency as a proxy of the capital regulatory stringency (Barth 
et al., 2006). Initial capital stringency measures whether the source of funds that count as 
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regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities, borrowed 
funds, and whether the regulatory/supervisory authorities verify the sources of capital. This 
index is based on following question (Yes=1, No=0): Are the sources of funds to be used as 
capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? Can the initial disbursement or 
subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? 
Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? Initial capital stringency 
is calculated by the sum of the answers to these questions divided by 3. Higher values 
indicate greater stringency. 
Public interest view argues that bank supervisors have the incentive and expertise to 
overcome market failures due to imperfect information (Beck et al., 2006). Strong 
supervisory control can prevent managers from engaging in the excessive risk-taking 
behaviour (Klomp and Haan, 2012). Fernandez and Gonzales (2005) also report that in 
countries with low accounting and auditing requirements more supervisory control appears 
to reduce risk. Therefore, a powerful supervisory agency that directly monitors and 
disciplines banks can enhance the corporate governance of banks and boost investors’ 
confidence in banks issued securities. However too stringent supervision could have a 
negative impact on bank development, performance, and stability (Barth et al., 2004; 
Djankov et al., 2002), which may perceive equity investors want a discount on the stock 
price if a bank announces an equity issuance in a highly regulated and supervisory banking 
market. 
Prompt corrective action measures the extent to which the law establishes pre-
determined levels of bank solvency deterioration that force automatic enforcement actions, 
such as intervention, and the extent to which supervisors have the requisite, suitable powers 
to do so. This variable is based on several questions (Yes=1, No=0):  
(1) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organisational 
structure? 
(2) Are there any mechanisms of cease and desist type orders, whose infraction leads 
to the automatic imposition of civil and penal sanctions on the bank’s directors 
and managers?  
(3) Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses?  
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(4) Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute 
dividends?  
(5) Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute bonuses?  
(6) Can the supervisory agency suspend the director’s decision to distribute 
management fees?  
Prompt corrective action is calculated as the sum of the score for each question and 
divided by 6. A Higher value indicates greater supervisory power. 
Depositor protection. According to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), a deposit 
insurance system influences bank soundness in two opposite ways. On the one hand, bank 
runs are less likely to occur when deposits are insured. Deposit insurance can rule out bank 
runs without reducing the ability of banks to transform assets. O’Hara and Shaw (1990) 
suggest that deposit insurance protects individual financial institutions from instability in the 
intermediation process, thereby providing stability to the financial system as a whole. 
Therefore, equity issued by banks with deposit insurance issue gives the market a positive 
signal and increases investors’ confidence. 
 On the other hand, the deposit protection scheme of banks can create moral hazard 
problem, which leads to bank’s excessive risk-taking behaviour (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; 
Gorton and Huang, 2004; Dam and Koetter, 2012). The excessive risk makes banks more 
complex and less transparent, which intensifies the information asymmetry problem between 
bank and investors when banks announce SEOs hence reduce the investor’s confidence for 
bank-issued securities. This may put a downward pressure on the bank issued equity’s 
announcement effect. Dam and Koetter (2012) also provide empirical evidence by using all 
observed capital preservation measures and distressed exists in the German banking industry 
during 1995-2006, that bank bailouts makes bank taking additional risk. Santos (2001) also 
get the same conclusion from depositor monitoring aspect, that government bears the risk by 
offering a guarantee that depositors are not subject to lose. Therefore, depositors reduce the 
incentive to monitor banks and to demand an interest payment commensurate with the risk 
of the bank. Barth et al. (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) provide evidence 
that an explicit deposit insurance scheme tends to increase the probability of banking crisis. 
However, Laeven and Levine (2009) suggest that deposit insurance is associated with an 
increase in risk only when the bank has a large equity holder with sufficient power to act on 
the additional risk-taking incentives created by deposit insurance.  
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Therefore, the relationship between deposit protection level and bank issued equity 
announcement effect may be nonlinear, as deposit insurance may increase investors’ 
confidence on the equity issued by banks, but also may lead to an additional risk-taking 
behaviour if the deposit insurance level goes too high, which gives a negative signal to the 
market.  
Followed by Barth et al (2008), depositor protection is based on the answer to the 
following questions (Yes=1, No=0): 
(1) Does the deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene a bank? 
(2) Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action for violations against 
laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against bank 
directors or other bank officials? 
(3) Has the deposit insurance agency/fund ever taken legal action for violations 
against laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) against 
bank directors or other bank officials? 
(4) Were any deposits not explicitly covered by deposit insurance at the time of the 
failure compensated when the bank failed (excluding funds later paid out in 
liquidation procedures)? 
Depositor protection= {[(1)+(2)+(3)]/3 + (4)}/2. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, 
where higher values indicate greater level of depositor protection. 
 
5.3.2 Control variables 
I also include bank-specific, market-specific, and country-specific variables in the 
analysis of equity issues announcement stock returns. For bank-specific variables, I control 
for firm size, equity level, risk level, equity-related financing costs level. For market-specific, 
I include market volatility and the market run-up to control market risk and overall market 
and economic conditions. Some of the control variables are the same as chapter 5, including 
(lnTA, Equity/total assets, market run-up, stock run-up, stock return volatility). Besides 
these variables, I also add one firm-specific variable and four country-specific variables 
since this is a cross-country study. I use GDP deflator and economics freedom as the country 
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level variables to control for differences in economics development and institutions across 
countries. Appendix 1 provides the detailed definition of each of the variables. 
Diversification is measured as non-interest income divided by total revenue. Liu et al., 
(2013) suggest that the diversification of bank can be positively related to bank stability due 
to the diversification benefits. This may give investors more confidence in the security issued 
by a bank and lead to less negative announcement effect. However, Stiroh (2004) and Beck 
et al. (2009) also suggest that more diversified banks experience less stable performance 
than their less diversified counterparts, which may harm the announcement effect upon bank 
equity issuance. Therefore, I have no clear expectation on the relationship between bank’s 
diversification and equity announcement effect. 
Inflation is expected to have a negative impact on announcement effect of equity 
offerings issued by banks. High inflation is often associated with high relative price volatility, 
which may give investors a signal that the operational risk of the bank is high and want a 
discount on the stock price. Boyd et al. (2001) find a significant, economically important 
and negative relationship between inflation and banking sector development. This lower 
development also could reduce investors’ confidence in bank issued equity.  
KKZ index is an index of institutional development. The KKZ-index is from Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008). According to Kaufmann et al. (2008), KKZ is based on six 
dimensions of governance. Higher KKZ value indicates a more advanced level of 
development. 
Economic freedom is the average value for the period 2001-2012 of an index of 
economic freedom (freedom from government interference afforded to businesses and 
individuals). It measures the extent of how much freedom individuals and firms can get from 
their governments to carry on with their business. This indicator ranges in value from 1 to 5, 
with greater values signifying better protections of freedoms. It is calculated as 6 minus the 
economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation. I expect a positive relationship between 
economic freedom and equity announcement effect. 
 GDP growth is expected to associate with positive bank issued equity announcement 
effect. Because with higher GDP growth, banks might have more business opportunities and 
can sustain positions of abnormal profitability (Goddard et al, 2011). Beck et al (2006) also 
suggest that the growth rate of GDP is positively correlated with firm growth, indicating that 
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firms grow faster in an economy with greater growth opportunities. This may give the 
investor more incentive to invest because they may think that the purpose for bank issue 
equity is to raise money for some project with positive NPV. 
 
5.4 Summary statistics 
Table 6.1 shows the characteristics of regulatory restrictions across countries, where I 
observe a wide variation in all aspects of the regulation measures of Activity restriction, 
Initial capital stringency, Depositor protection, Prompt corrective action, and Total 
regulation. 
Activity restriction varies from a low of around 0.13 in Germany and 0.14 in Thailand 
to a high of 0.75 in China. These results indicate that China forbids banks from most non-
banking activities, such as securities, insurance, and real estate activities. Germany and 
Thailand, on the other hand, have relatively low restrictions for banks that want to participate 
in these markets. With the highest value of Initial capital stringency (1.00), U.K. banks can 
include other funds than cash, government securities and borrowed funds as regulatory 
capital. I find that, on average, developing countries have lower Depositor protection. The 
average value for Depositor protection of Brazil, Chile, China, India, are all zero, which 
indicate that these countries barely have explicit deposit insurance scheme for banks during 
the sample period. Low depositor protection is not only limited to developing countries: 
Greece, the U.K., and Austria also score low on depositor protection (all have scores below 
0.01). Indonesia has the greatest supervision power with the highest prompt corrective action 
level (1.00), indicating the greatest power to force automatic enforcement actions when the 
level of bank solvency deterioration is reached. The Total regulation index varies from 0.02 
(China) to 0.85 (U.S.) with an average value of 0.62.  
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Table 5.1 Summary statistics for regulation variables of equity issuers 
Country N 
Activity 
restriction 
Initial capital 
stringency 
Depositor 
protection 
Prompt 
corrective 
action 
Total 
regulation 
Australia 89 0.44 0.78 0.13 0.88 0.49 
Austria 13 0.51 0.46 0.01 0.78 0.17 
Brazil 11 0.70 0.64 0.00 0.86 0.22 
Canada 19 0.52 0.82 0.53 0.47 0.78 
Chile 11 0.51 0.33 0.30 0.95 0.28 
China 19 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.02 
France 13 0.38 0.67 0.46 0.51 0.67 
Germany 46 0.13 0.57 0.49 0.56 0.70 
Greece 43 0.46 0.88 0.00 0.64 0.48 
Hong Kong 11 0.64 0.56 0.11 0.82 0.26 
India 122 0.45 0.33 0.00 0.76 0.09 
Indonesia 44 0.70 0.33 0.38 1.00 0.27 
Israel 20 0.42 0.73 0.03 0.81 0.40 
Italy 39 0.50 0.75 0.19 0.31 0.50 
Japan 91 0.49 0.64 0.09 0.94 0.35 
Malaysia 16 0.38 0.67 0.26 0.63 0.53 
Portugal 17 0.37 0.69 0.03 0.76 0.38 
Spain 20 0.46 0.45 0.30 0.58 0.39 
Thailand 21 0.14 0.52 0.02 0.73 0.33 
U.K. 15 0.39 1.00 0.01 0.35 0.58 
USA 641 0.46 0.84 0.58 0.92 0.85 
Total 
130
7 0.45 0.72 0.37 0.83 0.62 
Notes: This table includes the countries that are included in this study. The Column N represents the 
number of SEOs by banks from this country in the sample period (January 2001 to December 2012). The 
remainder of the table reports the mean figures (in percentage form) of the regulation variables over the 
sample period for each country. A detailed description of the definitions of the variables is included in 
Appendix 1. 
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I also include bank-specific, market-specific, and country-specific variables in the 
analysis of SEOs announcement stock returns. Ln(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of 
total assets, which measures the size of the bank. Previous studies (Kang and Stulz (1996), 
De Roon and Veld (1998), Abhyankar and Dunning (1999), and Lewis, Rogalski, and 
Seward (1999)) suggest that larger firms are likely to have a lower level of information 
asymmetry, and may be associated with more negative announcement effects. The Capital 
Level of the bank is measured as the Equity/total assets ratio. Firms with a lower capital 
level are considered riskier, facing higher expected costs of financial distress. Diversification 
is a control variable for the level of bank diversification and is measured as non-interest 
income divided by total revenue. In previous studies, bank diversification is to have a 
conflicting impact on bank risk-taking (Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson (2013), Stiroh, (2004), 
and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006)), which may have implications on bank’s 
moral hazard and the SEO announcement effects.  
Market run-up is the cumulated stock return over the window (-60, -2) relative to the 
announcement date. It measures the overall market and economic conditions, as well as the 
growth expectations, during the period leading up to the security offer (see, for example, 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003); Lowry (2003)). Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) argue that 
the investor reactions are typically less negative following the increases in stock market 
prices because of the lower costs of external equity financing during market expansions. 
Therefore, investors react less negative in good economic conditions. Stock run-up is the 
cumulated stock return over the window (-60, -2) relative to the announcement date. Lucas 
and McDonald (1990) argue that, after a period of positive abnormal returns, overvalued 
firms have incentives to issue equity directly. Stock return volatility is the annualised stock 
return volatility measuring firm’s riskiness calculated from daily returns over the day 
interval from -250 to -10 relative to the equity issue date. A number of previous studies 
assume that firms with a higher stock return volatility face higher costs of attracting new 
debt financing (see, for example, Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (1999, 2003)).   
Finally, I control for a group of country-specific variables, which are Inflation, KKZ-
index (an index of institutional development), Economic Freedom, and GDP growth. The 
KKZ-index is from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008). A higher value of the KKZ-
index indicates a more advanced level of institutional development. Economic freedom is 
derived from the Heritage Foundation and is the average value for the period 2001-2012 of 
an index of economic freedom (freedom from government interference afforded to 
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businesses and individuals). It measures the extent of how much freedom individuals and 
firms can get from their governments to carry on with their business. I expect bank SEO 
announcement effect is associated with lower inflation, higher GDP growth, better 
institutional development, and more economic freedom.  
Table 5.2 shows the summary statistics of the key variables of this study. The highest 
and the lowest 2% of each variable have been eliminated from the sample to mitigate the 
potential distortions that may be caused by the extreme outliers. The Total Assets of the 
banks in the sample range from $0.04 billion to $3,060 billion, with the average total assets 
being $197 billion. Capital Level is measured as Equity/Total Assets. The results for this 
variable show that banks on average hold 7.27 per cent equity to their total assets, which is 
below the requirement of capital regulation. This result is consistent with Berger and 
Bouwman (2011). The Diversification variables show that, on average, 32.16% of the total 
operating income of the banks in the sample is from non-interesting income, with the 
minimum and maximum being 6.93% and 71.85%, respectively. Bank SEOs announcements 
are on average preceded by a significant market run-up (4%) and individual stock run-ups 
(4.32%), indicating that banks tend to announce SEOs after a period of stock price 
appreciations. The KKZ-index ranges from -0.93 to 1.69 indicating a wide variation of 
institutional development across the sample countries. The Economic Freedom index also 
shows significant variations among sample countries from 5 to 90, with the mean value being 
72.38. 
Table 5.2 Summary statistics for CAR and variables 
Variable N mean t-statistics stddev median min max 
Firm-specific variables        
Total assets 1307 197*** 13.42 518 14 0.04 3060 
Equity/total assets 1307 7.27*** 82.84 3.22 6.88 1.53 16.38 
Diversification 1307 32.16*** 76.23 15.21 30.73 6.93 71.85 
Market runup 1307 4.00*** 18.17 8.3 5.44 -21.54 22.21 
Stock runup 1307 4.32*** 10.86 14.87 4.56 -33.28 42.81 
Stock return volatility 1307 80.50*** 46.3 63.84 47.6 9.79 174.77 
Country-specific variables        
Inflation 183 2.61*** 36.67 2.66 2.23 -6.01 18.15 
KKZ index 183 0.96*** 59.73 0.63 1.2 -0.93 1.69 
Economic freedom 183 72.38*** 273.16 9.87 78 51 90 
GDP growth 183 2.19*** 23.67 3.34 2.55 -7.1 14.2 
Notes: This table provides the summary statistics for the control variables of the bank-specific and country-
specific variables over the sample period of January 2001 to December 2012. The sample consists of 500 banks 
in 21 countries for a 4-period panel. The variables are defined as outlined in Appendix 1. Total assets are in 
billion U.S. dollars. N denotes the number of observations. *** represent significance at 1% significance level. 
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Table 5.3 provides the mean and median values of the cumulative abnormal stock 
returns (CARs) for the SEO announcements for the banks in the whole sample.  
The CARs are measured using a market model with an estimation window of (-250, 
-10). The mean CAR for the 1,307 observations over event window (-1, 1) is -0.74%. The 
median CAR over the same event window is -0.45%. Both mean and median are significant 
at the 1%-significance level. As a robustness check, I also calculate CARs for slightly 
different event windows. As can be seen from Table 6.3 all these CARs have means and 
medians that are negative and that are significantly different from zero at the 1%-level. 
  
Table 5.3 Cumulative abnormal return 
 
Event window N Mean Median 
(-1,1) 1307 -0.74*** -0.45*** 
(-1,0) 1307 -0.67*** -0.32*** 
(-1,2) 1307 -1.02*** -0.71*** 
(-2,1) 1307 -0.96*** -0.52*** 
(0,1) 1307 -0.79*** -0.35*** 
(0,2) 1307 -0.55*** -0.54*** 
Notes: This table provides the mean and median values of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
different event windows over the sample period from January 2001 to December 2012. CARs are 
estimated using the standard market model procedure with time window (day -250, day -10) as the 
estimation window.  Day 0 is the announcement date. N represents the number of observations. *** 
represents a 1% significance level using a two-tailed test. 
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5.5 Multivariate analysis 
5.5.1 Regression analysis 
The overall results presented in Table 5.4 imply a curvilinear, non-monotonic 
relation between these regulation measures and the CAR associated with bank SEOs (the 
regression model and the estimation of CAR are mentioned in chapter 3). The results show 
a positive and significant coefficient for Initial capital stringency, Depositor protection, 
Prompt corrective action, and Total Regulation, and a negative and significant coefficient 
for their quadratic terms, respectively. These results support the hypothesis that there is an 
inverted U-shaped relation between the stringency of bank regulation and bank SEO 
announcement effects. Under a mild bank regulation environment, the market perceives that 
more regulation helps to take less risk and to reduce the moral hazard of banks. Hence, the 
market reacts more positively to the bank SEO announcement compared to a less regulated 
market. However, if bank regulation becomes too stringent and increases beyond a certain 
level investors are likely to become concerned that the too stringent regulation reduces the 
franchise value of the banks and that this regulation will induce more risk-taking by the 
banks. Thus, the market may react more negatively to bank SEO announcement in more 
regulated markets.  
I calculate the inflection point of the quadratic function and compare it with the 
distribution of the data. In column (4), the inflection point is 0.61. The CAR increases at first 
and reaches the maximum value as Initial capital stringency reaches 0.61, and then it declines 
continuously as Initial capital stringency continues to 1. The inflection point for Depositor 
protection, Prompt corrective action, and Total regulation are 0.32, 0.55, and 0.55, 
respectively.  
The only regulation variable for which I don’t find significant results is Activity 
Restriction. On one hand, Barth et al (2004) suggest that restricting bank activities is 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of suffering a major crisis because broad 
banking power allows the bank to diversify income sources and enhance stability. However, 
on the other hand, broad financial activities might intensify moral hazard problems and 
provide more opportunities for banks to increase risk taking (Boyd et al., 1998). Moreover, 
broad activities may lead to the formation of extremely large and complex entities that are 
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extraordinarily difficult to monitor and “too big to discipline” (Laeven and Levine, 2007). 
Thus banks with broader activities are more likely to experience a more negative 
announcement effect upon equity issuance since investors may perceive these banks to be 
too complex and opaque. Therefore, these investors may have less confidence in equity 
issuance by these banks. This finding of insignificant coefficients on Activity restriction may 
be the result of these two cancelling effects of bank diversification on bank performance. 
This result is also consistent with the insignificant results of Diversification as a control 
variable in the regression model. 
The signs and significance levels of the control variables are to a large degree in line 
with my expectations. For example, bank size, measured as Ln(Total Assets), is an important 
determinant of the SEO announcement effect where large banks SEOs are more likely to be 
associated with higher CARs. This result is consistent with Abhyankar and Dunning (1999), 
who find that larger banks are more efficient and have less information asymmetry problems. 
I observe that Market run-up tends to be positively associated with the bank SEO 
announcement effect. This finding is consistent with Choe (1993) who find that investor 
reactions are less negative following increases in stock market prices. I also observe that the 
GDP growth is positively related to the bank SEO announcement effect. This result is 
expected, since, with higher GDP growth, banks might have more business opportunities 
and can sustain positions of abnormal profitability (Goddard et al, 2011).
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Table 5.4 Bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Activity restriction Initial capital stringency Depositor protection Prompt corrective action Total regulation 
Bank Regulation 0.944 14.615*** 3.362** 11.319*** 5.374* 
 (1.151) (2.777) (1.995) (3.347) (1.949) 
Bank Regulation squared -0.146 -11.891*** -5.312*** -10.369*** -4.855*** 
 (-0.696) (-3.222) (-3.101) (-4.027) (-2.613) 
lnTA 0.208** 0.186** 0.190** 0.202** 0.203** 
 (2.504) (2.233) (2.294) (2.438) (2.452) 
Equity/total assets 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 
 (0.599) (0.540) (0.537) (0.549) (0.511) 
Diversification -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.478) (-0.240) (-0.312) (-0.334) (-0.361) 
Market run-up 0.041* 0.043* 0.039* 0.037 0.037 
 (1.739) (1.828) (1.653) (1.584) (1.591) 
Stock run-up -0.023 -0.026 -0.024 -0.026 -0.025 
 (-1.406) (-1.560) (-1.465) (-1.560) (-1.546) 
Stock return volatility -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.432) (-1.443) (-1.355) (-1.376) (-1.352) 
Inflation -0.100 -0.155 -0.205** -0.157 -0.101 
 (-0.979) (-1.614) (-2.054) (-1.630) (-1.039) 
KKZ index -2.550 -3.268 -1.900 -2.541 -2.975 
 (-1.136) (-1.420) (-0.861) (-1.141) (-1.305) 
Economic freedom -0.007 -0.149 -0.090 -0.157 -0.172* 
 (-0.070) (-1.468) (-0.931) (-1.573) (-1.688) 
GDP growth 0.363*** 0.288** 0.275** 0.296** 0.312*** 
 (3.102) (2.487) (2.367) (2.567) (2.732) 
Constant -0.829 9.283 4.559 11.974 12.526 
 (-0.108) (1.095) (0.578) (1.438) (1.476) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 
adj. R-sq 0.036 0.043 0.045 0.044 0.044 
This table presents the results of the regression analyses of stock price reactions around bank SEOs from 21 countries for the period from January 2001 to December 2012. The dependent variable is 
the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date, calculated using standard event study methodology with the estimation period from -250 
days to -10 days. t-statistics are computed as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in Appendix 
1. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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5.5.2 Endogeneity issues 
In this section, I consider the endogeneity between bank regulation stringency and 
SEO announcement effects. The reverse causality may not be a serious concern in the 
regression analysis. However, simultaneity may exist, for example, the observed inverted U-
shaped relation between the bank regulation measures and the SEO announcement effects 
may be driven by some unknown factors that have an impact on both bank regulation and 
bank SEO announcement effects. I take advantage of the different timing of the adoption of 
Basel II framework by different countries as a source of exogenous variation. The Basel II 
accord adopts a “three pillars” concept. The first pillar deals with maintenance of regulatory 
capital calculated for three major components of risk that a bank faces: credit, operational, 
and market risk. The second pillar is a supervisory review, giving regulators more tools to 
supervise banks from different aspects. The third pillar is developing a set of disclosure 
requirements that allow the market participants to gauge the capital adequacy of a bank. 
Bank regulation tends to be strengthened from different aspects after the adoption of Basel 
II and that varies across countries and over time. For example, Austria adopted Basel II in 
2005, whereas China and Malaysia adopted it only in 2010. Consequently, I use the 
exogenous cross-country and cross-year variation in the timing of the Basel II adoption as 
the instrument to bank regulation stringency in order to assess the causal impact of bank 
regulation on SEO announcement effects.  
Table 5.5 provides the results of a two-stage least squares model. In the first stage, I 
run an OLS model of the bank regulation measures on its known determinants. I use the 
Basel II dummy (one for the time after the country adopted Basel II and 0 otherwise) as the 
instrumental variable for the regulation measures. The predicted values of bank regulations 
from the first stage are then used as the key explanatory variables in the second stage. In the 
first step, I find that the coefficients of Basel II are significantly positive for Initial capital 
stringency, Prompt corrective action, Depositor protection, and Total Regulation. These 
results indicate that bank regulation became more stringent after the adoption of Basel II by 
the respective countries. However, I find a significantly negative coefficient for the Basel II 
dummy for the Activity restriction variable. This result implies that, after the adoption of 
Basel II, banks are permitted to conduct more non-bank activities to diversify their income 
stream.  
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In the second step analysis, I find that the coefficients on the linear terms of Initial 
capital stringency, Prompt corrective action, Depositor protection, and Total Regulation are 
positive. At the same time, the square terms of these bank regulation measures are 
significantly negative. These findings confirm the main findings that the relation between 
bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effect is an inverted-U shaped non-linear 
relation.
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Table 5. 5 Bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effect, including treatment effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
1st stage:Activity 
restriction 
2nd stage: 
CAR 
1st stage:Initial 
capital stringency 
2nd stage: 
CAR 
1st stage:Depositor 
protection 
2nd stage: 
CAR 
1st stage:Prompt 
corrective action 
2nd stage: 
CAR 
1st stage:Total 
regulation 
2nd stage: 
CAR 
Bank regulation  2.033  20.030***  2.743**  21.168*  5.206*** 
  (0.357)  (3.056)  (1.963)  (1.705)  (2.923) 
Bank regulation squared  0.513  -14.713***  -4.551***  -15.127**  -4.649*** 
  (0.709)  (-3.611)  (-3.294)  (-2.179)  (-3.863) 
Basel II -0.078*  0.136***  0.360***  0.074***  0.356***  
 (-1.748)  (14.725)  (21.324)  (7.965)  (21.096)  
lnTA -0.002 0.245*** -0.006*** 0.222*** -0.009* 0.218*** -0.005*** 0.215*** -0.011** 0.221*** 
 (-0.263) (2.918) (-3.242) (2.812) (-1.951) (2.759) (-2.691) (2.731) (-2.364) (2.786) 
Equity/total assets 0.005* 0.002 0.000 0.018 -0.001 0.016 -0.000 0.017 -0.001 0.015 
 (1.785) (0.040) (0.555) (0.413) (-0.671) (0.378) (-0.285) (0.400) (-0.765) (0.348) 
Diversification -0.003** 0.003 0.001** -0.009 0.002** -0.007 0.000 -0.008 0.002*** -0.008 
 (-2.270) (0.135) (2.571) (-0.645) (2.576) (-0.497) (1.019) (-0.599) (3.099) (-0.560) 
Market run-up 0.004 0.009 0.002*** 0.026 0.002** 0.027 0.001*** 0.028 0.003*** 0.027 
 (1.458) (0.366) (4.561) (1.182) (2.021) (1.271) (2.589) (1.239) (2.817) (1.248) 
Stock run-up 0.001 -0.018 -0.001*** -0.019 -0.001*** -0.019 -0.000* -0.018 -0.001*** -0.019 
 (0.691) (-1.121) (-3.568) (-1.229) (-2.715) (-1.202) (-1.919) (-1.132) (-3.259) (-1.223) 
Stock return volatility 0.000 -0.005 -0.000* -0.005 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000 -0.004 
 (0.596) (-1.549) (-1.820) (-1.402) (0.438) (-1.334) (-0.415) (-1.392) (-0.173) (-1.338) 
Inflation 0.012 -0.071 -0.034*** 0.016 -0.063*** -0.106 -0.019*** -0.113 -0.069*** -0.044 
 (0.673) (-0.738) (-8.250) (0.137) (-11.368) (-1.070) (-4.928) (-0.984) (-10.684) (-0.423) 
KKZ index -1.259*** 5.456 -0.207*** 0.024 -0.427*** 0.482 -0.161*** 0.229 -0.343*** 0.034 
 (-5.258) (1.040) (-4.055) (0.013) (-4.326) (0.275) (-3.227) (0.119) (-3.534) (0.020) 
Economic freedom 0.029** -0.107 -0.028*** -0.072 -0.057*** -0.009 -0.011*** -0.031 -0.063*** -0.033 
 (2.348) (-0.870) (-9.748) (-0.812) (-9.620) (-0.113) (-3.854) (-0.378) (-10.578) (-0.382) 
GDP growth -0.020*** 0.304*** -0.010*** 0.187** -0.015*** 0.242*** -0.002 0.226*** -0.015*** 0.231*** 
 (-2.654) (2.833) (-5.329) (2.365) (-4.256) (3.170) (-1.289) (2.975) (-4.295) (3.046) 
Constant 1.646* -11.180 3.568*** -6.075 5.633*** -5.147 2.121*** -9.526 6.349*** -3.948 
 (1.758) (-0.925) (14.473) (-0.605) (11.623) (-0.663) (9.343) (-0.801) (13.080) (-0.489) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1296 1340 1296 1340 1296 1340 1296 1340 1296 1340 
adj. R-sq 0.399 0.033 0.765 0.042 0.651 0.040 0.667 0.036 0.696 0.043 
Notes:  This table presents the results of regression analyses of stock price reactions on bank issued SEO announcements from 21 countries for the period from January 2001 to December 2012. The dependent variable is the 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date, calculated using the standard event study methodology with the estimation period from -250 days to -10 days. I use a two 
stage least squares model to address the endogeneity problem between the bank regulation and CARs. I use the exogenous cross-country, cross-year variation in the timing of the Basel II adoption as the instrument to bank 
regulation stringency to assess the causal impact of bank regulation on SEO announcement effects. I report both the first and second stage results. In the first stage regression, I regress bank regulation measures on all exogenous 
variables and the instrument variable Basel II dummy. In the second stage, I use the predicted value of bank regulation measures from the first stage as the independent variable. The dependent variable in the second stage is the 
CAR. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in Appendix 1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
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5.6 Robustness test 
In this section, I consider the impact of involuntary equity issuance on the relation 
between the bank SEO announcement effect and the stringency level of bank regulation. 
Because of bank capital regulation, particularly after the implementation of the Basel Accord, 
banks are sometimes forced to involuntarily issue stock in order to meet government capital 
requirements. Besanko and Kanatas (1996) argue that forcing undercapitalised banks to issue 
equity in order to meet the government requirements reduces the expected surplus available 
to bank “insider” shareholders, who therefore provide less effort to monitor loan repayments. 
Hence, the reduction in insider effort reduces the equity value of the bank. For the period 
1975-1986, Keeley (1989) documents a more negative announcement effect for involuntary 
bank stock issues compared to voluntary issues. He proposes three explanations to this 
finding: the reduction of the value of the deposit insurance guarantee, the distortion of capital 
structure optimum, and the conveyance of unfavourable information about the firm.  
However, Cornett and Tehranian (1994) argue that for Keeley’s sample, the regulator 
has the discretion to force involuntary bank stock issuance. Therefore, such an issue may 
convey inside information about the issuing bank. Cornett and Tehanian (1994) instead 
classify equity issues by “undercapitalized” banks with total capital ratios below 7% as 
oluntary issues. They find that these involuntary stock issuances have significantly lower 
negative abnormal stock returns than voluntary stock issues. This finding confirms their 
hypothesis that the issuance of equity, required to maintain capital standards, does not 
convey any signal of future prospects of the firm. Meharn and Tehranian (1998) also find 
that commercial banks that voluntarily issue SEO exhibit a long-run decline in both 
operating performance and stock return performance following the issue. These firms also 
experience a systematic negative market reaction to quarterly earnings announcements 
following the issue. Cornett et al., (1998) find that banks voluntarily (but not involuntarily) 
issue common stock experience a significant drop in the matched adjusted operating 
performance, in benchmark firm’s adjusted stock prices following the issue. They also find 
there is a negative market reaction to post-issue quarterly earnings announcements. These 
results confirm that banks with the discretion to issue equity do so when they are overvalued. 
Using an extended data from 1983 through 2005 that covers more recent bank regulation 
changes, particularly the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) 
in 1991, Krishnan et al., (2010) find that both undercapitalised and well-capitalised banks 
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have significantly negative mean abnormal returns around SEO announcements. This result 
indicates that investors do not perceive these two types of banks to be economically different. 
Therefore, theories and empirical evidence on the relation between involuntary equity 
issuance and bank SEO announcement effects are not conclusive. 
Calem and Rob (1999) suggest that although banks take more risk-taking when 
capital levels are very low or very high (hence a U-shaped relation between bank capital and 
risk-taking), the incentives behind the risk-taking are different. Undercapitalized banks take 
more risks to exploit risk-shifting benefits of deposit insurance. Hence, they are a reflection 
of moral hazard problems. However, well-capitalised banks take more risks because they are 
far from insolvency. Gorton and Rosen (1996) also argue that well-capitalised banks take 
excessive risks because of factors exogenous to the portfolio decisions, such as managerial 
incompetence or a lack of lending opportunities. Therefore, the relation between bank 
regulation and bank SEO announcement effects may be different between under- 
(involuntary) and well-capitalised (voluntary) banks issuance.   
I conduct two empirical tests to investigate this relationship. First, I classify bank 
voluntary and involuntary SEOs based on the capital requirements of their own countries. I 
define a dummy variable, Involuntary, that takes a value of one if the bank SEO is issued 
when either of the following ratios is less than the requirement of the government: bank’s 
capital ratio, equity to assets ratio, tier 1 capital ratio, or total capital ratio (Bank’s capital 
ratio is the percentage of a bank’s capital to its risk-weighted assets. Equity to assets ratio is 
the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. Tier 1 capital ratio is the ratio of bank’s 
core equity capital to its total risk-weighted assets. The total capital ratio is tier 1 capital ratio 
and tier 2 capital ratio divided by risk-adjusted assets. All these data are from datastream.) 
Otherwise, the value of the dummy variable is zero. I include this dummy variable in the 
main regression to examine whether involuntary bank SEOs have higher or lower 
announcement effects than their voluntary counterparts. Second, I include interaction terms 
between the Involuntary dummy and both the linear and the quadratic terms of the Initial 
capital stringency variable. These are included in the main regression in order to examine 
whether the previously found inverted U-shaped relation between bank capital regulation 
and bank SEO announcement effects is different between voluntary and involuntary issues. 
I do not consider the other four regulation measures because voluntary/involuntary issuance 
is mainly related with bank capital regulation. 
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Table 5.6 shows the results of these robustness tests. In column (1) I find that the 
Involuntary dummy is significant and negative. This result is consistent with Keeley (1989) 
in the sense that the involuntary bank SEOs are associated with more negative announcement 
effects. In column (2) I find that for involuntary issuance, the coefficients for initial capital 
stringency and initial capital stringency squared are the opposite sign of those for voluntary 
issuance, and they are significant and at a similar level in magnitude. When I sum the 
coefficients of involuntary issuance and the interaction of involuntary issuance and Initial 
capital stringency, it is close to zero and is insignificantly different from zero. The same is 
also true if I sum the square term of involuntary issuance and its interaction term with initial 
capital stringency. These results indicate that bank capital regulation has no significant 
impact on involuntary bank SEO’s announcement effects. These results are consistent with 
Cornett and Tehranian’s (1994)’s finding that the issuance of equity required to maintain 
capital standards (involuntary issuance) does not convey any signal of future prospects of 
the firm.  
Overall, the results in Table 5.6 suggest that involuntary bank SEOs may signal more 
negative information (reduction of the value of the deposit insurance guarantee or the 
distortion of capital structure optimum) than voluntary bank SEOs and hence leads to more 
negative SEO announcement effects. However, the stringency of the regulation on the source 
of funds that can be counted as regulatory capital does not have any further impact on the 
announcement effects of these involuntary issuances. 
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Table 5.6 Bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effect, including involuntary issuance 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR CAR 
Initial capital stringency 13.771*** 18.775*** 
 (2.583) (3.059) 
Initial capital stringency squared -11.260*** -14.752*** 
 (-3.012) (-3.583) 
Involuntary * Initial capital stringency  -18.043** 
  (-2.550) 
Involuntary * Initial capital stringency squared  13.702** 
  (2.423) 
involuntary -1.052* 4.023** 
 (-1.700) (2.003) 
lnTA 0.185** 0.200** 
 (2.247) (2.407) 
Equity/total assets 0.009 0.011 
 (0.221) (0.258) 
Diversification -0.005 -0.004 
 (-0.331) (-0.323) 
Market run-up -0.024 -0.025 
 (-1.471) (-1.503) 
Stock run-up 0.043* 0.043* 
 (1.809) (1.824) 
Stock return volatility -0.158 -0.140 
 (-1.643) (-1.465) 
Inflation 0.266** 0.282** 
 (2.283) (2.427) 
KKZ index -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.393) (-1.405) 
Economic freedom -0.131 -0.171 
 (-1.285) (-1.619) 
GDP growth -3.426 -3.105 
 (-1.486) (-1.332) 
Constant 8.639 9.095 
 (1.016) (1.047) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes 
N 1307 1307 
adj. R-sq 0.045 0.046 
Notes:  This table presents the results of regression analyses of stock price reactions on bank issued SEO 
announcements from 21 countries for the period from January 2001 to December 2012. The dependent variable is the 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) measured over the window (-1,1) relative to the announcement date, calculated 
using a standard event study methodology with the estimation period from -250 days to -10 days. I include the dummy 
variable Involuntary and the interaction term of Involuntary and Initial capital stringency. Detailed definitions of 
variables can be found in the Appendix 1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. N denotes the number of observations. 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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I also consider the impact of the sample size of the U.S. issued SEOs. The 
relationship between the bank SEO announcement effect and the stringency level of bank 
regulation may be bias because of U.S. issuance. Therefore, I also conduct an empirical test 
without the U.S. sample to investigate this relationship as a robustness test. The results are 
very similar to the main results. There is a significantly positive coefficient of initial capital 
stringency and prompt corrective action, and a significantly negative coefficient of their 
quadratic terms, respectively. These results support the hypothesis that there is an inverted-
U shaped relation between the stringency of bank regulation and bank SEO announcement 
effects. The market reacts more positively to the bank SEO announcement compared to a 
less regulated market, but may react more negatively to bank SEO announcement when the 
bank regulation becomes too stringent. 
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Table 5.7 Bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effects, sample without US 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Activity 
restriction 
Initial capital 
stringency 
Prompt corrective 
action 
Depositor 
protection 
Total 
regulation 
Bank regulation 0.241 11.386** 15.006*** -1.661 -5.755 
 (0.278) (2.011) (3.252) (-0.556) (-1.255) 
Bank regulation squared -0.121 -8.538** -12.974*** 2.251 3.123 
 (-0.536) (-2.085) (-3.632) (0.574) (1.182) 
lnTA 0.283** 0.263** 0.272** 0.284** 0.277** 
 (2.300) (2.105) (2.200) (2.335) (2.229) 
Equity/total assets 0.028 0.019 0.029 0.024 0.028 
 (0.507) (0.342) (0.531) (0.438) (0.522) 
Diversification 0.015 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.018 
 (0.921) (1.034) (0.902) (0.960) (1.039) 
Market run-up 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.006 
 (0.214) (0.302) (0.258) (0.206) (0.260) 
Stock run-up -0.023 -0.024 -0.021 -0.023 -0.024* 
 (-1.573) (-1.611) (-1.454) (-1.546) (-1.651) 
Stock volatility -0.021 -0.026* -0.020 -0.023 -0.024* 
 (-1.547) (-1.845) (-1.448) (-1.585) (-1.760) 
Inflation -0.106 -0.122 -0.197** -0.103 -0.145 
 (-1.063) (-1.284) (-1.979) (-0.968) (-1.504) 
KKZ index -4.646 -5.502* -3.985 -4.979* -4.483 
 (-1.624) (-1.885) (-1.405) (-1.749) (-1.582) 
Economic freedom 0.072 0.061 0.140 0.080 0.038 
 (0.660) (0.545) (1.275) (0.690) (0.325) 
GDP growth 0.282** 0.293** 0.233* 0.292** 0.267** 
 (2.385) (2.440) (1.920) (2.452) (2.254) 
constant -4.397 -4.798 -12.405 -4.488 0.549 
 (-0.515) (-0.540) (-1.441) (-0.504) (0.054) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 641 641 641 641 641 
adj. R-sq 0.095 0.098 0.116 0.094 0.096 
Note: This table presents the results of regression analyses of stock price reactions around bank SEOs using the sample without the 
U.S. data. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the 
announcement date, calculated using standard event study methodology with the estimation period from -250 days to -10 days.  T-
statistics are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. Detailed 
definitions of variables can be found in Appendix I. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, *** represent statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.  
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I also consider the impact of the 2007-09 GFC. The relationship between the bank 
SEO announcement effect and the stringency level of bank regulation may be bias because 
of this GFC. Therefore, I conduct another empirical test and control for the crisis. I add a 
dummy variable ‘yearcrisis’ which equals to 1 if the SEOs issued during the year 2007 to 
the year 2009, otherwise equals to 0. The results stay the same as the main results, which are 
consistent with the hypothesis that there is an inverted-U shaped relation between the 
stringency of bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effects. 
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Table 5.8 Bank regulation and bank SEO announcement effects, controlling the GFC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Activity restriction 
Initial capital 
stringency 
Prompt corrective 
action 
Depositor protection Total regulation 
Bank regulation 1.229 15.260*** 11.331*** 4.188*** 5.615** 
 (1.598) (3.036) (3.439) (2.619) (2.268) 
Bank regulation 
squared -0.239 -12.653*** -10.950*** -5.780*** -3.266*** 
 (-1.203) (-3.570) (-4.334) (-3.296) (-2.779) 
lnTA 0.223*** 0.218*** 0.209*** 0.240*** 0.237*** 
 (2.775) (2.741) (2.627) (2.986) (2.939) 
Equity/total  0.022 0.023 0.021 0.024 0.022 
 (0.531) (0.565) (0.523) (0.587) (0.528) 
Diversification -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.009 
 (-0.647) (-0.451) (-0.435) (-0.744) (-0.682) 
Market run-up -0.019 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 -0.020 
 (-1.156) (-1.420) (-1.359) (-1.376) (-1.263) 
Stock run-up 0.021 0.029 0.024 0.023 0.024 
 (0.972) (1.325) (1.103) (1.061) (1.059) 
Stock volatility -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 (-1.399) (-1.386) (-1.354) (-1.373) (-1.287) 
Inflation 0.031 -0.137 -0.147 -0.184* -0.125 
 (0.323) (-1.457) (-1.564) (-1.821) (-1.264) 
KKZ index 1.962 -1.787 0.158 -0.838 -0.978 
 (1.160) (-1.026) (0.096) (-0.487) (-0.562) 
Economic freedom -0.025 -0.129 -0.073 -0.051 -0.044 
 (-0.291) (-1.518) (-0.876) (-0.623) (-0.538) 
GDP growth 0.217*** 0.143* 0.211*** 0.192** 0.183** 
 (2.704) (1.847) (2.742) (2.512) (2.369) 
constant 0.061 -0.087 0.267 0.078 -0.037 
 (0.151) (-0.221) (0.675) (0.199) (-0.096) 
Time fixed effect -7.793 4.815 -0.418 0.638 -1.916 
Country fixed effect (-1.076) (0.653) (-0.059) (0.093) (-0.269) 
N 1307 1307 1307 1307 1307 
adj. R-sq 0.029 0.042 0.044 0.038 0.037 
Note: This table presents the results of regression analyses of stock price reactions around bank SEOs after controlling the global financial crisis. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) measured over the window (-1, 1) relative to the announcement date, calculated using 
standard event study methodology with the estimation period from -250 days to -10 days.  T-statistics are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered for banks and are presented in brackets. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in Appendix I. N denotes the number of observations. 
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.  
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5.7 Conclusion 
The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in assessing the 
appropriate regulatory reforms. But how does the level of the stringency of bank regulation 
may impact on the announcement effect upon equity issuance announcement is still a 
question. In this regard, and building upon a recent worldwide survey, I examine the effects 
on bank regulation and the announcement effect upon equity issuance announcement.  
Based on the empirical analysis, I find that bank regulation has a significant nonlinear 
relation with the bank issued SEO announcement effects. More specifically, I find an 
inverted U-shaped relation with the security issuance announcement effect. This effect 
increases as the level of bank regulation increases, and then decreases as the level of bank 
regulation continues to increase. Regarding bank regulation, I find in particular that higher 
initial capital stringency, prompt corrective action, depositor protection, and total regulation 
exert a positive impact on the SEO announcement effect at first, but turn to be negative when 
these regulations rise too high. The results imply that the bank regulation can pay a double-
sided role in affecting the stock price reaction to SEO announcements. There are potential 
tradeoffs between the wealth effect of bank issued SEO announcements and bank regulations.  
I use the different timing of the adoption of Basel II framework by different countries 
as a source of exogenous variation to address the endogeneity concern in the regressions. 
The main findings hold. I further find that involuntary bank SEOs are associated with more 
negative SEO announcement effects than their voluntary counterparts, and the stringency of 
the regulation on the source of funds that can be counted as regulatory capital do not have 
any further impact on the announcement effects of these involuntary issuances.  
 
Chapter 6 Conclusions  
6.1 Chapter introduction 
This chapter summarises and concludes this thesis. The chapter begins by presenting an 
overview and summary of this research project in section 6.2, which includes research 
objective, hypotheses, and findings. This is followed in section 6.3 by a discussion of the 
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contributions of the study. The research limitations are highlighted in section 6.4. Finally, 
section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Overview of the thesis 
This thesis carries out an extensive analysis of security announcement effect of 
commercial banks. I focus on the differences in the stock market reactions of convertible 
bonds and SEOs offerings between banks and non-bank firms, and how the stringency levels 
of bank regulation have an impact on the stock price reaction of bank issued equity. Chapter 
3 and chapter 4 focus on the U.S. data, and the third one undertakes a cross-sectional country 
analysis. 
The overarching research question for the first research objective is: is there any 
difference between the stock market reactions of convertible bond offerings between banks 
and non-banks? To address this question, two sets of literature were reviewed: first, the 
literature which directly investigates the theories on why firms issue convertible bond; 
second, the literature on convertible bond announcement effect. The hypothesis is 
formulated with test the abnormal return associated with the announcement of bank issued 
convertible bond comparing with that of non-bank issued convertible. I collect convertible 
bond issuance data between January 1982 and December 2011 and compare the share price 
reaction of convertible bond issuance for U.S. banks into counterpart U.S. non-bank firms. 
The dataset consists of 2,076 convertible issues out of which 88 are by banks and the 
remaining 1988 by non-banks. The abnormal return is measured by using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression, and I calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) by using 
market model within an event study approach. The empirical findings show that banks issued 
convertible bond experience overall 2.889% significantly stronger returns than that of non-
bank institutions. Bank regulation changes increased bank capital requirement and 
encouraged voluntary disclosure, and thus reduced the level of information asymmetry 
between managers and investors, leading to more favourable stock abnormal return upon 
convertible bond offerings for banks than non-banks. These results hold after adjusting for 
a number of firm-, issue-, and market-specific characteristics. 
  In this study, I also find that arbitrageurs’ activity of buying convertible bonds and 
short selling equities induce significant downward pressure on stock price, however, this 
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effect cannot explain the full difference in CARs between banks and non-banks. Further 
research may be extended to conduct a cross-country study to examine the impact of 
different levels of bank regulation on the announcement of security issuance.  
 The second research question formulated to address the second research objective is: 
was: is there any difference between the stock market reactions of SEOs between banks and 
non-banks? Two set of literature is relied on to provide a context for this research objective. 
First, the literature on the SEO announcement effect is reviewed. The second literature 
reviews the evidence with regards to bank security announcement effect. This literature has 
mostly focused on the examination of bank issued SEO announcement effect. The hypothesis 
is centred on the differences between the announcement effect associated with bank and non-
bank issued SEOs. To empirically examine the research question, I examine 375 SEO 
announcements of U.S. banks and compare their announcement returns in relation to those 
of counterpart non-banks from 1982 to 2012. 
 Empirical results of this study are consistent with the results of chapter 3, which bank 
issued securities experience higher announcement effect than non-bank. I find that the 
cumulative difference on abnormal return associated with equity offerings for banks is 0.61 
percent higher than the counterpart non-bank firms. These results are also consistent with 
the hypothesis that bank regulation reveals positive information about banks. First bank 
monitoring regulations limit the behaviour of banks at the time of the SEO; second, there is 
an incentive for banks to avoid excessive risk-taking due to the existence of capital 
regulation; and third, the market perceives that banks may benefit from the government’s 
implicit too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy. Therefore, the market is less likely to assume that 
bank SEOs signal information that the bank is overvalued compared to their non-bank 
counterparts. 
Chapter 5 addresses the third research question how the bank regulation affects bank 
issued SEO announcement effect. This chapter examines the relation between bank 
regulation and the market reaction of associated with bank issued equity announcement. 
Based on the analysis, I find that bank regulation has a significant nonlinear relation with 
the bank issued SEO announcement effects. More specifically, I find an inverted U-shaped 
relation with the security issuance announcement effect. This effect increases as the level of 
bank regulation increases, and then decreases as the level of bank regulation continues to 
increase. Regarding bank regulation, I find in particular that higher initial capital stringency, 
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prompt corrective action, depositor protection, and total regulation exert a positive impact 
on the SEO announcement effect at first, but turn to be negative when these regulations rise 
too high. These results imply that the bank regulation can pay a double-sided role in affecting 
the stock price reaction to SEO announcements. There are potential tradeoffs between the 
wealth effect of bank issued SEO announcements and bank regulations.  
I also use the different timing of the adoption of Basel II framework by different 
countries as a source of exogenous variation to address the endogeneity concern in the 
regressions, and the main findings hold. I further find that involuntary bank SEOs are 
associated with more negative SEO announcement effects than their voluntary counterparts, 
and the stringency of the regulation on the source of funds that can be counted as regulatory 
capital do not have any further impact on the announcement effects of these involuntary 
issuances.  
 
6.3 Contributions 
The findings in this study provide evidence that the bank issued convertible bonds and 
SEOs are associated with higher announcement effects than non-bank firms issued. 
Dutordoir et al. (2014, p.12) suggest that it would be interesting to examine whether the 
financial firms’ choice for convertible securities is merely driven by regulatory concerns 
since these financial firms are often excluded from convertible bond research samples, as is 
common in corporate finance research. To my best knowledge, Janjigian (1987) and De Jong 
et al. (2012) are the only other two studies that report the share price reactions on convertible 
bond offerings in firms within alternative industries, including banks. However, neither 
study focuses on commercial banks nor do they provide any explanation of the difference 
between banks and non-banks. This study intends to fill this gap and contribute to the 
literature by exploring whether the share price reaction to convertible bond offerings made 
by U.S. commercial banks is significantly different from that of non-bank firms. 
This study also contributes to the debate on bank regulation regarding whether carefully 
designed regulation/supervision/monitoring boosts investor confidence and significantly 
reduces firm equity issuing costs in terms of announcement effects. These results confirm 
the fact discussed in Slovin et al. (1991) that banks are frequent equity issuers, and one of 
the reasons for this frequency may be the lower issuing costs. These results are also 
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consistent with the previous literature, which documents significantly higher announcement 
effects of SEOs by another highly regulated utility industry (Smith, 1986). 
This study contributes to the literature by extending Polonchek et al. (1989), who find 
that the mean abnormal returns of bank SEO announcements are higher than those of non-
bank counterparts. The limitations of Polonchek et al. (1989), however, are that it covers the 
period (1975-1984) before the adoption of Basel I in 1988 and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. These important regulation changes 
should have a significant effect on the stock market behaviour of bank SEOs. The 2007-09 
financial crisis may also change the investors’ perception of firm/bank SEO announcement. 
Their relatively small sample also suggests that their findings are not conclusive. For 
example, there are merely 41 equity event announcements in Polonchek et al. (1989), and 
the researchers themselves admit that “the sample sizes involved in this study are necessarily 
small” (p.449). Another recent study on U.K. rights issues between 1988 and 1998 by Iqbal 
(2008) finds less negative stock market reactions in the rights offerings by financial firms 
compared with industrial firms. However, both studies’ findings are based solely on the 
comparison of the mean values of the cumulated abnormal return (CAR) over the SEO 
announcement window and ignore the differences in other characteristics between banks and 
non-banks. These characteristics are important in determining the differences in CARs 
between banks and non-banks if any. For example, banks that issue SEOs are generally 
larger than non-banks, and the different stock market reactions to the announcement of SEOs 
may simply be caused by the differences in size between banks and non-banks. 
This study also complements to the strand of literature that studies the determinants of 
the announcement effects of bank SEOs. For example, Wansley and Dhillon (1989) find 
negative announcement effects from the issuance of common stock, the magnitude of which 
is similar to that found in the previous literature for utilities and smaller than that of industrial 
firms. Keeley (1989) documents a more negative announcement effect for involuntary bank 
stock issues than voluntary ones during the period 1975-1986, whereas Cornett and 
Tehranian (1994), on the contrary, find that involuntary equity issuance does not convey any 
signal of the firm’s future prospects. Krishnan et al. (2010) find that both undercapitalised 
and well-capitalised banks have a significantly negative mean abnormal return around SEO 
announcements, indicating that investors do not perceive these two types of banks as 
economically different. 
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Finally, the findings suggest that there is an inverted U-shaped non-linear relationship 
between the stringency of bank regulation and bank issued SEO announcement effect. In 
this study, I consider the impact of the extent of the stringency of bank regulation on SEO 
announcement effect and focus only on banking industry across the world. To my best 
knowledge, this study is the first empirical analysis of the relationship between bank 
regulation and the announcement effect associated with bank issued equity.  
This study also has timely implications to the current debate over bank regulation. It 
examines the stock market’s reactions to bank SEO announcement across countries with 
different bank regulation environments and shows that the relation between bank regulation 
and the SEO announcement effect is more complex than previous literature would suggest. 
Though the work does not examine the total benefits and costs of bank regulation to the real 
economy, the results do indicate that over-regulation is harmful to bank’s equity issuing cost 
in terms of SEO announcement effects.  Given that reducing firm’s financial constraints is 
important for the whole economy, countries with highly stringent regulation should rethink 
and redesign their regulatory systems. 
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Appendix 1: Variables definition 
 
Variable name Classification Description 
CAR Firm-specific The cumulative abnormal return over the three-day event window (-1,1) from one day before to one day 
after the SEO announcement date 
Bank Firm-specific 1 for commercial banks, 0 otherwise 
Bid-ask-spread Firm-specific 
The average daily bid-ask spread, scaled by the stock price, over the 250 trading days prior to the 
announcement date 
Capital expenditure Firm-specific Dummy variable equals to 1 if the issuer uses the proceeds of convertible bond for capital expenditure, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Diversification Firm-specific The ratio of non-interest income over total operating income 
Equity/total assets Firm-specific Total equity divided by total assets. It is the sum of common equity, preferred stock, minority interest, 
long-term debt, non-equity reserves and deferred tax liability in untaxed reserves. For insurance 
companies, policyholders' equity is also included 
lnTA Firm-specific Natural logarithm of total assets denominated in US dollar 
Involuntary Firm-specific Dummy variable equals to 1 if the bank SEO issued when either one of the bank's capital ratio, equity to 
assets ratio, tier 1 capital ratio or total capital ratio is less than the government's requirement, and 0 
otherwise. 
Share turnover Firm-specific Trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding 
Stock return volatility Firm-specific Annualized stock return volatility, calculated from daily returns over the window (-250, -10) relative to 
the convertible bond announcement date 
Stock run-up Firm-specific Stock return over the window (-60, -2) relative to the announcement date 
Arbitrage risk Issue-specific The residual variance, expressed as a squared percentage of the market model OLS regression residual 
estimated over the 250 trading days before the announcement date 
Cbarbitrage Issue-specific 
I scale the change in monthly short interest by the number of shares outstanding measured on trading 
day -20 relative to the announcement date, then regress this ratio on potential determinates of 
convertible arbitrageur's interest in that particular convertible bond offering. The predicted value of this 
regression for each convertible bond issue is arbitrage demand. 
Conversion Premium Issue-specific Conversion premium of the convertible, expressed as a percentage. It is calculated by dividing the 
conversion price by the stock price measured on trading day -5, and subtracting one from this ratio. 
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Firm commitment Issue-specific Dummy variable equals to 1 for equity issued as a firm commitment (the entire issue is sold directly to 
the underwriter), and 0 otherwise (eg. best efforts). 
Inverse elasticity Issue-specific The natural log transformation of the absolute value of the daily raw return divided by the daily 
turnover, averaged over 250 trading days before the announcement date 
Maturity Issue-specific Convertible bond maturity measured as the issue date 
Market-to-book ratio Issue-specific Market value divided by the book value of common equity 
Porceeds/total assets Issue-specific Relative size of the convertible bond/equity offerings, calculated as the offering proceeds divided by 
total assets 
Rule 144A Issue-specific 1 for offerings made under SEO Rule 144A, and 0 otherwise 
Secondary Issue-specific 1 for shares being sold by existing shareholders, 0 otherwise 
Rule 415 shelf Issue-specific 1 if equity offering was shelf registered, 0 otherwise 
Market volatility Market-specific Annualized market return volatility, calculated from daily returns on the S&P 500 index over the 
window (-240, -40) relative to the security announcement date 
Market run-up Market-specific Return on S&P 500 index over the window (-60, -2) relative to the announcement date 
Economic freedom Country-specific An index based on trade freedom, business freedom, investment freedom, and property rights (ranging 
from 1 to 5). Calculated as 6 minus the economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation. 
GDP growth Country-specific The exports, government spending, retail expenditures, and inventory levels. 
Inflation Country-specific The ratio of nominal GDP to the real GDP 
KKZ Country-specific An indicator of the quality of institutional development in the country. Calculated as the average of six 
indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law, and control of corruption. Greater values signify better institutional environment. 
Year crisis   1 for equity issued during year 2007 to year 2009, 0 otherwise 
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Appendix 2 Measure for arbitrage-related short selling 
Although I do not have direct data on convertible bond arbitrage activity in individual 
issues, I am able to identify firms and dates on which I know that initial arbitrage positions 
are taken: convertible bond issuance dates. Following by Duca et al., (2012), I construct a 
measure for the amount of arbitrage-related short selling associated with each convertible 
bond offering, to test the arbitrage explanation for differences in convertible bond 
announcement returns of bank and non-bank industry respectively. Firstly, I download 
monthly short interest data from the Datastream database during the sample period January 
1982 to December 2011. To match short interest data to convertible bond issues, I apply the 
algorithm used by Bechmann (2004) and Choi et al. (2009). If a bond is issued before the 
cutoff trade date of a given month (three trading days prior to the 15th of each month), I 
match the issue date with the short interest data filed for that month. Otherwise, I match the 
issue date with the short interest data for the following month. I scale the change in monthly 
short interest (∆SI) by the number of shares outstanding (SO) measured on trading day -20 
relative to the announcement date.  Using ∆SI as a proxy for arbitrage activity has several 
advantages over using hedge fund databases to estimate convertible bond arbitrage activity. 
First, this provides a measure of positions taken by arbitrageurs in individual securities. Fund 
flows data in hedge fund databases are self-reported and therefore provide an incomplete 
measure of convertible bond arbitrage activity. The databases only partially represent the 
hedge fund universe, with many large funds choosing not to participate. Second, there can 
be style misclassification and funds reporting multiple strategies to hedge fund databases. 
Third, even if I measured the assets of the funds perfectly, the positions would still be 
unobservable due to the use of leverage. 
As argued by Choi et al. (2009), part of the observed increase in short interest around 
convertible bond offerings may be attributable to the short-selling actions of fundamental 
traders. Secondly, I isolate the portion of the ∆SI/SO measure that can effectively be 
attributed to short selling by convertible arbitrageurs by regressing ∆SI/SO on potential 
determinants of convertible arbitrageurs’ interest in that particular convertible offering. I 
take the predicted value of this regression for each convertible bond issue as a measure for 
the change in short interest caused by arbitrage-related short selling for that convertible bond. 
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 I expect convertible arbitrageurs to be more interested in issuers with more liquid 
shares (since high liquidity makes it easier for them to obtain their hedging positions), with 
no dividend pay-outs (since dividends represent a cash outflow for short sellers, and with 
more volatile stock returns (since volatility positively affects the option value of the 
convertible, thus allowing a higher potential profit). I therefore consider the Amihud (2002) 
measure for illiquidity, a dummy variable equal to one for convertible bond issuers that paid 
out a dividend in the previous fiscal year, the percentage of institutional ownership (obtained 
from Thomson Reuters), and the issuer’s stock return volatility as potential issuer-specific 
determinants of the arbitrage demand for convertible bond offerings. 
Moreover, I expect arbitrageurs’ interest in a convertible bond issue to be affected 
by the characteristics of the offering itself. I predict a larger increase in arbitrage-related 
short interest around offerings for which arbitrageurs need to short-sell a larger number of 
shares to hedge their positions. I therefore include the ratio of DeltaNeutral to shares 
outstanding (SO), with DeltaNeutral representing the expected number of shares shorted by 
arbitrageurs following a delta-neutral hedging strategy. The typical convertible bond 
arbitrage strategy employs delta-neutral hedging, and consists of two parts. The arbitrageur 
initially buys the convertible bond and sells short the underlying equity at the current delta. 
Next, if the price of the stock increases, the arbitrageur adds to the short position because 
the delta has increase. Similarly, when the stock price declines, the arbitrageur buys stock 
due to the decrease in delta. Although deltaneutral hedging represents the “bread-and-butter” 
strategy of convertible arbitrageurs (Calamos, 2003), arbitrage funds may also follow 
directional hedging strategies in which they short sell slightly more or less than what would 
be required under a deltaneutral hedge (Calamos, 2003; Fabozzi et al., 2009). Consistent 
with Fabozzi et al. 2009), I define GammaBear (GammaBull) as the number of shares 
expected to be shorted under a bearish (bullish) gamma hedging strategy in which 
arbitrageurs short well delta plus (minus) 0.09 at issuance. The bearish gamma hedge yields 
a small profit when stock prices decrease, and the bullish gamma hedge yields a small profit 
when stock prices increase. I also expect arbitrageurs’ interest to be positively influenced by 
the convertible debt gamma. Gamma captures the sensitivity of the convertible’s delta with 
respect to changes in the underlying stock price. A convertible with a high gamma offers 
dynamic hedging opportunities more frequently, thus allowing the possibility of higher 
returns (Calamos, 2003). Finally, I expect arbitrageurs to be more interested in zero-coupon 
convertibles. The reason is that paying no coupons makes it easier to separate the option 
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component of the convertible from its fixed-income component, which is a technique often 
applied by convertible arbitrage hedge funds.  
Calculation of DeltaNeutral, GammaBear, and GammaBull 
 DeltaNeutral represents the number of shares expected to be shorted by arbitrageurs, 
under the assumption that arbitrageurs follow a delta-neutral hedging strategy. In line with 
De Jong et al. (2011), I calculate this variable as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 × 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
           
 (6) 
I calculate the number of convertibles issued by dividing the offering proceeds by 
the face value of the convertible (both obtained from SDC). Delta represents the sensitivity 
of the convertible bond value to its underlying common stock value. In line with Burlacu 
(2000), Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2007), and Loncarski et al. (2009), I calculate delta as 
follows: 
  
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 =  𝑒−𝛿𝑇𝑁 {
ln (
𝑆
𝑋) + ( 𝑟 −  𝛿 +  
𝜎2
2  ) 𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
} 
                                   (7) 
With 𝛿 the continuously-compounded dividend yield (obtained from DataStream database), 
N(.) the cumulative probability under a standard normal distribution, S the stock price on 
trading day -5 relative to the announcement data (obtained from DataStream database), X 
the conversion price (obtained from SDC), r the yield on a 10-year US Treasury Bond 
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measured on the issue date (obtained from Datastream), 𝜎 the stock return Volatility and T 
the convertible bond Maturity (both measured as outlined in Appendix 1, table 1). 15 
Arbitrageurs may also exploit the convertible’s gamma to obtain incremental profits. 
Gamma measures the sensitivity of the convertible’s delta to underlying stock price 
movements. In line with Fabozzi et al. (2009), I calculate gamma as: 
𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎 =  𝑒−𝛿𝑇𝑁′(𝑑1) =  𝑒
−𝛿𝑇  
𝜑 {
ln (
𝑆
𝑋) +  ( 𝑟 −  𝛿 +  
𝜎2
2  ) 𝑇 
𝜎√𝑇
}
𝑆𝜎√𝑇
 
           
 (8) 
With 𝜑 the probability distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and all other 
parameters defined as in the context of Eq. (2). Consistent with Fabozzi et al. (2009), I 
consider a bearish gamma strategy in which arbitrageurs buy the convertible and short-sell 
delta plus 0.09, and a bullish gamma strategy in which they buy convertible and short-sell 
delta minus 0.09. I calculated GammaBear and GammaBull values using Eq. (1), but 
replacing delta with delta plus 0.09 and delta minus 0.09, respectively.
                                                 
15 As argued in Zabolotnyuk et al. (2010), a potential disadvantage of delta is that it does not capture convertibility and 
callability characteristics. As such, delta provides as incomplete measure for the equity component size of convertibles. 
However the purpose of the delta measure included in the DeltaNeutral variable is to replicate the inputs that are actually 
used by arbitrageurs in their hedging strategy. Calamos (2003) argues that arbitrageurs base their hedging on a delta 
measure analogous to the one defined in Eq. (7), so I conclude that it is appropriate to use this measure as an input in 
DeltaNeutral. 
153 
 
        Appendix 3 Correlation matrix 
 
  
Correlation matrix for chapter 3 
  
CAR lnTA 
Proceeds/Tot
al Assets 
Equity/Total 
Assets 
Maturity 
Stock 
Run-up 
Market 
Run-up 
Stock  
Return 
Volatility 
Market 
Volatility 
Opacity Rule144A CBarbitrage 
CAR 1            
lnTA -0.0881* 1           
Proceeds/Total Assets -0.0116 -0.5188* 1          
Equity/Total Assets -0.0681* -0.1140* 0.2125* 1         
Maturity 0.0747* 0.0204 -0.1088* -0.0512* 1        
Stock Run-up -0.0824* -0.1910* 0.1057* -0.0231 -0.0703* 1       
Market Run-up -0.000 0.0421 0.0046 -0.0044 -0.0991* 0.2446* 1      
Stock Volatility -0.0332 -0.3989* 0.0799* -0.1044* -0.0329 0.5469* -0.0142 1     
Market Volatility -0.0729* 0.0899* -0.1118* -0.0845* -0.013 0.2011* 0.0962* 0.4424* 1    
Opacity -0.0540* 0.5554* -0.4415* -0.0543* 0.029 -0.1237* 0.0381 -0.2271* 0.0413 1   
Rule144A -0.1623* 0.2741* 0.0969* 0.1670* -0.1212* 0.0323 -0.0092 -0.1373* 0.0161 0.1371* 1  
CBarbitrage -0.0649 0.2205* -0.0309 0.0657 0.0161 -0.4140* -0.0071 -0.7346* -0.3043* 0.1026* 0.1471* 1 
Notes: This table reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in Appendix 1 The *represent 5% 
significance level.  
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Correlation matrix for chapter 4 
  
CAR Secondary 
Rule415 
shelf 
Share 
turnover 
lnTA 
Proceeds 
ratio 
Equity/Total 
assets 
Stock run-
up 
Stock 
return 
volatility 
Market 
volatility 
Market 
run-up 
Year crisis 
Firm 
commitment 
Capital 
expenditure 
Inverse 
elasticity 
Arbitrage 
risk 
Bid-
ask-
spread 
CAR 1                 
Secondary 0.0830* 1                
Rule415 shelf 0.0684* 0.5522* 1               
Share turnover -0.0118 -0.2334* -0.3000* 1              
lnTA 0.0649* -0.1021* -0.1368* 0.0681* 1             
Proceeds/total assets -0.0775* -0.0677* 0.0186 0.0926* -0.5879* 1            
Equity/Total assets -0.0417* -0.0032 -0.0134 0.0863* -0.5013* 0.3203* 1           
Stock run-up -0.1051* -0.1145* -0.1106* 0.1483* -0.0571* 0.1792* 0.1327* 1          
Stock volatility -0.0916* 0.0369* 0.1986* 0.0272 -0.3731* 0.2980* 0.1662* 0.2514* 1         
Market volatility -0.0420* -0.0225 0.1220* 0.0117 0.1716* -0.0928* -0.1251* 0.1549* 0.4625* 1        
Market run-up 0.0155 -0.1464* -0.1829* 0.1024* 0.0118 0.0352* 0.0184 0.3613* 0.0274 0.0961* 1       
Year crisis -0.0471* -0.0802* 0.1085* 0.0158 0.1153* -0.0440* -0.0908* 0.0559* 0.2486* 0.4592* 0.0416* 1      
Firm commitment -0.0472* -0.4526* -0.7633* 0.2919* 0.0156 0.0463* 0.0703* 0.0908* -0.1623* -0.1458* 0.1739* -0.1067* 1     
Capital expenditure -0.0674* -0.3770* -0.0886* 0.0545* 0.0302* 0.1000* 0.0227 0.0913* 0.0900* 0.1539* 0.0505* 0.1908* 0.0647* 1    
Inverse elasticity -0.0547* 0.0881* 0.1921* -0.1565* -0.4445* 0.2205* 0.0714* -0.0248 0.2842* -0.0046 -0.0291* 0.0556* -0.1285* 0.0448* 1   
Arbitrage risk -0.0972* 0.0564* 0.1762* 0.0404* -0.5421* 0.3836* 0.2548* 0.2433* 0.9089* 0.2846* -0.0229 0.1577* -0.1213* 0.0549* 0.3577* 1  
Bid-ask-spread -0.0376* 0.0181 0.0789* -0.0580* -0.3415* 0.1441* 0.0392* -0.0339* 0.1857* -0.0246 -0.0288 0.0121 -0.0331* -0.0139 0.6676* 0.2437* 1 
Notes: This table reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in Appendix 1. * represents the significance at  5% significance level 
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Correlation matrix for chapter 5 
 CAR 
Activity 
restriction 
Initial 
capital 
stringen
cy 
Prompt 
correcti
ve 
action 
Depositor 
protection 
Total 
regulatio
n 
Total 
assets 
Equity/tot
al assets 
Diversificatio
n 
Market 
runup 
Stock 
runup 
Stock 
return 
volatilit
y 
Involunt
ary Inflation KKZ 
Econo
mic 
freedo
m 
GDP 
growth 
CAR 1                 
Activity 
restriction 0.01 1                
Initial capital 
stringency -0.13* -0.04 1               
Prompt 
corrective 
action -0.08* 0.17* 0.30* 1              
Depositor 
protection -0.12* -0.04 0.65* 0.41* 1             
Total 
regulation -0.14* -0.16* 0.84* 0.38* 0.95* 1            
Total assets 0.08* -0.20* 0.04 -0.22* -0.00 0.04 1           
Equity/total 
assets 0.02 0.14* 0.06* 0.16* 0.10* 0.08* -0.18* 1          
Diversificatio
n 0.02 -0.19* -0.10* -0.33* -0.12* -0.10* 0.37* -0.17* 1         
Market runup 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.11* 0.06* 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 1        
Stock runup -0.03 0.02 -0.07* 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07* 0.12* 0.02 0.52* 1       
Stock return 
volatility -0.07* 0.07* 0.37* 0.34* 0.42* 0.43* -0.10* 0.20* -0.23* 0.12* 0.02 1      
Involuntary -0.07* -0.16* -0.01 -0.20* -0.09* -0.05 0.32* -0.36* 0.15* -0.03 -0.02 -0.19* 1     
Inflation 0.11* 0.18* -0.53* -0.10* -0.32* -0.45* -0.11* 0.09* -0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.19* -0.21* 1    
KKZ index -0.10* -0.16* 0.54* 0.11* 0.27* 0.41* 0.16* -0.00 -0.02 -0.06* -0.07* 0.27* 0.10* -0.60* 1   
Economic 
freedom -0.09* -0.03 0.58* 0.31* 0.40* 0.50* 0.05 0.12* -0.19* -0.04 -0.07* 0.46* -0.10* -0.50* 0.87* 1  
GDP growth 0.16* -0.04 -0.57* -0.07* -0.40* -0.49* -0.11* -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.07* -0.34* -0.08* 0.51* -0.52* -0.54* 1 
This table reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Detailed definitions of variables can be found in Appendix 1. The *represent 5% significance level. 
